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ABSTRACT 
The Role of Probabili in Indicative and Deontic Conditionals 
Edward J. Sutherland 
Research by Manktelow and Over (1991,1992) suggested that utility, a construct usually 
associated with the separate discipline of decision-making research, played a role in 
mediating deontic reasoning. This research added to a growing feeling of links between 
decision-making and reasoning. In order to further these links an additional construct from 
decision-making research was applied to reasoning: probability. 
Initial experiments considered the role of probability in indicative conditionals, and found 
evidence to support the use of probability by participants on tasks such as this. The task 
used was Wason's (1966,1968) four-card selection task, although this task was revised in 
order to facilitate the use of probabilistic information in the task. This resulted in the 
introduction of the Large Array Selection Task (LAST). 
Following these initial findings a move was made to the realm of deontic reasoning. Deontic 
reasoning is a form of practical reasoning about actions, reasoning about what actions one 
should, ought or may perform. The task used here was a revised version of Cheng and 
Holyoak's (1985) immigration task employing the LAST. 'Mese results showed a large effect 
of probability on deontic reasoning. Finally a set of computer experiments were run which 
presented participants with probabilistic information, and demonstrated that participants 
could extract probabilistic information from the data presented to them. 
The interpretation of these results considers current theories of both indicative and deontic 
reasoning, and the mental models approach of Johnson-Laird and Bytne (1991) is favoured 
here. This theory can account for the findings presented whereas alternative theories made 
predictions that were not supported by the data presented in this thesis. Finally there is a 
discussion of future research including a need to research the role of probability in other 
related tasks, such as deontic statements involving threats and promises, as well as looking at 
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1.1 Thinkin and ReasoqLng 
1.1.1 Human Thought - Its Nature 
It has been claimed that the one thing that distinguishes humans from the test of the 
animal kingdom is the fact that we are rational beings (Garnham & OakhiX 1994). We are 
constantly engaged in thought processes of some kind, and these can vary tremendously in 
their nature, structure and purpose. The opening section of this thesis will attempt to 
consider the various ways in which we use our thought processes, and how we apply 
different modes of thought to different goals in out thinking. 
Johnson-Laird (1988, pp. 220) attempted to present 'a taxonomy of thought'. This structure 
moves through various ways of thinking including daydreaming, calculation, creation and 
two forms of reasoning: inductive and deductive. Ilese two forms of reasoning are of 
central importance to our existence as humans. As Johnson-Laird points out they can lead 
to an increase in semantic information (only in the case of inductive reasoning), they are 
involved in our goal of increasing understanding, adding to out existing knowledge base, in 
order to gain a fiffl comprehension of our environment. Our thinking impinges on every 
action in which we are involved: problem solving, reasoning, creativity, and daydreaming. It 
is therefore clear that an understanding of thinking generally, and reasoning specifically is 
central to a full understanding of human psychology. 
Thus, it is of no surprise that psychologists have concerned themselves with understanding 
human thinking. The study of human thought processes dates back over 2,000 years to 
Aristotle (Audi, 1989) and is still of interest to many modern cognitive psychologists, 
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cognitive scientists and philosophers. Ile purpose of the introductory chapter of this thesis 
is to address the history of research into human thinking, although special consideration 
will be placed on deductive reasoning, and wid-tin this field conditional reasoning as it is the 
form of reasoning to be considered in the present research programme. 
1.1.2 Historical Perspectives on Reasoning Research 
In order for the current research to be understood fiffly, it is imperative that a fiffl and clear 
outline of the history of reasoning research be given. It is in the opening chapters of this 
thesis that this shaU be done. This review wiU begin with the importance of reasoning to 
human life and the history of reasoning research, foHowed by the patterns of performance 
observed, and finaUy consider some of the theories that have been offered to account for 
these pattems. 
It is clear that life as we know it now would be as nothing without the ability to reason 
clearly about the world around us. However, the majority of reasoning that we engage in 
everyday seems to occur unconsciously, and we draw our inferences without knowingly 
being occupied in reasoning. For example, if we go to visit out parents, and the car is not in 
the drive, then we conclude that they are not at home, given that we know that the car is 
not at the garage etc. This is not a deduction that we reaRy think about making, or have to 
work at to draw. We apply our world knowledge to the situation and make the above 
deduction, even though if one actually considers the rules that have been applied, and the 
reasoning that is involved, then one realises how amazing the abilities of human reasoning 
are. 
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Without the ability to draw inferences such as this, everyday conversation would be almost 
impossible (Manktelow and Over, 1990). For someone to tell a story or give instructions 
requires the listener to reason clearly. Without this ability such everyday activities would be 
almost impossible. Not only must the listener make inferences from the information that 
they are given, but the person who is giving the instructions is also aware of the inferences 
that the other person is able to draw, and will adjust the information that they give. For 
example, when speaking to a child then one does not expect the listener to draw many 
inferences. Consequently one tends to give the child all the necessary information to carry 
out the required task, whereas when speaking to an adult who knows the task well only the 
barest information need be given to the listener. 
Therefore, it is clear that reasoning plays a huge role in the lives of everybody, the way we 
speak, the way we act, and the way that other people react to us. However, it is important 
to note here that there are different kinds of reasoning, as mentioned earlier: deductive 
reasoning, and inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is the one that concerns this 
thesis, and inductive reasoning will be dealt with only briefly. Deductive reasoning is a form 
of reasoning that does not add any finther information to that which has already been 
given. A deductive inference is one that draws out a conclusion that is latent, or implicit in 
the information given. The conclusion that is drawn is not a trivial one, but one that has 
not been explicitly stated already, but which assumes nothing outside of the information 
given in the ptemises. 
Iberef6te, it is important now to look at the research that has been carried out by cognitive 
psychologists into the area of human deductive reasoning. 'Men to consider some of the 
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theories which have been offered as an explanation for the phenomena which have been 
found, and also some of the shortcomings of these theories. 
1.2 Reasoning Research 
1.2.1. Introduction to research 
As was discussed briefly above, there are various forms of thinking and reasoning, and 
these A serve a different purpose for humans, and many of these thought processes have 
been investigated in the psychology laboratory. The purpose of this section is to present a 
brief overview of the research into thinking and reasoning, considering the various modes 
of thought and some of the methods employed to study them. 
1.2.2. Inductive Reasonfting 
Inductive inferences do not necessarily foRow from the information with which we have 
been presented, or more specificaRy, they are non-logical infermces (Stevenson, 1993). 
Induction plays a major role in everyday life; induction is a form of thought that has a 
precise goal (as opposed to creation), and yet unlike deduction, induction leads to an 
increase in semantic information: that is some information that was not present in the 
premises. There is a lot of work involved in induction, although it seems that people are 
remarkably unaware that they are involved in such a complex mental process Gohnson- 
Laird) 1988). However, it is an essential part of human thinking, as we do not often have all 
the information that we need to draw the conclusions that we would like to. Consequently 
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we must assume some information, and this is where the role of probability comes into the 
equation, and it is this that is the major concern of this thesis. 
For example, making an inference from a generalisation to a particular case, all swans are 
white, therefore this swan is white, is a deductive inference. However, the reverse process 
of this, which is empirical generalisation, is a classic case of everyday induction; thus we 
would reason inductively thus, "All the cats I have seen have tails, therefore, this cat has a 
tail" (see Stevenson, 1993). Generalisations such as this are, logically speaking, unsound, 
because the person drawing this conclusion will not have seen all the cats in the world. The 
classic example being that they may never have seen a Manx cat, which does not have a tail, 
and so the conclusion is not based on a full set of information. However, inductions are 
still an essential part of our thinking in the everyday world. Inductive inferences are 
informative to humans, although they are not guaranteed to be true. Ihe fact that 
inductions are not guaranteed to be true is part of their intrinsic nature. They are plaujible 
given out knowledge of the world, we bring some of our beliefs to bear on the premises 
with which we have been presented in order to make an inference which we believe is likely 
given what we know about the world. 
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1.2.3. Deductive ReasonLng 
Deduction is distinct from induction in that deductions are logicaUy necessary. This means 
that a deductive inference follows from the information in the premises. For example: 
All Men are mortal 
Socrates was a man 
. '. Socrates was mortal 
The example given above is known as a syllogism, and is one of the most studied forms of 
deducdve reasoning performance in humans (see Garnham and OakhiU, 1994). Syllogistic 
reasoning will be considered briefly below. The important point to note from this example 
is that the information about Socrates and mortality has been inferred from the information 
in the premises. lhus deductive reasoning is based around forms of lqgic. Logic represents a 
competence theory, that is how people nvuld think if they never made mistakes, it is not a 
performance theory of how people trally perform when engaging in deductive thought 
processes (Gatnham and Oakhill). A central concept for consideration throughout this 
thesis then is logic and its relationship to human deduction. 
It is important to note here that logic is concerned with the validity of conclusions, not 
whether they are true or not. A conclusion can be true and not valid, not true and valid, 
true and valid, and finally untrue and invalid. When psychologists study human reasoning 
they are concerned with whether participants conform to the dictates of formal logic or 
not. For example, participants are asked what conclusions follow (generation task) or 
whether a given conclusion follows (evaluation task). The responses given by participants 
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are then compared to the valid conclusions as dictated by logic, and the participant is 
judged correct or not accordingly (see Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993; Manktelow, 1999, 
for a detailed discussion of syllogistic reasoning). 
This section has dealt briefly with the nature of deduction in general terms, and used 
syllogistic reasoning as an example. As will be discussed below humans display a wide 
variety of performances on deductive reasoning tasks, and numerous factors can have an 
effect on their reasoning performance. Attention wiU now be turned to the specific area of 
conditional reasoning, as this is the form of deduction with which this thesis is concerned. 
1.2.4 Conditional Reasoning. 
It is important that attention is turned to studies of conditional reasoning, in order to gain 
some insight into the level of reasoning competence that exists in humans. In order to do 
this a review of research literature displaying typical patterns of reasoning behaviour will be 
presented. In order to place this research in context in is necessary to consider the nature of 
conditional reasoning itself, what it is, what the associated inferences are, and finally to 
examine some of the findings of research on conditional reasoning. 
Conditional reasoning is reasoning concerned with the logical connective 'if .. then' (see 
Howson, 1997 for a brief discussion of the conditional in logic). Initially conditionals will 
be considered in their abstract form, to Mustrate the inferences associated with them. For 
example: 
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If p then q The conditional statement. 
P Additional information regarding one of the components of the conditional. 
An inference can then be drawn. 
With conditionals there are four classical inferences to consider: two of which are valid, and 
two of which are invalid. Ihe valid inferences shall be considered fitst. Given the following 
prenuses: 
If p then q 
p 
It is possible to detive q. 11is rule is called modus ponens (MP), this is an easy inference to 
draw, as can be seen from the regularity with which both adults and children draw or 
endorse the inference (Wildman and Fletcher, 1977). The second valid inference that can 
be drawn with conditionals is the modus tollens VI) inference. Given the premises: 
If p then q 
not-q 
It is possible to derive not-p. This is a harder inference to draw, and is drawn or endorsed 
less frequently than the MP inference above (Wildman and Fletcher, 1977). As mentioned 
earlier there are two invalid inferences that can be drawn with conditionals, namely 
affirmation of the consequent (AC) and denial of the antecedent (DA). Affirmation of the 
consequent is as foRows: 




This is an invalid argument form, however, it is commonly endorsed by participants in 
laboratory studies (Evans, 1977). The final inference to be examined here is denial of the 
antecedent: 
If p then q 
Not-p 
. '. Not-q 
As with the AC inference drawing or endorsement rates of this inference is reasonably 
high, despite its being invalid. The validity of inferences can be assessed via logical truth 
tables. Ihe truth table for conditional statements is given below: 
Table 1.1 Truth table for conditional statement if p then _q 





T= True F= False 
Table 1.1 displays the truth-values for the conditional statement given the truth-values of 
the antecedent and the consequent. It can be seen that in aU cases except where p is true 
and q is false the conditional is true. However, the truth table also allows assessment of the 
validity of argument forms, as outlined above. For the MP inference in cases where If 
then q is true, and p is true (line 1 in table 1.1) it is possible to see that q is true, there is no 
ambiguity, and thus the argument form is valid. For the MT inference it can be seen that 
where the conditional is true and q is false, not-q, Qine 4 in table 1.1) then p is false, with no 
ambiguity. However, if the AC and DA inferences are assessed via truth tables then it is 
clear why they are invalid. Firstly AC: Where the conditional is true, and q is also true Oines 
1 and 3 in table 1.1. ), here p could be true (line 1) or could be false (line 3), thus the 
argument form could lead to ambiguity, and thus is invalid. A similar explanation can be 
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applied to the DA inference. When the conditional is true, and p is false, not-p, (lines 3 and 
4 from table 1.1) q could be either true or false, and thus the argument form is invalid. 
Given that it is clear which of these inferences ate valid, and which of them are invalid, it is 
of interest to see how often participants in conditional reasoning tasks draw or endorse 
valid and invalid conclusions, through laboratory experiments. However, it is important to 
note that conditional staternents can be interpreted in two ways - as the conditional 
described above, or as a biconditional, which is if and only if p then q (this is denoted in 
formal logic as iff, Howson, 1997). Given this interpretation then all four of the inferences 
described above are valid as the biconditional. has a different truth table to that of the 
conditional, but biconditionals are not of interest here. 
Attention will now be turned to empirical studies of conditional reasoning, and how 
frequently participants draw or endorse the four conclusions described above. Firstly, 
Rumain, Connell and Braine (1983): in this study, the researchers considered the 
performance of many different age groups, in order to examine the development of 
conditional reasoning. 
Although Rumain et al. varied the nature of the problems which they presented to their 
participants they are presented here as averaged across these problem types in order to 
Present a mote compact set of results here. 
For adults, the percentages of correct responses, pooled across problem types, were as 
follows: Modus ponens: 92%, denial of the antecedent: 74%, affirmation of the consequent: 
69%, and finally modus tollens: 69%. For children, the percentages of correct responses, 
pooled across problem types, were as follows: Modus ponens: 89%, denial of the 
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antecedent: 40%, affirmation of the consequent: 32%, and finaUy modus toRens: 62%. 
Although results for both adults and children have been given, it is really with the adult 
responses that the review here is mainly concerned. As suggested briefly above there was 
little dffficulty with the MP inference (92/o), whereas the MT (69%) inference was drawn 
less frequently, however, this requires the application of more than one inference rule, 
unlike MP. However, the participants also displayed a tendency to endorse or draw the 
fallacious inferences (DA and AC). Iherefore, although these results show far from perfect 
reasoning performance, they do suggest a reasonably sound level of performance with the 
valid inferences, although there is evidence that the invalid inferences were also supported. 
Although only one study of conditional reasoning has been considered here, it is important 
to note that the findings are typical of the area. Ile participants here found MP an easier 
inference to make then MT. and they also showed an inclination towards endorsing 
faUacious inferences. This is a pattern of performance that can be observed in many studies 
of conditional reasoning (e. g. Kodtoff and Roberge, 1975; Evans, 1977; Wildman and 
Fletcher, 1977). However, there are no definitive figures which can be placed on the 
endorsement rates, because reasoning behaviour can be dramaticaRy influenced by the 
content of the tasks (see Donlinowski, 1995), and these vary from one experiment to 
another. For example some conditionals may invite a biconditional interpretation, and this 
may lead to an increase in DA and AC inferences being made. 
Attention will now be turned to other studies of conditional reasoning in order to provide a 
good understanding of the conditional reasoning abilities of humans, rather than 
considering just the results that are found in only one study of the area. Section 1.2.5 will 
consider how the use of concrete apparatus may aid conditional reasoning performance, if 
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at A Chapter 3 wiH Mustrate clearly the influence of content and context on reasoning 
performance, consequently it is of interest to consider a further study of conditional 
reasoning which looks at conditional reasoning in a different format to that already 
considered. 
1.2.5 Concrete Apparatus. 
The second study that we wiU now consider is that of Markovits (1988). In this study 
Markovits examined participants' performance on a conditional reasoning task using 
concrete apparatus, rather than the traditional paper and pencil tasks that are usually 
presented to participants. The findings from this novel paradigm will then be compared to 
results form the traditional reasoning literature note that Legrenzi, 1970 also used concrete 
apparatus). 
It is important here that we should understand the apparatus that Matkovits used to 
examine conditional reasoning in his participants. 'Me piece of equipment used was known 
as the 'marble game!. Ibis presents the participants with a box on top of which there is a 
row of open-topped containers. Below the box is another identicalrow of containers. Ile 
participants are informed that hidden tubes link each top container to one bottom 
container, although it remains unknown as to which top container is linked to which 
bottom container. The exception to this is a visible tube, which links the two middle 
containers of each row. The participants are told that "if a marble is put in the top middle 
container, it will fall into the middle container on the bottom". which is a verbal 
confirmation of what they can see in front of them. Participants must infer the trajectories 
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which tnatblcs could take from the top middle container, and the trajectory it could take to 
the bottom middle container. 
Three response patterns were previously noted in participants: 
1. Conditional: Ihese are given by participants who consider that the top containers could 
be linked to any of the bottom ones, including the =dddle one (i. e. that the relations are not 
necessarily one-to-one, as clearly indicated by the verbal description given to participants). 
2. Intermediate: These responses ate mainly given by participants who consider that the top 
containers could be linked to any of the bottom ones, and (contrary to the verbal 
description) that the bottom containers could be linked to any of the top ones. 
3. Biconditional: participants who consider that the middle container on the bottom is 
linked only to the middle top container give these responses. 
The participants are then shown two concrete manipulations using the apparatus, the first 
of these is as follows: a marble is placed into the second cup on the top tow, and the 
matble then lands into the second cup on the bottom tow. This manipulation was designed 
to reinforce a one-to-one representation of the apparatus. However, the second of these 
two manipulations gives more important information to the participants. A marble is 
dropped into the fifth cup on the top row, and this reappears in the second cup on the 
bottom row. This was presented to the participants for two reasons, firstly, it clearly shows 
that two different tubes can lead to the same cup, and secondly that it is possible for tubes 
to cross inside the apparatus. 
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Markovits made a number of predictions. Firstly, it was hypothesised that participants 
would not change their response patterns after they were shown the two experimental 
manipulations outlined above, even when the evidence from these manipulations was in 
direct opposition to the previous inferences that participants had made about how the 
apparatus functioned. Secondly, it was suggested that those participants who altered their 
reasoning after being shown the first manipulation would tend to give more biconditional 
responses. Iley believed that the bottom middle container is linked only to the top middle 
container. In addition to this, after the second manipulation, it was suggested that there 
would be an increase in conditional responding: that any of the top containers could be 
linked to any of the bottom ones. The last hypothesis that Markovits proposed was that 
intermediate response patterns are a transition between the two relatively stable response 
patterns represented by conditional and biconditional responses. 1hus he argued that 
participants giving intermediate responses would show the greatest degree of variability in 
their responses after the manipulations had been shown to the participants. 
It is important here to quickly outline the experimental procedure that was used by 
Matkovits in this experiment. The participants were seated near the experimental apparatus, 
and they were told that if a marble was put into the middle cup (cup 3/ top) on the top, 
then it will land in the middle cup on the bottom (cup 3/ bottom). They are then shown 
that this is true by dropping a marble into cup 3 on the top. The subject can see it land into 
cup 3 on the bottom, this is clear to participants, as the link between these two cups is 
visible, whereas all the other tubes are invisible to the participants. 
The participants were then asked the foRowing four questions: 
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1. If a marble is put into Cup 3/ top, where could it go? 
2. If a matble has landed in Cup 3/ bottom, where could it have come from? 
3. If a marble is put into Cup 1/ top, where could it go? 
4. If a marble has landed in Cup 1/ bottom, where could it have come from? 
After being asked these questions the participants were then presented with the two 
experimental manipulations that were outlined above, and then asked the four questions 
again. Response patterns were considered to be conditional if the participants answered all 
the questions correctly, to be biconditional if the answers they gave indicated that they 
believed the only way to get a matble into cup 3/ bottom was to go via the visible tube 
from cup 3/ top. AU other response patterns were considered to be intermediate. 
The results from these experiments showed that some of the participants did make the 
changes to their reasoning, as was hypothesised by Markovits. SpecificaRy, participants did 
show more biconditional responses to the task after the first manipulation, when compared 
to their initial responses and fewer such responses after the second manipulation. It is 
interesting to note that 64% of the participants showed stability across the three trials, that 
is that they did not alter their initial choice to something else. 
The results here are also interesting in that they serve to highlight that participants are 
reticent to change any decisions that they may have made on the basis of incoming 
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empirical data. Yet, as Evans, Newstead and Byme (1993) point out, it shows a reasonable 
level of reasoning competence. Markovits' experiment is interesting in that it allows 
participants to change their answers after seeing the apparatus work, although the majority 
chose not to alter their answers. 
The results of Markovits' (1988) experiments are in keeping with other conditional 
-reasoning research 
in that participants display some level of reasoning competence, and yet 
also make errors, and exhibit evidence of a biconditional interpretation on occasions. 
1.3 Theories of Reasonftng., 
Having considered some of the research into human reasoning, it would seem that humans 
have some grasp of reasoning, and yet they do make mistakes, and sometimes these 
mistakes follow a pattern, rather than just occurring randon-dy. Thus, it is now time to 
consider some of the theories that have been put forward to explain human reasoning. 
There ate two main theories that have been proposed here, firstly theories of mental logic, 
these suggest hat the mind contains formal inference rules; and secondly, mental models 
theory as proposed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). Other theories have also been 
presented, namely, Heuristic-Analytic theory (Evans, 1984,1989,1995,1996) Optimal Data 
Selection (Oaksford and Chater, 1994,1995,1996) and the Pragmatic Reasoning Schema 
(PRS) theory of Cheng and Holyoak (1985). PRS theory will be considered in the next 
chapter, and not here, however, mental logic and optimal data selection will now be 
considered here. 
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1.3.1 Mental Logic. 
Mental logic theorists, such as Rips (1983,1994) and Btaine and O'Brien (199 1), argue that 
humans use language based representations, and cognitive processes which are similar to 
natural deduction methods which have been designed by logicians. Thus the basic principle 
of the approach is that is that the mind contains the various inference rules necessary for 
humans to reason their way through the world. 
As noted by Evans et al. (1993) the various theories differ slightly, however, they are 
sufficiently similar to be treated here as a theory type, rather than as the individual theories 
that they are. It should be noted here that the general discussion will consider Braine and 
O'Brien's (1991) theory, and Rips' (1994) theory separately within the context of the results 
reported here. Mental logic theories consist of three basic steps to making an inference: 
1. Firstly reasonets must convert the premises into an abstract logical form. 
2. Secondly, they must retrieve the catalogue of inference rules to construct a mental 
derivation or proof of a conclusion. 
3. Finally, they must convert the content-free conclusion back into the terms of the 
premises. 
For example, the reasoner is presented with the conditional statement: If Oscar is a cat, Then 
he has a tail, and given the additional information that Oscar is a cat. The reasoner, according 
to mental logicians, translates this into an abstract form for example: 
18 
If p, then q. 
p. 
nen according to the second step of making an inference, they call-up the content-free 
rule corresponding to modus ponens, as described above, and construct a proof of the 
conclusion: 
. *. 
Finally, in following the third step of making an inference, the reasoner must translate this 
content free logic form back to the form of the original premises, thus they conclude that: 
Oscar bas a tail 
Another important aspect to mental logic theories is of relevance here, that is that of the 
reasoning program. This component of mental logic controls how the rules are selected, 
modus ponens, in the example given above, and how and when they are applied during the 
reasoning process, and when to move on to the next step of the proof Ultimately, as 
mentioned above, there is the third component that decodes the premises into the logical 
form, and then re-codes the conclusion back into the form of the premises. 
A final point, with regard to the workings of mental logic theories is that of direct and 
indirect reasoning, as proposed by Brain, Reiser and Rufnain (1984), and elaborated by 
Braine and O'Brien (1991). Direct reasoning occurs when rules are matched to the 
propositions in the premises: those that can be applied are applied, and each inference is 
added to the pren-dse set until a conclusion is reached. However, on occasion this direct 
reasoning may fail, and indirect reasoning strategies are applied, such as heuristics, which 
will be covered later. 
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Thus, easy valid inferences ate made by the reasoner applying the corresponding inference 
rule, such as MP. However, this is not the same in the case of difficult valid inferences, as 
they have no corresponding inference rules, like MT, i. e. there is no one rule in logic for 
deriving the MT inference. Reasoners must construct a proof through several steps to infer 
the conclusion. 11us considering the number of steps required and also other factors such 
as how the reasoning program selects the rules required can assess the difficulty of a 
problem. 'Merefore, mental logicians account for the errors that participants make by 
claiming that they make mistakes on these difficult tasks, by not applying the right rules at 
the appropriate times (Braine and O'Brien, 1991; O'Brien, 1993). It has also been argued by 
mental logicians that errors may occur because, although participants may have the rules 
necessary, they have some difficulty in accessing the rules, and thus the result is that 
participants make mistakes (Rips and Conrad, 1983). Finally, there is the claim that 
participants make the errors they do because of a 'failure to accept the logical task! (Henle, 
1962). SpecificaRy, participants tend to endorse conclusions that they find believable rather 
than assessing the validity of them, which is what tasks of logic require participants to do. 
1he outcome of these explanations of errors is that mental logicians claim that it is possible 
to account for both reasoning competence (the application of rules such as MP), and 
reasoning errors (failure to accept the logical task, misapplication of rules, failure to access 
rules). 
Finally, some researchers have put forward various other reasons as to why participants 
show errors on reasoning tasks, such as the comprehension component, which, as 
mentioned above, decodes the logical form of the premises as they are presented to the 
participants. (Evans et al, 1993). Participants may also add an additional premise, such as a 
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common-place assumption that the participants believe to be true in the world, but that is 
not stated in the premises of the task (Evans, 1993). The addition of premises can cause 
changes in reasoning behaviour (Byrne, 1989). The above discussion represents the general 
principles of mental logic theories, it is now important to consider the evidence that exists 
for mental logic. 
Braine et al. (1984), argued that their proposal that the simplest inference problems are 
those which follow directly from the lexical entry is supported by the low rates of errors on 
such tasks. In addition to this they argued that those inferences which require the reasoner 
to make more steps in order to reach a conclusion are more difficult. In order to test this 
they measured task difficulty by requiring participants to rate the difficulty of the task on a 
9-point scale, and combined this with the latencies to solve the problem and the error rates 
on the problems. They found that task difficulty was a function of the number of steps 
required and the number of words in the task. '1he mental logic approach has been 
criticised however, and these criticisms will be addressed below in section 1.3.2. 
1.3.2 Criticisms of Mental Logic. 
Firstly mental logic has been criticised by Cheng and Holyoak (1985) for its inability to 
offer a satisfactory explanation for content effects in reasoning, that is that familiar or 
concrete materials in tasks can greatly alter the correct response rates on tasks (see 
Don-ýinowski, 1995 and Chapter 3 here). Mental logicians have argued that content effects 
can be accounted for in the comprehension component, that is the decoding and re-coding 
section of the theory, and yet this step of the theory remains remarkably unexplained by 
mental logic theorists. (Byrne, 1991; Evans, 1989). Both Braine and O'Brien (1991) and 
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Rips (1994) have suggested that some form of schema, theory (such as Cheng and 
Holyoales, 1985 Pragmatic Reasoning Schema Ibeory) could be applied when the content 
of the task is suitable. 
Johnson-Laird, Byrne and Schaeken (1992) made a further criticism of the mental logic 
view of reasoning. They pointed out that rule theorists cannot explain why Modus Tollens 
is an easier inference to make from a biconditional, than from a conditional, when the same 
number of steps is required in both cases. Mental logic theorists have claimed that as the 
number of steps required to derive a proof increases, so does task difficulty. This idea is 
disputed by the findings of Johnson-Laird et al. (1992). 
Finally, as mentioned above, recent arguments by rule theorists (e. g. Braine and O'Brien, 
1991) have suggested that the inference rules of the n-dnd could be supplemented with 
content-sensitive rules in order to account for some of the data that has been found (e. g. 
Griggs and Cox, 1982; Johnson-Laird, Lcgrenzi and Legrcnzi, 1972; Wason and Shapiro, 
1971). However, this has been ctiticised by Manktelow and Over (1991) who argued that it 
weakens the entire theory on grounds of parsimony and testability. It is also unclear as to 
how this switch from one method of reasoning to another would occur, and what factors in 
the problem type would initiate such a change in the reasoning process. 
Finally, Lowe (1993) has suggested that there is no reason why minds should contain the 
rules of formal logic as many aspects of formal logic have only recently been developed, 
and thus to suggest hat we have been genetically equipped with such rules is outrageous. 
However, O'Brien (1995) has responded to this accusation by stating that he does not claim 
that minds contain formal 'boole logic, but rather abstract rules that concur with logical 
22 
proofs. It is important to note here that Lowe is not criticising only formal logic, but also 
mental models theory (see Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991; and 
Chapter 2 here). Lowe claims that the concept of humans having logic programs is 
'ludicrous' regardless of whether it is in the form of 'natural deduction', or some kind of 
'semantic tableau' (Lowe, 1993, p. 223). 
1.4 Optimal Data Selection 
1.4.1 Introduction to the Theo 
An interesting recent theoretical development has been that of Optimal Data Selection 
(ODS) as proposed by Oaksford and Chater (1994,1995,1996). The theory is based on 
Anderson's rational analysis model of cognition (as applied to categorisation, for example) 
and sees the selection task very differently form other theories of reasoning. Rather than 
considering the selection task as requiring the participants to engage in logical reasoning, in 
some form, as other theories do ODS theory considers that the task requires participants to 
decide between two competing hypotheses. Specifically, these are the dependence model 
(that p and q occur together: q depends on p) and the independence model (p and q are 
independent of each other). 
Oaksford and Chater have argued that the goal for participants when presented with the 
selection task is to reduce their uncertainty about the rule (decide between the two models 
described above). They also argue that the falsificationist view of science (Popper, 1959) is 
outdated, and no longer the dominant view in the philosophy of science, and thus to expect 
falsification by participants on the task (via the selection of the p, and not-q cards) is 
unrealistic. 
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Oaksford and Chater argued that participants reduce their uncertainty about the rule by 
selecting those cards that will be most infortnative in relation to reducing uncertainty about 
the two models. It was argued that initially the two models are seen as equiprobable - they 
both have a probability of . 5. This is then combined with information about the 
ptobabilities of p and q, and thus an estimate of the informadon gain of examining each 
card can then be estimated. Information gain is the difference in uncertainty about the two 
models before and after receiving data - turning a card. Thus beliefs held about the 
probabilities of p and q wiH affect the estimates about which cards wiR contain the most 
information, and this will subsequently influence the cards that are selected. 
When presented with the selection task it is impossible for participants to know what is on 
the unseen side of the cards. 1hus information gain must be calculated for all possible 
alternatives: p and not- p for the q and not cards and q and not-q for the p and not-p cards. 
All that can be calculated then is expected information gain (EIg). Each of the EIg values is 
then scaled against the average value for each card, in order to reflect the perceived 
distinctions between cards, yielding scaled expected information gain or SE(Ig). Thus the 
higher the value of SE(Ig) the more likely the card is to be selected. It is important to note 
here the importance of what Oaksford and Chater call the rarity assumption. This is the 
assumption that p and q are rare (in respect to not-p and not-q respectively). When the 
rarity assumption holds the p and q cards will be the most informative. Subjective 
probabilities can be calculated using Bayes' theorem. 
When SEgg) is calculated for the four cards in the standard task the following order card 
(in terms of SEgg))is revealed: p>q>not-q>not-p. This is the standard order of selections 
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made on the task when presented in it's indicative form (see Chapter Three for details of 
the selection task literature). Thus it appears that participants are behaving in a rational, 
though not logical manner. The theory accounts for thematic task performance (where 
participants do make logical selections) because the rarity assumption is challenged in such 
cases -p or q may now be seen as common rather then rare. As the occurrences of q 
increases so does the information gain of selecting the not-q card, and this is the pattern 
that is observed in versions of the selection task that lead to facilitated performance where 
more not-q cards are selected than in the standard version (see Chapter three). Thus it is 
possible for Oaksford and Chater to offer a rational explanation for the observed 
performance on the selection task in both its indicative and thematic forms. Criticisms of 
this innovative theoretical approach are considered below: 
1.4.2 Criticisms of Optimal Data Selectio 
The exciting theoretical developments described by Oaksford and Chater (1994,1996) has 
attracted a number of criticisms three of which appeared in Psychological review in 1996. 
These criticisms will now be detailed. Lan-dng (1996) has offered a criticism of the 
calculations used by Oaksford and Chater, but Oaksford and Chater have successfully 
rebuffed these critiques. However, Evans and Over (1996a) have offered a more damaging 
criticism. They argued that equating information gain with reduction (on of the central 
principles of the theory) is, in itself misguided. 'Mey argued that there are occasions where 
information could be received that would cause a change in information gain, but would 
not lead to a reduction in uncertainty. For example, if a belief of . 25 was held in a 
hypothesis, then data was received that changed the belief to . 75, uncertainty would not 
have changed (. 25 from an absolute value) and yet there would have been information gain. 
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Thus there is not a direct relationship between information gain and reduction in 
uncertainty. Oaksford and Chater (1996) have accepted this criticism and altered the way 
that changes in belief are calculated, but still leaving the theory intact. However, Evans and 
Over argued that information gain is stiU too narrow a concept by which to capture 
changes in belief and argued that episternic utility is a better measure to use. 
Finally Almor and Sloman (1996) argued that the theory is unable to explain the cases 
where reasoning is facilitated, but that the context is non-deontic, which is sometimes 
observed. However, Oaksford and Chater can counter this by arguing that any version of 
the task which overturns therarity assumption will lead to increased selections of the not-q 
card. Ibis does not necessarily have to be a dcontic version of the task, but any version that 
chaRenges the rarity assumption. 
Having considered mental logic theories of reasoning and the novel approach of optimal 
data selection, attention will now be turned to a theory that is more concerned with 
pragmatic principles than abstract-rule theories. Ile mental models theory Gohnson-Laird, 
1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 1995 though see also Evans, 1993). 
This theory will be discussed separately in Chapter 2 because of the importance that this 
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2.1 A Semantic Theoty of Reasoning 
2.1.1 Chapter Overview 
As has been explained in chapter one in the discussion of inference rule based theories of 
human reasoning, it is necessary for formal inference rule theories to invoke pragmatic 
principles in order to account for some of the phenomena that have been observed in 
empirical studies of human reasoning. However, there ate theories in which pragmatic 
principles are involved more directly: mental models theory Gohnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 1995). Mental models theory is a semantic theory as 
opposed to the syntactic approach of abstract rule theories. 
As with formal inference rule theories in chapter one, the first section of this chapter will 
be concerned with a discussion of mental models theory. 'Me structure of this chapter will 
be as follows: firstly it will outline the basic principles of the theory. Then how the theory 
explains the results of empirical studies of reasoning, along with the evidence that supports 
the theory. FinaUy, the criticisms which have been leveRed at the theory will be addressed, 
as well as and how the proponents of the theory have answered these criticisms, including 
some recent developments and changes to the theory. 
28 
2.2 Mental Models Tht= 
2.2.1. Basic Principles 
Attention will now be turned to mental models theory as proposed by Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (1991). Johnson-Laird and Byrne characterise reasoning in terms of both what the 
mind does when it makes a deduction, and how the mind makes a deduction, based on the 
computadonal / algotidunic levels of M= (1982). 
In terms of what the mind does Johnson-Laird (1983) describes three constraints that 
govern the deductions which people draw from premises that they are given. Johnson-Laird 
states that people's deductions do conform to these constraints, although they may not be 
conscious of these constraints when making a deduction: 
1. People do not throw away semantic information: although a valid deduction does not 
increase semantic information, participants wiH avoid those inferences that decrease 
semantic information. 
2. Conclusions should always be parsimonious: people do not draw any conclusions which 
reassert something which has already been asserted, such trivial conclusions are infinite, and 
thus consideration of them would lead to an overload of working memory (Baddeley and 
Hitch, 1974, Baddeley, 1986) very quickly. 
I Any conclusion that is drawn should be informative: it should contain information that is 
not stated explicitly in the premises. 
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Having considered what the mind does when making a deduction, attention wiU now be 
turned to how the mind makes a deduction. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991), propose that 
the mind does not contain formal inference rules, as proposed by Rips (1983) and Braine 
and O'Brien, (1991), but rather a set of procedures which are used to manipulate mental 
models Gohnson-Laird, 1983). By the term mental models Johnson-Laird refers to a mental 
representation of how the world would be if the premise were true. 
2.2.2 The Structure and Manipulation of Mental Models 
For example, consider again the conditional If Oscar is a cat, then be bas a tail Participants do 
notrepresent mentally any cases where the premise is false, and so for a conditional such as 
this there are three cases where the premise could be true, based on truth tables. 
The three cases that people represent are as follows: 
1. Oscar is a cat hc has a tail 
2. Oscat is not a cat he has a tail 
I Oscar is not a cat he does not have a tail 
Each of these corresponds to a situation in the world, and each separate model is 
represented on a separate line. The case in which it is true that Oscar is a cat but false that 
he has a tail, is false when these two assertions are conjoined by if. Therefore, this case is 
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not represented here, as it is unnecessary (see truth table 1.1 earliet). The theory claims that 
models will represent as little as possible for reasons of cognitive economy. 
However, it is of some discussion as to exactly what the nature of these models is, that is, 
how are they represented in the mind? They may be images, or they may be propositional 
tags (see Pylyshyn, 1973 and Kosslyn, 1994, for a detailed discussion of the imagery 
debate). However, the nature of the models is not the critical point within the theory. What 
is crucial, however, is the structure of the models, and how humans manipulate them in 
order to make deductions. 
In order to reason about the conditional here V wiU be used to represent: 'Oscar is a cae, 
and 'e wiU be used to represent: 'he has a tair, and '--l' is used to represent negation, such 
that '-le means 'does not have a tair. This is the notation used by Johnson-Laird and Byrne 
(1991). Therefore, using this notation, the models that would be constructed, according to 
mental models theory would be as follows: 
Ct gs a cat, has a tail) 
-1c ýs not a cat, has a tail) 
gs not a cat, does not have a tail) 
Further to this, as was mentioned earlier, working memory limitations play a role in the way 
that models are constructed (e. g. Quayle and Ball, 1997). As a result of this, as much 
information as possible is represented implidtly, in the model, for example: 
t ýs a cat, has a tail) 
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Clearly, the top line represents 'is a cae and 'has a tair, the three dots in the bottom line are 
used to express that there are further models possible, the content of which is not yet 
explicit Gohnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). In addition to this there is also the use of square 
brackets, for example: 
[c] t 
This is used to indicate exhaustive representation of A instances of this contingency: there 
cannot be a case in which Oscar is a cat, without his having a tail (this would be the case 
from truth tables which result in a false outcome when the two assertions are conjoined by 
if, thus there is only one model which contains c as affirmative). However, the information 
that Oscar has a tail has not been exhaustively represented (thus it has not been expressed 
in square brackets), and so this may occur in other models. When these other models 





The above section has considered how mental models are constructed, and the information 
they represent, however, it is the manipulation of models which allows reasoning to occur. 
The theory of mental models now explains how these models are manipulated in order to 
make the deduction necessary. The model theory of propositional reasoning specifies that 
reasoning requires 3 stages Gohnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). 
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1. Ile first stage of this reasoning involves model constructing procedures. These 
procedures take the information in the premises and convert them into the model format, 
they also add to the premises any knowledge of the area that the person may already have. 
Finally, the model constructing procedure 'fleshes oue the models to be more explicit, if 
this proves to be necessary. 
2. The second stage of the reasoning process involves the model combining procedures, 
these procedures take two or more sets of models and combine them together, revising 
them as they go in order to remove any inconsistencies. This second step of the process 
also has model describing procedures, which produce a parsimonious description of the 
models. 
Mbe final stage of the reasoning process, according to Johnson-Laird and Byrne, is the 
validation process. This is where the conclusion, if one is possible, is produced. The 
validation process involves taking a set of models and a putative conclusion, and tries to 
produce a new set of models, and a conclusion that falsifies the putative conclusion. New 
models are produced which are consistent with the premises, but which may be 
inconsistent with the putative conclusion that has been drawn, and if this is the case then 
the putative conclusion is rejected, and a new conclusion is sought. 
'Me theory of mental models suggests that humans have the abilities to make rational 
deductions, and yet they do make errors when applying the general principles of deduction 
Gohnson-Laird and Byrne, 1993). Johnson-Laird and Byrne term this as "rational in 
principle, but erring in practice. " This is how the mental models theory can account for the 
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pattern of responding that was presented in Chapter One - people have the tools to make 
deductions, but they make mistakes when using these tools. 
For example modus ponens is a relatively easy inference to make, and humans show little 
difficulty in making this inference (as discussed earlier e. g. Wildman and Fletcher, 1977). 
However, modus tollens is a harder inference for humans to make, and this is borne out in 
the performance of humans when presented with tasks that require them to make this 
inference. They are more likely to show correct performance when making a modus ponens 
inference than when they are making a modus tollens inference. For example consider the 
models required to draw the modus ponens inference: 
Given the foflowing: 
If Oscar is a cat then he has a tail 
Oscat is a cat 
Following the principles of the theory as outlined above the first stage of the theory is the 
model constructing process, thus an initial model set is constructed which corresponds to 
the first premise above: 
[c] t 
Where V corresponds to 'is a cae, and T to 'has a tair and '.. .' corresponds to other 
possible models, which as yet have no explicit content. 
There is also a model corresponding to the second premise: 
C 
34 
Thus the first stage of the process is complete, and the second stage begins, this is the 
model combining procedures. During this process the information from the second model 
is added to the first model in the initial set, and the implicit model is eliminated, due to 
exhaustive nature of the first part of the first model. As mentioned above this stage also 
features model describing processes, and the model which results could be described as: 
Oscar is a cat and has a tail. 
However, the processes of making a modus toUens inference are not quite so 
straightforward, given the foRowing: 
If Oscar is a cat thcn hc has a tail 
Oscar does not have a tafl 
As with Modus ponens, reasoners represent he first premise as: 
[c] t 
The second premise is represented as: 
-it 
However, unlike modus ponens the information in these two premises cannot be combined 
here, and so some reasoners conclude that nothing follows from the premises. If the set of 






The second stage of reasoning, combining the models, now adds the information from the 
second premise to the information in the third model set above. This now eliminates the 
first two models, as they contain information about Oscar having a tail, and this leaves the 
final model: 
-1c -it 
Ilie procedures that describe the models now produce the parsimonious conclusion that 
Oscat is not a cat. 
1hus it is clear that modus tollens is a far harder conclusion to draw than modus ponens, 
because models must be fleshed out ffilly (made explicit) and multiple models need to be 
kept in mind at the same time. From the above examples it can be seen that mental models 
theory is distinct from theories of formal inference rules, as rules are not applied in model 
theory, rather the models are constructed and manipulated in order to produce conclusions. 
2.3 Evidence for the Mental Models Theo 
2.3.1 Mode Theo and Reasonin Errors. 
Model theory can also account for why humans make some of the mistakes they do when 
they are presented with tasks that require them to draw inferences. Errors may occur if 
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reasoners do not flesh out the initially implicit models Uly. This was illustrated above with 
modus tollens. Errors may also occur due to failure to consider a possible model to be so, 
or due to working memory limitations: the inability to be able to keep all the relevant 
models in mind at any one time. (Baddeley, 1986). Two classic errors that participants make 
are denial of the antecedent (DA), and affirmation of the consequent (AC). These errors 
are as follows. Consider again the conditional, If Oscar is a cat then he has a tail, denial of the 
antecedent is committed if when given the second premise Oscar is not a cat, they draw the 
conclusion that Oscar does not have a tail ne affirmation of the consequent error is made 
when humans are given the second premise Oscar bas a tail, and they draw the fallacious 
conclusion that Oscar is a cat, as discussed earlier. 
These errors can occur if the participants consider that there are no alternatives to Oscar 
being a cat, which could result in his having a tail (being a dog, mouse, horse etc. ). 
Logically, participants take the statement as being a biconditional. rather than a conditional 
(or expressing material equivalence rather than material implication). In terms of our 
statement above, the biconditional would be if and only, if Oscar is a cat then be bas a tail As 
with both the MP and MT inferences the humans construct an initial model set, however, 
in this case both components of the model atc exhaustively tcpresented: 
Rl 
Given then that Oscar has a tail, the procedures used for combining the models, can 
eliminate the implicit models above, and the conclusion is drawn that Oscar is a cat, and 
thus the AC error is committed, although this is not an error given a material equivalence 
(biconditional) reading. 
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In terms of the DA error participants are given the second premise that Oscar is not a cat, 
they may initially draw no conclusion because they are unable to combine the information 
in the second premise with that of the initial model set. As above, their initial model set will 
be: 
[C] Rl 
Thus the model for the second premise, that Oscar is not a cat: 
-ic 
is not able to be combined with the models above, however, if the implicit models above 
ate fleshed out then the full model set for the biconditional interpretation is: 
Ct 
-1c -it 
It is then possible for the information from the second premise to be combined with this 
model set, and the first model is then eliminated, and the DA conclusion that Oscar does 
not have a tail is subsequently drawn. 
Thus mental models theory is able to account for the four inferences that have been 
observed in studies of conditional reasoning, that is MP (Modus Ponens), MT (Modus 
Tollens), AC (Affirmation of the Consequent) and DC (Denial of the Consequent). 
In addition to being able to account for the observed patterns of performance, there is 
further evidence for mental models theory that has been offered by Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (1991). As has been mentioned before, the greater the number of explicit models 
that humans need to consider for any given deduction, the harder the inference is. In 
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addition to this any deduction that can be made by using only the initial models is easier 
than any deduction which requires the models to be fleshed out to an explicit level. Finally, 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1993) point out that it takes time to check for inconsistencies 
between models. 
As we have seen above, mental models theory can account for the differences in 
performance between modus ponens and modus tollens for a conditional. It can also 
account for the lack of difference between MT and MP for a biconditional, in that the 
initial set of models contains explicit information about both the affirmative and negative 
cases. Using the example above, in its biconditional form'Oscar is a cat only if he has a tair 
yields the following set of initial models: 
[c] t 
-1c 1-1 
This initial set of models allow both the MP and MT inferences to be made without the 
need for any further fleshing out. However, because a biconditional requires two models 
MP should be harder to draw under a biconclitional interpretation. Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (1991) claimed that the data support this assertion. 
Ihe theory can account for the ambiguity sometimes shown by rcasoners as to whether 'if 
is to be interpreted as a conditional or a biconditional, because as we have seen above initial 
models can be fleshed out to be either. Finally mental models theory can also account for 
the drawing or endorsing of fallacious inferences under a conditional interpretation (e. g. 
Evans, 1977; Wildman and Fletcher, 1977). 
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2.4 Criticisms of Mental Models. 
Attention will now be turned to some of the criticisms that have been made of mental 
models theory. Initially empirical criticisms will be made, and then criticisms of a theoretical 
nature wM be examined. 
Some researchers have failed to find support for the predictions of the theory. Rips (1990), 
claimed to have found no difference in the correct deductions made by participants 
regardless of whether they were single model problems, or multiple model problems 
(approximately 65% correct for both type of problem). As was seen above with the MT 
inference example, multiple model problems should be harder to solve. However, Rips' 
theory predicts that there should be no difference in performance rates on problems 
involving the negation of a conjunction, and ptoblems involving the negation of a 
disjunction. Whereas mental models theory would predict that there would be a difference, 
due to the negation of a conjunction leading to three models, and the negation of a 
disjunction leading to only a single model. Byrne and Handley (1992), however, showed 
that reasoners rarely made the correct interpretation of the three model problem (259/6), 
whereas performance on the single model problem was better (430/6), thus offering support 
for the predictions of mental models theory. 
Attention will now be turned to some theoretical criticisms. Rips (1986) argued that 
although the theory could explain content effects (something that poses difficulty for 
formal rule theorists, as was discussed in Chapter 1), it was unable to explain reasoning with 
unfamiliar material. However, Johnson-Laird and Byrne, (199 1) replied to this criticism by 
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suggesting that humans could reason successfully with unfamiliar materials because all they 
need is knowledge of the connectives (if, and, or etc. ) and the quantifiers (some, many, 
none etc. ), rather than specific knowledge regarding the materials. 
Green (1993) and Eysenck and Keane (1990) have critidsed the theory on the grounds that 
the process by which world knowledge is incorporated into the models that people use, and 
how people retrieve counterexamples, remains unclear. 
It is the search for counterexamples, which is a central issue of mental models theory, in 
that a putative conclusion will be tested by the search for counterexamples. However, this 
element of the theory appears to motivate few predictions that are made based on the 
theory (Polk, 1993). Bata (1993) and Fetzer (1993) have argued that searching for 
counterexamples is a very difficult task for humans to attempt successfully. Finally, Rips 
(1990) contends that the theory for propositional reasoning appears to rest on an algorithm 
that does not involve the search for counterexamples. 
However, in reply to this Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1993) suggest that the search for 
counterexamples is not necessarily a self-conscious one, and reasoners frequently make 
mistakes at this stage, or may fail to complete it at A In response to the search for 
counterexamples being difficult, Johnson-Laird and Byrne argue that it is this very difficulty 
which results in the prediction that the greater the number of models in the deduction, the 
more difficult the inference will be. However it should be noted that this does appear to be 
a slightly different argument from saying that it is the number of models which need to be 
considered that make an inference difficult. 
41 
One of the most commonly used tasks for studying conditional reasoning in humans over 
the past thirty years has been the Wason selection task, and it is this task that is the sole 
tool used here for research purposes. The task, along with some of the results that its use 
has yielded, and the various theories used to explain these tesults will be consideted in 
detail in the next chapter. However, the task will be described briefly here, along with the 
mental models account of task performance, and its claim to account for the 'five 
phenomena' of the selection task. 
2.5 The Selection Task and Mental Models Theo 
2.5.1 The Selection Task 
The basic selection task (Wason, 1966,1968) is as follows. A participant is presented with 
four cards such as those given in Figure 2.1 below, and is also given the rule 'If fberv is an A 
on one jide, then then is a2 on the otber side' 
Figure 2.1 
A_27 
Cards used in the selecdon task (Wason, 1966) 
Participants are required to select those cards and only those cards that would test whether 
the rule was true or false. The correct solution to the task is to select the 'A' and 7 cards, as 
these are the only cards that could contain the falsi6jing combination of an 'A' with a 
number other than'2'. Ihe task is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.1 below. 
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The aim of this section is to briefly discuss the selection task in terms of the mental models 
theory. The theory is also considered in detail in the General Discussion, and the analysis 
here will be brief as a result. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) list the 5 phenomena of the selection task as those 
manipulations of the task that lead to improved performance on the task. The theory also 
claims to be able to account for these five factors. These five phenomena (which are 
discussed in detail in the next chapter) are: 
1. Change the form of the rule: matching bias is an example of this facilitatory 
manipulation. 
2. Change the content of the rule: this has been the source of much research on the 
selection task (e. g. Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi, 1972; Dominowski, 1995). 
3. Change the context of the rule: such as the use of a deontic framework (deontic 
reasoning is discussed in more detail later). For example, Cheng and Holyoak, (1985), 
Cosmides, (1989). 
4. Change the content of the cards: Jackson and Griggs (1990) found that labelling 
negative explidtly, led to improved performance. 
5. Altering the task so that participants are more likely to represent all alternatives 
explicitly in their models. This manipulation includes the RAST (Reduced Array 
Selection Task) (Wason and Green, 1984), instructing participants to check for 
violations of the rule (Chrostowski and Griggs, 1985), and making participants verbalise 
the reasoning behind their selections (Berry, 1983). 
Mental models theory claims that it accounts for all of these facilitatory manipulations, and 
theories that rely on memory for counterexamples, or pragmatic reasoning schemas are 
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unable to do so. 'Me selection task and examples of these 'five phcnorncawill now be 
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3.1 The Waso Selectio Task. 
3.1.1 Chapte Overvie 
'Me primary tool for the study of conditional reasoning has been the Wason selection 
task (Wason, 1966,1968), and the numerous permutations of it which followed over 
the next thirty years (e. g. Wason and Shapiro, 1971; Evans and Lynch, 1973; Griggs and 
Cox, 1982; Wason and Green, 1984; Manktelow and Over, 1991; Kirby, 1994). The task 
has been considered briefly in Chapter two in terms of the mental models account, but 
the task will be dealt with in detail in this chapter. The task will be considered in detail 
as it is the tool used in the present research. Following this history of the selection task 
there will be a short section presenting two domain specific theories which have been 
proposed to account for the selection task in only some of its forms. This is in contrast 
to the mental logic and mental models theories considered thus far, which attempt to 
account for all reasoning with conditionals. 
3.2 The Selectio Task 
3.2.1 The Standat Selectio Task 
Initial attention will be turned to describing the original task itself, and then some of 
the numerous different versions that have been presented to participants since the 
original task. (See Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993; and Dominowski, 1995, for a 
review of the selection task literature). The standard selection task, (Wason, 1966,1968) 
or abstract task as it has become known was presented to participants as follows: 
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A participant is told that a set of cards has been produced all of which have a letter on 
one side and a number on the other. Ile participant was then presented with four 
cards, 2 of which were letter side up, and 2 of which were number side up (see Fig. 3.1). 
The participant was told that the following rule applies to these four cards, and that it 
may be true or false: 'If there is an A on one jide, then then is a2 on the other Jide. an purely 
logical terms the conditional would be stated as Ifp then q, and the cards would show 
the four possible values of p, not-p, q and not-q). The task for the participants is to 
indicate those cards and only those cards that need to be turned over in order to decide 
whether the rule is true or false. 
AHDfl2fl7 
Figure 3.1 Cards that may be used in the selection task. 
Although the task was thought to be quite simple, it was clear that many participants 
had a great deal of difficulty in selecting the correct cards. The most common choices 
for participants to make were to select the p (A) and q (2) cards, or to select the p (A) 
card alone (these two selection patterns accounted for 79% of choices made by 
participants, when presented with the selection task by Johnson-Laird and Wason, 
(1970), when pooling across four experiments, 46% selecting p, q and 33% selecting the 
p card alone). Ihese rates are robust and replicated many times e. g. see Dominowski 
(1995). However, the correct choice for participants to make was to select the p (A) 
I 
and not-q (7) cards, as only these cards could contain the falsiýring combination of an 
A with a number other than 2. Correct performance on this task is surprisingly low, in 
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relatively educated participants (usually undergraduates), with only 4% of participants 
selecting this logically correct combination in Johnson-Laird and Wason's 1970 
experiments (again pooled across four experiments). 
When participants are presented with the selection task what are they required to do? 
Evans, (1982) suggested that there are three steps necessary to solve the task: 
(i) Ihe participant must appreciate the falsification principle (Popper, 
1959). This alludes to the importance of the not-q card, and its 
potential to falsify the rule, and thus to solve the task correctly. 
(ii) , The participant must use a truth table in order to determine which 
cases would be falsifyýg. 
The participant must decide which of the four cards could reveal a 
case such as this. 
Given that the majority of participants fail to solve the task correctly, they must be 
failing to complete one or all of these steps. Originally Wason (1966) suggested that 
participants were trying to verify the rule rather than falsify it, as they should do, hence 
the p and q card selections. Verification does not allow the participant to state whether 
the rule is true or false, as even if all four cards with which the participant is presented 
conform to the rule it still may not be true. However, if only one card contains the 
falsifying combination of an A and a number other than 2, then the participant can 
state that the rule is false. Thus a series of experiments was devised where participants 
were given hints or tips towards the importance of the not-q card in the task. 
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3.2.2 The Thera Experiments 
Wason (1968) presented participants with the task, and they were given clues as to the 
importance of the falsi6jing potential of the not-q card (the card which is typically 
ignored). These experiments, perhaps not surprisingly, have become known as the 
therapy experiments. Participants have little difficulty in determining possible falsifying 
situations, this is an expected finding given that participants can display a reasonable 
knowledge of logical 'truth tables'. As was discussed in Chapter One, truth tables are 
used by logicians to explain the way a logical operator acts on any given proposition 
Gohnson-Laird and Tagart, 1969). In addition to this participants were aware of the 
importance of the not-q card as a card that could reveal such a situation because that is 
what the therapy experiments were for, to alert the participant to the not-q card. Evans 
(1982) then suggested that the difficulty for participants may lie in step (i) above, that 
participants were failing to appreciate the falsification principle. Although note that 
manipulations in which the participants were explicitly informed that they should 
attempt to prove the rule false do not lead to an improved rate of performance on the 
task (Wason and Golding, 1974). However, many participants who had been through 
this logical therapy session sfill selected the p and q cards, rather than the potentially 
falsi4ing not-q card. 'Me reason for this tendency may lie in a phenomenon termed 
matching bias (Evans and Lynch, 1973), this factor was revealed through the use of the 
negations paradigrrL 
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3.2.3 The Negatio Paradigm and Matching Bias 
Evans and Lynch (1973) presented participants with selection tasks with rules that 
differed from that used in the standard selection task. Ilese rules saw the introduction 
of negation. For example, rather than the standard ý'p then q, the rule used would be Ifp 
then not-q. All four permutations of the rule were used, the two previously mentioned, 
plus If notp then q and If nof-p then not-q. The logic here remains the same, although the 
values of the cards which the participants should select alters. In order to explain this 
fully the cards must now be given a new title, in order to clarify the logical status of the 
cards: true antecedent (TA), false antecedent (FA), true consequent (TC), false 
consequent (Fq. For the standard task these are clear, however, for the rule Ifp then 
not-q the TC card is now represented by the not-q card and FC by the q card etc. 
Whatever the form of the rule, participants should always select the true antecedent and 
the false consequent cards, as this is the potentially falsifying combination. 
Manipulation of the task with negatives allowed Evans and Lynch to test Wason's 
original hypothesis that participants select the TA and TC cards because they are 
potential verifiers of the rule (Wason had previously found support for a verification 
bias in inductive reasoning with the 2-4-6 task, Wason, 1960). The findings from Evans 
and Lynch suggested that participants were not trying to verify the rule they had been 
given. Rather they appeared to select those cards which had been mentioned in the rule 
itself, or to 'match' their choices with the values from the rule hence the term matching 
bias. Evans and Lynch's findings arc surnmarised below: 
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Table 3.1 Matchin Bias Data from Evans and Lynch. 1973 
RULE TA FA TC FC 
(1) If p then q 88% 8% 50% 33% 
(2) If p then not-q 92% 4% 8% 58% 
(3) If-not-p then q 58% 29% 58% 42% 
(4) If not-p then not-q 54% 46% 29% 75% 
Evans and Lynch (1973). 
It can be seen from table 3.1 that there is a tendency for participants to select those 
cases which match the items mentioned in the rule (matching cases are given in bold). 
However, it should be noted that double matching cases are rate, occurring only in the 
second rule in the table. It appears then that matching occurs more in the consequent 
cards than in the antecedent cards. The matching bias effect is robust and has been 
replicated many times, e. g., Manktelow and Evans, (1979), Oaksford and Stenning, 
(1992). (See Evans, 1998 for a full review of matching bias research). 
3.2.44. The Effec of Realistic Conten 
'Me selection task data that have been considered so far have concentrated solely on 
the abstract or standard selection task, using numbers and letters as the card values. 
Later research revealed that the use of realistic or thematic contents could facilitate 
participants' performance on the selection task. The first reported case of this comes 
from a manipulation of the task presented by Wason and Shapiro, (1971, experiment 2). 
In this version of the task participants were given a claim made by the experimenter: 
'Eveg time Igo to Manchester I travel by car. ' Participants were then presented with four 
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possible values on cards (as in the standard task, examples of the cards are given below 
in figure 3.2), and asked which of the cards would need to be turned over in order to 
assess whether the experimenter's claim was true or false. 
Figure 3.2 Cards used by Waso and Shapiro (1971) 
Manchester Leeds Car Train 
IIIIIII 
Wason and Shapiro (1971). 
When participants were presented with this version of the task perfortnance was 
dramaticaUy increased when compared to the standard task described in section 3.2-1. 
In this revised version of the task 63% of participants correctly selected the p and not-q 
cards (Manchester and Train), on the thematic version of the task, and only 12.5% 
selected the p and not-q cards on the standard version, in line with previous abstract 
task performance (Wason, 1966,1968). It should be noted here that in logical terms 
the two tasks were seen as isomorphic, with the same logical process required to take 
place in order for participants to correctly solve the task. Hence it appears that it was 
the content of the problem that influenced the patticipants' selections on the task. 
Further support for this 'thematic facilitation effect' was found by Johnson-Laird, 
Legrenzi and Legrenzi, (1972) in a task now known a's the postal task. In this task 
participants were given a rule regarding postal regulations, required to imagine that they 
were post office workers, and shown four envelopes rather than four cards. 'Me rule 
they were told was 'If a letter is sealed, then it has a 50 lire stamp on ie, and the four 
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envelopes wete as follows: sealed (p), unsealed (not-p), 50 hre (q), and 40 hre (not-q), 
see figure 3.3 below. Participants were told to turn over those envelopes, and only 
those envelopes, that they thought they needed to check in order to make sure that the 
rule was not being broken. 
Figure 3.3 Cards Used by Johnson-Laird gj al. (1972). 
50 Lire 40 Lire 
Johnson-Laird, et al. (1972). 
As with the Towns and Transport version of the task, presented by Wason and 
Shapiro, this thematic version of the task produced improved performance, compared 
to the standard selection task. Over 91% of participants correctly solved this postal 
version of the selection task, by selecting the 40 lite stamped envelope (not-q) and the 
scaled envelope (p) for inspection. It is important to note here that the participants 
used in this experiment were British students who would be familiar with a rule such as 
this (a postal rule of this nature had previously been in force in Britain). Consequently, 
the experiment can be criticised on the grounds that it taps directly into knowledge that 
the participants would have, and thus they bring extra information to their reasoning 
rather than just their reasoning ability per se. It would be possible for the participant to 
solve the task without engaging in any reasoning at all. Indeed Cheng and Holyoak 
(1985) repeated this version of the task with participants who were not familiar with 
such a rule, and they showed poor performance on the task, suggesting that it does rely 
on some form of recall. 
53 
It appeared to be the case that content had a dramatic effect on the performance of 
participants presented with the selection task. When the task was in its standard 
abstract form, performance was very poor. When in a thematic, realistic form 
performance was dramatically improved with participants selecting the logically correct 
p and not-q cards. Obviously it was of interest that human reasoning performance 
seemed to be so strictly tied to the content of the problems with which participants 
were presented. It did question Piaget & Inhelder's (1969) theory of formal operations, 
where adolescents should acquire the rules of formal logic to guide their thought 
processes. However, were this the case content should not influence reasoning, as logic 
should be content independent, and not influenced by the meaning of the words in the 
rule. 
However, later studies revealed that the thematic facilitation effect may not be as robust 
as originally suggested. A series of experiments by Manktelow and Evans (1979) failed 
to find any facilitatory effect with thematic materials. Manktelow and Evans (1979) 
presented participants with a range of conditionals concerned with food and drink such 
as, 'If I eat haddock then I drink gin' and 'If I eat inacatoni, then I do not drink 
champagne! Using these rules Manktelow and Evans found no difference between 
these thematic versions of the task and abstract versions using letters and numbers. In 
addition to this Manktelow and Evans also found no facilitation on the task using 
Wason and Shapiro's (1971) Towns and Transport version, as presented in figure 3.2. 
This evidence resulted in Manktelow and Evans claiming that the facilitation effect was 
not as strong as had originally been suggested from earlier results with thematic 
materials. However, it should be noted that although the versions used by Manktelow 
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and Evans are thernatic in that they are about something real, they are not rules that are 
common in their usage. Perhaps it is the reverse of the example used by Johnson-Laird 
et al. (1972) which was criticised for being too realistic, with Manktelow and Evans' 
version not being realistic enom , gb. 
In summary of the research on the selection task thus far: Initially it appeared that 
realistic content on the selection task would lead to improved performance, (as had 
previously been noted by Wilkins, 1928, with syllogisms) and the avoidance of 
matching bias (Wason and Shapiro, 1971, and Johnson-Laird et al, 1972). However the 
seties of expetiments by Manktelow and Evans, (1979) cast doubt on thcse findings 
and suggested that the effect of thematic content may not be as robust as had been 
originaUy suggested. There was clearly a need for further research to examine the role 
of content in reasoning, and to tease out those factors that lead to facilitation on the 
task. Such research was also necessary to enable the findings about thematic material to 
be accounted for within a theoretical framework. One of the theoretical suggestions of 
the time was memory cueing, the idea that the participant must be familiar with the rule 
in order to correctly solve the task, as seemed to be the case with Johnson-Laird et al's 
(1972) findings, and Manktelow and Evans' results in 1979. However, this theory was 
soon to be challenged by fatther work within the influence of content on selection task 
performance. 
In 1980 Rumelhart reported D'Andrade's Sears task. This version of the task has 
participants showing facilitation although they do not necessarily have any familiarity 
with the rule as such, thus casting doubt on the idea of memory cueing. This rule was 
presented to participants as follows: Participants were required to imagine that they 
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worked in a department store, and were told that 'If a purchase exceeds $30 then the 
receipt must be approved by the departmental manager'. Ihe four cards that were 
presented with this task are given below in figure 3A 
Figure 3.4 Cards used in D'Andrade's Sears Task ýas Reporte by Rumelhart, 
1980). 
$50 $30 ............. 
Rumelhart (1980). 
Few people have any difficulty in selecting the p and -1q cards on this task, that is the 
receipt for more than $30 and the unsigned receipt. lberefore, as mentioned above the 
initial idea of memory cueing as the explanation for facilitation was not enough to 
explain the results, that is participants did not recall the correct solution from previous 
experience. They had not all worked in department stores where this rule had been 
enforced, and thus could not be accessing the information from some long-term 
memory store. Thus they were not solving the task without reasoning about it, as had 
been claimed of Johnson-Laird et al. 's (1972) findings with the postal task. There must 
be some other process taking place, some reasoning process. Before moving to 
theoretical explanations of selection task performance, there is one last finding of 
interest: that of transfer effects. 
3.2.5 , Transfe Effects 
Some researchers (Griggs and Cox, 1982) have shown that the facilitation effect can 
transfet from a task whete facilitation is found onto petformance on a non-facilitatory 
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version of the selection task, although these data are somewhat inconclusive. Unlike 
earlier efforts Gohnson-Laird et al., 1972 and Wason and Shapiro, 1971), Griggs and 
Cox (1982) were successful in their attempt to show a transfer of facilitation. They used 
two main rules here, these were the Drinking age rule and the Clothing age rule. The 
Drinking age rule is as foRows: 
On this task imagine that you ate a police officer on duty. It is your job to ensure that 
people conform with certain rules. The cards in front of you have infonnation about 
four people sitting at a table. On one side of a card is a person's age and on the other 
side of the card is what a person is drinking. Here is a rule: "IF A PERSON IS 
DRINKING BEER, THEN THE PERSON MUST BE OVER 19 YEARS OF 
AGE". Select the card, or cards that you definitely need to turn over to determine 
whether or not people are violating the rule. 
gFjigure 1.5 Cards Used by Griggs and Cox (1982). 
Drinking a Drinking a 16 Years 22 Years 
Beer Coke of Age of Age 
IIIII _j 
Griggs and Cox (1982). 
Patticipants showed very little difficulty in making the cortect selections when 
presented with this version of the selection task. Facilitation on this task was very 
strong with 74% of participants checking the beer drinker and the person under 19 
years of age, that is the p and --lq cards (Griggs and Cox, 1982), when compared to 
standard selection task performance. 
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However, to return to the main point here, that of transfer of the facilitation effects. 
Griggs and Cox (1982), did find evidence of facilitation transfer, by using three versions 
of the task, the drinking age rule as shown above, an abstract version ýetters and 
numbers, as described earlier in section 3.2.1) and the Clothing Age rule. This version 
of the task has the same set-up as the Drinking Age rule, but the participants are given 
the following rule: "If a person is wearing blue, then the person must be over 19 years 
of age". Although this rule has the same structure as the Drinking Age rule, it has no 
teal world reference, that is, that there is no age limit as to what colour of clothes 
people can wear in reality, whereas there is an age limit to drinking alcohol in a public 
place. 'Me important factor in participants making the correct selections on the 
Clothing Age rule is the order in which the three tasks where presented to the 
participants. When the Clothing Age rule was presented first there was no facilitation 
effect. However, when the Drinking Age rule was presented first and the Clothing Age 
rule followed there was a significant transfer effect. However, there was no transfer to 
the abstract letters and numbers version of the task. Thus it appears that memory 
cueing is not responsible for facilitation effects. It is the deonfic content of the rules. 
This will now be discussed in section 3.3.1. , 
3.3 Deontic Reasonin 
3.3.1 Deontic Content 
Ile important factor here which was initially pointed out by Cheng and Holyoak 
(1985) is that in the Drinking Age Rule task the participants are required to check for 
rule violation, whereas in the Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi task the 
participants were claim testing, rather than checking for violations. Ibus in the Postal 
task the participants rely on memory cueing for facilitation (the participants who were 
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familiar with such a rule show the facilitation), whereas the Drinking Age rule does not, 
and participants who have no experience of such a rule can solve the task. The 
important criterion then for facilitation is that the rule should be in a dcontic form. 
Deontic reasoning is a form of reasoning that is concerned with actions that should, 
may or ought to be performed. Over and Manktelow (1993) defined deontic reasoning 
as part of what philosophers term practical reasoning, and is distinct from theoretical 
reasoning. lbeotetical reasoning is concerned with discovering objective matters of 
fact. Alternatively practical reasoning is concerned with inferring what we should, may 
or ought to do, it is concerned with actions. However, it is true that theoretical 
reasoning may have implications for practical reasoning, though the latter goes further 
to make decisions about actions. Given that deontic reasoning is reasoning about 
actions it is somewhat strange that psychologists ignored it for so long, as it is a form of 
reasoning in which we must regularly engage. As mentioned above it was Cheng and 
Holyoak who first claimed that it was a deontic context that would yield facilitation on 
the selection task. Specifically, facilitation on a problem may be improved if the task 
involves the search for violations of the rule (search for violations is not sufficient for 
facilitation - though it may be necessary), rather than just testing the rule, as was the 
case in the standard task, and the rule should contain modal terms like 'may'or, muse. 
As weH as pointing out the importance of the dcontic context Cheng and Holyoak also 
proposed a theoretical account of performance on the selection task, which was domain 
specific, in that it only relates to the selection task when it is presented within a 
particular form, its deontic form. Below will be a brief summary of their research, and 
then Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) theory will be presented. 
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3.4 Domain Specific Theories 
3.4.1 Pragmatic Reasonin Schema TLeojy 
As was mentioned above, the selection task has been the primary tool used in reasoning 
research over the past thirty years, and it has appeared in many different forms, some 
of which have been presented here. There are also theories which have been developed 
primarily to explain performance on the selection task, particularly thematic versions of 
the task, such as the Drinking Age rule (Griggs and Cox, 1982). The main theory here, 
which has been the motivation for much of the recent research in the area of deontic 
reasoning, is that of Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas (PRS), as proposed by Cheng and 
Holyoak (1985). PRS theory is a domain specific theory that attempts to account for 
facilitation on the selection task. Before the theory is considered in detail the concept of 
schemas generally must be explained. 
Thus, it is necessary that schemas are ffiUy understood, as these underpin the theory 
itself Schemas are similar to what would be generally called concepts, but yet, they can 
be more specific than concepts, in that they can actually contain rules for inference. 
However, schemas contain knowledge that has been abstracted, or drawn from prior 
experience in a particular field or area (see Anderson, 1995 for a discussion of the role 
of schemas in cognition). Tbus, schemas can be used to explain the robust facilitation 
effect that has been observed when the task has been presented to participants with a 
thematic content. This works in that participants reason by experience, the schemas 
contain abstract rules about reasoning. When the participant sees the relationship 
between the task with which have they been presented and the abstract rules present in 
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the schema they apply the appropriate rules and thus make the correct selections on the 
task. 
To consider the theory now in more detail the schema that Cheng and Holyoak 
explained fully in their 1985 paper will be considered here, that is the pennission 
schema (although they also considered obligations in 1989). 'Me permission schema is 
acquired from those situations where preconditions must be satisfied in order to carry 
out a particular action. Cheng and Holyoak suggested that this schema consists of four 
production rules, which can be applied when the conditional in question is of the form: 
'If an action is to be taken then the precondition must be satisfied. Ile four rules are 
as foRows: 
Rule 1: If the action is to be taken then the precondition must be satisfied 
Rule 2: If the action is not to be taken then the precondition need not be satisfied 
Rule 3: If the precondition is satisfied then the action may be taken 
Rule 4: If the precondition is not satisfied then the action must not be taken 
In order to understand how these rules facilitate selection of the p and -, q cards 
consider the Drinking Age rule that was oudined above. Participants select the -lq card 
because rule 4 above teUs them that if you are not over 19 then you must not drink 
alcohol, (where p corresponds to the action and q to the precondition). Ibus from rule 
4 above participants understand that if the precondition is not satisfied (being 19 years 
or older), then the action, (drinking alcohol), must not be taken. Participants know 
from this that they must select the underage drinker for further examination, as the 
precondition for the action has not been satisfied. The common error of selecting the q 
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card on the selection task is avoided because participants know from rule 3 that they do 
not need to check any card where the precondition has been satisfied. Specifically, rules 
14 make determinate prescriptions, whereas rules 2&3 make indeterminate 
presctiptions. 
It can be seen from this example that it is possible for the theory to explain how 
facilitation occurs on thematic versions of the task where the conditional can be seen to 
fall into the form of a permission. The theory can explain why participants perform 
well on the Sears task although they have no experience of being a shop manager or 
assistant. The action is buying goods to the value of $30 or more, and the pre-condition 
is acquiring the signature of the manager, thus the permission schema is retrieved and 
applied to the task, and participants accordingly select the p and not-q cards. It is the 
case that there may need to be some form of authority figure or reason to ehcit the 
permission schema. For example, the policeman in the Drinking Age rule (PoUard and 
Evans, 1987) or the prior knowledge of the rule in the postal task, where the 
participants were aware that the rule has been announced by an authority figure. 
Consequently, they were able to see the rule as a permission based rule, and thus they 
could elicit the permission schema, and subsequently solve the task correctly, selecting 
the p and not-q cards. 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985) have shown the importance of the ability of participants to 
see the task in terms of permission, and thus allowing the retrieval of the necessary 
schema. In order to do so they used the postal task, as described above, but used two 
groups of participants, some who had experience of such a postal rule (Hong Kong 
participants) and others who had no experience of such a rule (US participants). 
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However, the main difference between this version of the task and the original, was 
that Cheng and Holyoak included a rationale for some participants, stating that the 
purpose for the rule was to increase profit from personal mail which is nearly always 
sealed. When the rationale was present the US participants performed as well as the 
Hong Kong participants despite the fact that the US participants had no real world 
experience of such a rule before. Cheng and Holyoak concluded that the rise in 
performance of those participants who had no prior experience of the rule was due to 
the rationale facilitating the retrieval of the permission schema by participants. 
In addition to this Cheng and Holyoak (1985) even managed to produce facilitated 
performance of an arbitrary task. Again, using a content that could evoke the 
permission schema, and enable the participants to solve the task correctly did this. 
Participants were told that they were an authority figure who had the duty of checking 
regulations of the form "If one is to take action W then one must fulfil precondition 
TV' Participants were then presented with four cards, which showed on one side 
whether an action had been taken or not, and on the other side whether the 
precondition had been fulfilled or not. The four cards showed one of each contingency, 
e. g. action taken, action not taken, precondition satisfied, precondition not satisfied. 
Unlike previous arbitrary rules, where performance was very low (around 19'/o), 
performance on the task used by Cheng and Holyoak was up to 61%. Finally, with 
reference to the permission schema Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett and Oliver (1986) found 
that if participants had abstract training with schemas then facilitation on the selection 
task was elicited. Cheng et al. (1986) also introduced schemas for obligations, which are 
also a major factor in deontic reasoning. 
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3.4.2 Criticisms of Pragmatic Reasoning-Schema The= 
The pragmatic Reasoning Schema theory has been criticised on both methodological 
and theoretical grounds and these criticisms will be considered here. Jackson and 
Griggs (1990) criticised Cheng and Holyoak on methodological grounds, because 
Cheng and Holyoak used explicit negatives on their cards, and Evans (1983) had shown 
that explicit negatives decrease the extent of matching bias on the selection task. On 
abstract rules (both permission and obligation) Jackson and Griggs found that 
facilitation disappears when implicit negatives ate used. It is cleat from these findings 
that this does not bode well for PRS, thus shaking one of the major tenets of the 
theory, because the findings of Cheng and Holyoak may have been dependent on the 
use of explicit negatives rather than because schemas were being evoked. 
The theory has also been criticised on theoretical grounds. For example Evans (1991) 
ctiticised the theory for being too narrow, it is unable to account for the competence 
and errors that have been observed on abstract reasoning problems, it can only account 
for thematic versions of the task. O'Brien (1993) also made this criticism of PRS theory 
- the theory can only account for performance on 'quasi-selection tasks' such as the 
drinking age version of the task. Also the theory has been criticised because it is not 
properly formulated, for example, Oaksfotd and Chater (1993) have criticised PRS 
theory because it does not explain how beliefs are updated. Given that the theory 
emphasises the role of domain specific knowledge there should be some 
acknowledgement of this process. A final critique of the Pragmatic Reasoning Schema 
Theory comes in the form of an alternative domain-specific theory: Social Contract 
Theory (SCI). This theory, and the critiques of it ate outlined below. 
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3.4.3 Social Contrac Theo 
This theory is an evolutionary based approach, in which it is claimed that humans are 
innately programmed to look for cheaters. Humans must try to maximise the benefit 
from social situations. Individuals must try to cooperate with each other in order to 
provide the most mutual benefit from such social contracts. In such social contracts 
people are obliged to pay costs in order to receive benefits. Cosmides (1989) argued 
that humans are acutely aware of the potential of others taking the benefits without 
paying the cost. 
Cosmides argued that the "look for cheaters" algorithm would produce logical 
facilitation on a standard selection task (that is p and not-q). Cosmides (1989) and 
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) argued that there were two types of social contract, the 
standard social contract, and the switched social contract. The standard social contract 
was of the form 'If. you take a benefit then you pay the cost' whereas the switched social 
contract was of the form'Ifyompa _y 
the cost tbenjou take The benefit. Obviously, rules in this 
form lend themselves to study via the selection task, the cards used by Cosrnides are 
shown in Figute 3.6. 











Depending on which of the social contracts is being considered, the logical category of the 
card varies. 
Using the standard social contract the cards are as follows: Benefit accepted = p, Benefit 
not accepted = not-p, Cost paid = q, cost not paid = not-q. However, for the switched 
social contract the logical categories are Benefit accepted q, Benefit not accepted not-q, 
Cost paid p, cost not paid not-p. 
Importantly, despite the logical category of the cards the participants should still select the 
'benefit accepted and the 'cost not paid! cards. These are the two that represent potential 
cheaters, and if humans have a 'look for cheaters' algorithm, then these are the cards that 
participants should select. In addition to this participants should ignore the 'benefit not 
accepted! and the 'cost paid! cards, as these cards could not represent cheaters. Cosmides 
argued that any organism which did not have this 'search for cheaters' algorithm would be 
selected out, hence the evolutionary aspect of her theory. In summary then, while fortnal 
logic states that we should always accept the p and not-q cards, Cosmides claimed that this 
should not be the case in her switched social contract where she suggests that our cheater 
detection should lead us to accept the not-p and q cards. Cosmides' predictions were 
upheld in that participants did choose the 'benefit accepted! and 'cost not paid! cards 
regardless of the logical status of the cards. 
Cosmides argued that the facilitation that was shown by Cheng and Holyoak (19 85) was 
due to the rules that they used expressing social contracts. Cosmides backed up this 
claim by producing versions of the selection task that were not social contracts, but yet 
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were still permission rules. On tasks such as this there was significantly less facilitation 
than with social contract rules. This finding is supported by evidence from Gigerenzer 
and Hug (1992), who found similar results. However, on the non-social contract 
versions of the selection task performance was above the 10% level of the abstract 
selection tasks. For the non-social contract based problems, Cosmides and Gigerenzer 
and Hug reported correct responding of between 30% and 52%. Cosmides also claimed 
that her theory could account for existing data on the selection task. She claimed that all 
previous versions of the selection task that had produced reliable facilitation were social 
contracts (e. g. Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi, 1972), whereas unreliable, or non- 
facilitatory versions of the task were not social contracts (e. g. Wason and Shapiro, 1971; 
Manktelow and Evans, 1979). 
3.4.4 Criticisms of Socia Contract Theo 
Cheng and Holyoak responded to Cosmides' theory by claiming that not aU the 
facilitating contexts can be seen as being social exchanges, they point out the Drinking 
Age rule and the Seats problem are examples of this. Platt and Griggs (1983) found 
some support for SCT in that facilitation was not as strong when the cost-benefit 
structure was removed from problems. They also found that performance was better 
when the deontic: tenn'muse was included in the rules, although it could be argued that 
this also supports PRS theory. 
A number of theoretical criticisms have been made of the theory. For example, O'Brien 
(1993) has criticised SCT, like PRS, on the grounds that the scope of the theory is too 
narrow, it can only explain performance on what he calls 'quasi selection tasks', such as 
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the Drinking Age rule version of the task. O'Brien further criticised SCT in that he sees 
no a pioti reason why evolution should have provided humans with domain-specific 
processes, and not to have endowed human thought with some general processes. 
Indeed he goes on to claim that it would be of greater evolutionary benefit for humans 
to have general rules rather than domain-specific rules as these would allow for 
reasoning to still take place even though the environment may change. However, 
Cosmides responded to this claim by arguing that 2 adaptive rules would always be 
better than 1 general rule, and that evolution would shape specific adaptive rules, rather 
than general rules for reasoning. 
A further criticism was made by Manktelow and Over (1990): there are instances of the 
selection task which participants can solve, but that do not rely on a benefit-cost 
structure in order for facilitation to occur. This was found to be the case using the 
AIDS rule of Manktelow and Over (1990), this rule stated that "If you clear up spilt 
blood, you must wear rubber gloves". There is no way that cleaning up spilt blood can 
be seen as being a benefit, for the cost of having to wear rubber gloves, and yet 
participants select the p and not-q cards with very little difficulty on this task. 
It appears from this version of the task that the primacy of the benefit-cost relationship 
suggested by Cosmides (1989) is not as reliable as originally claimed. Manktelow and 
Over (1991) agree with Cosmides in that she introduced the idea of utilities into the 
field, but that the scope of utilities should be more general than a strict, narrow cost- 
benefit structure. Participants would pirfer to wear rubber gloves if they were to clear up 
spilt blood, as it is in their own best interests. Both Pragmatic Reasoning Schema 
1heory and Social Contract theory will be considered in more detail in the General 
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Discussion. The tole of utility in the selections which patticipants make on the selection 
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4.1 Utilijy in Reasoning 
4.1.1 Chapter Overvi 
The purpose of this chapter is to address closely the role of utility and social roles in 
reasoning. As discussed in Chapter three Cosmides suggested that utility may be important 
in reasoning about conditionals. However, Manktelow and Over (1991; 1992) and Over 
and Manktelow (1993) have argued that Cosmides' cost-benefit structure was too narrow, 
and that utility should be considered more generally. Ibus this chapter will examine closely 
the empirical work of Manktelow and Over (1991), and the suggestions from this for a 
revision to the mental models theory. Finally it will be argued that if utility (preferring one 
outcome to another) plays a role then so should probability (the likelihood of any given 
outcome). This will clearly show the rationale for the current research programme. 
4.2 The Role of Utility in the Selection Task 
4.2.1 An Introduction to Utili 
It was the research of Manktelow and Over (1991) that first studied thetole of social roles 
and utilities with regard to deontic reasoning, and it has caused a number of revisions or 
calls for revisions to existing theories Gohnson-Laird and Byrne, 1992; Holyoak and Cheng, 
1995a). As was outlined in Chapter three, there has been a lot of research that has shown 
that there is an effect of content in reasoning. This has posed some problems for theories 
which claim that reasoning is mediated by content free inference rules (see Evans, 1989; 
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Manktelow and Over, 1987,1990; Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; but see also O'Brien, 1993, 
1995). 
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, Manktelow and Over (1991) considered Cosmides' Social 
Contract lbeory to be too narrow in its benefit-cost structure. Subsequently, they designed 
a task that did show facilitation in participants' performance, and yet did not fit into the 
benefit-cost structure which Cosmides claimed was essential for facilitation on the selection 
task (the AIDS rule, Manktelow and Over, 1990a). lberefore, Manktelow and Over (1991) 
argued that it is the utility of a particular outcome that determines the choices which 
humans make. Thus although it was Cosmides, as cited in Manktelow and Over (1990b) 
who pointed out the importance of utilities in reasoning, Manktelow and Over used it in a 
more general way. 'I'llerefore, both utilities and social structures, which Manktelow and 
Over argued both play a role in mediating research, will be considered in some detail, as it 
was the research findings about utility which motivated the research to be presented here. 
However, there is an important issue to note: Manktelow and Over clash with Cheng and 
Holyoak with regard as to what is a conditional permission and what is a conditional 
obligation. Manktelow and Over claim that what Cheng and Holyoak term as being a 
conditional permission is in fact, a conditional obligation, because of the emphasis on what 
one oqbt to do. Due to the importance of pragmatics in deontic reasoning it is imperative 
that there is a clear understanding of what is a permission and what is an obligation, 
between researchers in the field. 
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4.2.2 Eml2irica Evidence for Social Roles and Utili 
Manktelow and Over (1991) studied the role of utilities by using the following statement, 
given to a son by his mother 'Ifyou M# your room tbenjou way go out to plqyý They claim that 
from this statement it is clear that the mother prefers tidy rooms to untidy rooms and thus 
she places a higher utility on the boy tidying his room than not. Conversely, one can 
assume that the son places a higher utility on going out to play than not doing so. If this 
were not the case, then it would be foolish for the mother to have uttered the statement in 
the first place, as the payoff of going out for tidying the room would be of no value to the 
son. It is also important to note here that pragmatically it seems to be the case that the only 
way that the son can get permission to go out is by tidying his room. 
Manktelow and Over term the person who utters the rule as the agent, and the person who 
is the subject of the rule as the actor. Following from this they claim that there arc four 
ways in which the rule can truly be said to be broken. These are as follows: 
1. The agent (mother) sees that the son (actor) has tidied his room but does not allow the 
actor to go out. 
2. The agent does not see that the actor has tidied his room, and yet she allows him to go 
out. 
3. The actor (son) tidics his room, and yet he does not go out 
4. The actor does not tidy his room, and yet he goes out anyway. 
Manktelow and Over looked at cases 1 and 4 above, and they compare these two cases to 
the benefit-cost structure of Cosmides (1989). Manktelow and Over point out that case 
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four is similar to the benefit-cost structure, in that the son takes the benefit (going out to 
play), and yet does not pay the necessary cost according to the rule (tidying his room). 
However, this is not true with case 1 above, where the mother sees that the son has tidied 
his room, and yet the mother does not let him out. Clearly, this can still be seen as breaking 
the rule, in that the agent has not kept het side of the deal. 
Manktelow and Over argued that even though case 1 does not fit with the structure that 
Cosmides sees as necessary for correct choices on the selection task, participants would still 
be aware of it as being a violation of the rule. When they are cued to see the task from the 
point of view in which this would be a violation they should select the correct cards 
accordingly. 
Participants were presented with the foRowing four cards. Each was understood to show 
on one side whether or not the room had been tidied, and on the other side whether or not 
the boy had gone out to play. 
, 
Figure 4.1 Cards Used b Over 1991 y Manktelow and tý= 
Tidied Did Not Went Did Not 
Room Tidy Out to Go Out 
Room lay Ito Play 
Figure 4.1 Manktelow and Over (1991). 
Participants, through a scenario presented with the task, were cued to see the task from 
either the perspective of the agent (mother) or from the point of view of the actor (son). 
Clearly, as stated above these toles involve the participants in having different utilities with 
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regards to the task, and what they see as being violations. Manktelow and Over made the 
following predictions about the choices that their participants would make on the task. 
They argued that those participants who were cued to the perspective of the agent (mother) 
would select the not-p and q cards, and those who were cued to see the task from the 
perspective of the actor (son) would select the p and not -q cards. 
For those parddpants who were cued to see the task from the perspective of the agent 
(mother), the predicdons were overwhelmingly confirmed, in that the modal selection 
pattern was to select the not-p and q cards (that is a reversal of the correct selecdons for 
the 'normar selection task). However, this was not the case when the pardcipants were cued 
to see the task from the perspective of the agent, although the p and not-q cards were 
selected reasonably frequently, it was not the modal selection pattern. 
In order to try to find an explanation for these results Manktelow and Over point out that 
in the scenario which cued participants to the perspective of the agent, there was a third 
party who recorded the details on the cards. Ilerefore, it was felt that a third party should 
be introduced into the scenario that was designed to cue participants to the perspective of 
the actor. When this was done the results were that the predicted patterns were found to be 
the modal selection. 
Finally, Manktelow and Over carried out a third experiment in order to test whether the 
participants understand the deontic context and its utilities and social toles that account for 
the results. ne alternative explanation to this is that participants were relying on personal 
experience in the above experiments, and so an experiment that used a scenario that 
differed from a field with which the participants were familiar was designed. 
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In this third experiment, the rule was "If you spend more than L100, then you may take a 
free gift". In this case the shop is the agent, and the customer is the actor, and as above 
there are four ways in which it is possible for the rule to be violated. In this experiment 
Manktelow and Over made predictions as to what the participants' selections would be for 
all four cases, as they cued participants to check for each of the four, rather than just for 
cases 1 and 4 as in the previous experiments. The results followed the predictions: for case 
1 the participants selected the p and not-q cards, case 2 the not-p and q cards, case 3 the p 
and not-q cards, case 4 the not-p and q. Manktelow and Over then claimed that this was 
evidence that a theory of deontic reasoning must take account of utility and social roles. 
4.3. Utili and Mental Models 
4.3.1 Revised Mental Models 
Manktelow and Over discussed their results in terms of an adapted mental models theory, 
which took account of utility and social roles. Mental models theory was discussed in depth 
in Chapter two, and the basics of the theory will not be considered again here, rather the 
changes to the theory which were called for will be discussed. 
Manktelow and Over argued that in addition to representing the possible states of affairs, 
and the outcomes of actions, mental models should also represent the preferences which 
people have between these outcomes, hence utilities need to be incorporated. However, 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1992) argued that there was no need to incorporate utilities into 
mental models theory. Alternatively, they suggested that participants consider only those 
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cards that ate explicitly represented in their models, and thus in order for a participant to 
have full. insight into the task, they must construct fully explicit models. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1992) offer their explanation of Manktelow and Over's results in 
terms of the third experiment that Manktelow and Over used. That is the rule "If you 
spend more than C100, then you may take a free gift". The pardcipants had four catds in 
front of them, showing a receipt, and whether or not the customer had taken the free gift 
or not. Participants were asked to choose those cards that would show whether the rule had 
been violated or not; obviously this could be a violation by the shop, or by the customer. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne considered the rule in terms of 'P'p then q, and the four cards 
represent: the shopper spent more than ý100 (p), the shopper did not spend more than 
L100 (not-p), the shopper took the free gift (q), and the shopper did not take the free gift 
(not-q). 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1992) began their account by outhning the model theory of the 
selection task Gohnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991) as a result this is where the current account 
will begin. Using a conditional such as "If there is a letter A, then there is a number 2". One 
explicit model, and one implicit model, as discussed in Chapter 2 would then represent this: 
[A] 2 
Participants presented with the task only consider those cards that have been explicitly 
represented in the models, the theory states. As a result of this the participants select the A 
and 2 cards, and as was discussed in Chapter 3, this is the modal choice when the task 
involves a indicative conditional of the form above. 
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However, it is possible for the models to be fleshed out into three explicit models, which 
each represent a possible state of affairs, these three models would be: 
A2 
-1 
-1 A -12 
When the models are fully fleshed out like this the participants now consider the -, A and 
-12 cards, which they would not have done in the first model above. Participants do not 
select the --, A card because this could occur with either the 2 or -12 cards, and thus this card 
is not able to detern-dne whether the rule is true or not. However,, the -12 card could 
determine the rule as false if it occurred with the A card, and so the participants add it to 
their selections. 
Iberefore, the model theory proposes that any context or content that causes the 
participants to flesh out the models will result in them sclecting the not-q card. Such cases 
of facilitation were discussed earlier. Johnson-Laird and Byrne suggest that the search for 
violations will lead to participants fleshing out their models fully, and hence performance is 
facilitated in a deontic selection task. However, they go on to contend that there are 
versions of the selection task which lead to a fleshing out of models, but yet have nothing 
to do with deontic: contexts (Oakhill and Johnson-Laird, 1985). lbus Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne conclude that no account of performance on the selection task can be complete if it 
relies solely on deontic considerations, as is the case with both Cheng and Holyoak (1985), 
and Cosmides (1989). 
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I Johnson-Laird and Byrne use the example from Manktelow and Over (1991) when they 
.P consider 
how to apply mental models theory to deontic conditionals, that is: 'Ifjou S end 
mom than C 100 then jou may take a fire gift. They then go on to show the models which 
participants would need to flesh out if they were presented with this conditional in terms of 




AU of these represent the permissible situations, that is those situations which do not 
represent a violation of the rule that the participants have been given, with regard to the 
conditional, as opposed to the truth/falsity that one would normally consider, whereas, the 
following model would be impermissible: 
-"Lloo gift 
As this represents the case where a customer spends less than L100, but takes a free gift 
anyway. 
However, as was seen above it is possible that participants interpret a conditional as being a 
biconditional, and then the permissible and impermissible models are altered. 1hus: 
ý100 gift 
-1gift 
Arc now the permissible situations, whereas the models that represent the impermissible 
situations are as follows: 
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ýC, l 00 -gift 
--'. ýloo gift 
The first model here could arise by the customer not selecting the gift even though they 
had fulfilled the necessary requirements, or because the store had gone back on its promise 
to give gifts to those customers who spent more than C100. The second impermissible 
model above could come about by the customer taking a free gift that they were not 
entitled to, or by the shop relaxing the rule and allowing those customers who have not 
fulfilled the requirements to clairn a free gift. Hence Johnson-Laird and Byrne conclude 
that the results observed by Manktelow and Over come about via the context of the 
selection task leading the participants to focus on one set of models rather than another. 
It was discussed above that Manktelow and Over did not find the predictions that they had 
expected in one half of their first experiment. When participants were asked to imagine that 
they were a son who was checking whether his mother had broken the rule, 'If Vou liývjour 
mom, tben_vou may go out to play, it was found that it was necessary to introduce a third party. 
The effect of this third patty was that participants selected the cards which Manktelow and 
Over predicted that they would (p and not-q cards). With this conditional the models for 
the impcnnissible situadons are as foUows: 
tidy -'play 
-, tidy play 
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It is possible then to see from this that if participants select all four cards then they can 
check for both types of violation, and this was the modal response found by Manktelow 
and Over (1991). Johnson-Laird and Byrne claimed that Manktelow and Over changed the 
instructions to such an extent that it was now made clear to participants that only the 
serious violation was at stake, that is that the son should tidy his room, and yet not be 
allowed out to play. Iberefore, Johnson-Laird and Byrne claimed that it was not the 
introduction of a third patty that led to the p and not-q cards being selected. Rather, the 
instructions now pointed the way for the participants to regard the mother seeing the room 
was not tidy, but still allowing the son out to play as being irrelevant to the task as such. 
In their conclusion, Johnson-Laird and Byrne argued that the content of a task can lead to 
participants constructing an explicit set of models, and yet application of everyday 
knowledge can lead to the participants interpreting the conditional as a biconditional. 
Hence they have two impermissible situations in their models, and the context of the task 
can lead to participants concentrating on one of these two impennissiblc situations. 'Mus 
Johnson-Laitd and Byrne claimed that their explanation of the results found by Manktelow 
and Over (1991), have the advantage of parsimony over that of Manktelow and Over. 
However, Manktelow and Over (1992) replied to Johnson-Laird and Byrne. They claimed 
that when Johnson-Laird and Byrne suggested that there is a serious violation for the son, 
they are in effect talking about the subjective utility of the violation for the son. Ibus 
Manktelow and Over claimed that Johnson-Laird and Byrne are admitting that participants 
do consider the utilities in the task, and that they do affect the reasoning in which they 
subsequently engage. 
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Manktelow and Over (1992) produced new data, which they claimed corroborated their 
suggestion for the need to consider utilities within a mental models framework in order to 
account for deontic reasoning. In this experiment subjective utility was varied, so that there 
were two scenarios with what were termed strong and weak preferences. There was also an 
experiment that involved participants reasoning using an episternic conditional, as Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne (1992) draw comparisons and make similar predictions between episternic 
and deontic, conditionals. 
In the epistemic task there is no real world content, whereas in the in the weak preference 
task there is no evidence for the participants to judge as to whether one outcome is 
preferred to another. Finally, in the strong preference task, there is some evidence to show 
that there may be cheaters who would try to bring one outcome about in preference to 
another (that is that they may be able to gain a prize if they cheat). 
Ile task is presented in the traditional selection card format, and Manktelow and Over 
stated that Johnson-Laird and Byrne's account would predict that the modal response for 
all cases should be not-p and q. Whereas Manktelow and Over predict that this would only 
be the case in the strong preference condition. 
The results were that the modal response was to select only the q card in the epistemic task, 
although there was no significant difference in the choices that participants made. In the 
weak preference task both p and p, not-p were chosen 3 times each, and again there was no 
significant difference between the selections made by participants. Finally, in the strong 
preference task the modal choice was not-p and q as predicted by Manktelow and Over, 
and there was a significant difference in the choices made by participants (only four 
participants made a choice other than not-p, q and this was to select the q card alone). 
82 
Iberef6te, Manktelow and Over claimed that there must be some consideration of utility in 
deontic reasoning accounts, otherwise, what is the point in reasoning about actions or 
outcomes if people have no preference between the outcomes? 
It should be noted here that Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1995) have revised their account of 
perspective effects in dcontic reasoning, in a version that involves biconditional 
interpretation, focussing and logical negation. Using Manktelow and Over's conditional: 
If you tidy your room then you can go out to play 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne argue that this can be given the biconditional interpretation: 
If you do not tidy your room then you can not go out to play 
Fleshing out the models for these yields: 
tp 
-it -IP 
where t is tidying your room, and p going out to play. The mental models theory relies on 
the search for counterexamples, there are two possible counterexamples here: 
-IP 
-it 
A full test of the conditional would result in the selection of all four cards - as is the case 
with participants who adopt a neutral perspective (Politzer & Nguyen-Xuan, 1992). 
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Johnson-Laird and Byrne argued that the perspective adopted by a participant would effect 
the models constructed. 'Me son will construct the following model: 
tp 
through the application of negation the following counterexample is derived: 
t -11) 
The participants who adopt the perspective of the mother represent the following model: 
-it -1p 
again, via negation the following counterexample is yielded 
-it p 
In the cases above the participants select the cases that correspond to the counterexamples 
yielded by the application of negation to their initial models. 
Manktelow and Over claimed that it was clear that utilities play a role in mediating 
. reasoning, and thus there is a link here between reasoning research and decision making 
theory, as subjective utility is traditionally a concept of the latter. Johnson-Laird and Shafir 
(1994) discussed the increasing links between decision making and reasoning research, 
which are traditionally two disparate fields of research (see also Doherty and Evans, 1996 
on the relationship between reasoning and decision-making). Thus in the tradition of 
subjective expected utility theory there is scope here for the study of the role of probability 
in reasoning research, as Manktelow and Over called for. The role of utility, or more 
generally preferences, has already been considered above, and this has come from decision 
theory. Decision theory states that not only are preferences important, but also 
probabilities. A brief, and somewhat crude explanation of the theory of maximising 
subjective expected utility will now be presented. Given two possibilities to choose from A 
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or B the following should become a consideration: what preference, if any, is there for A 
over B or B over A? Manktelow and Over have demonstrated that utility is important in 
deontic reasoning, but how does probability apply? 
Once preferences have been assigned to the possible outcomes, it is necessary to consider 
now the likelihood of each of these outcomes given the possible actions. It is possible to 
assign a numerical value to each of these factors (utility and probability). It is important to 
note that these numbers do not really signify anything in the world - just the value of our 
preference of A over B., and our belief in the likelihood of A given a certain set of actions. 
It is then possible to calculate subjective expected utility using the following equation: 
SEU = -rjiUi 
i 
where si is the subjective probability of the ith outcome, and Ui represents its subjective 
utiEty, and i ranges over a finite set of mutuaUy exclusive and exhaustive outcomes. 
According to the theory we should select the action that has the highest possible value 
following this calculation. It is clear from this brief summary that probability as well as 
utility has a role in decision making. Given the findings for the role of preferences in 
reasoning, it is a sound move to consider the role of probability in reasoning. 
Some recent work on probability in reasoning will briefly be discussed here before going on 
to outline the research conducted as part of the current programme. Green, Over and Pyne 
(1997) investigated the role of probability in reasoning, using the selection task. In their 
experiments participants were required to estimate the probability of finding a counter 
example to the'conditional that they had been given. Green et al. then explored the 
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relationship between these estimates and selections on the task. In the two experiments 
reported Green et al. found that probability estimates were a good predictor of selections 
made. Following Green (1995) Green et al. (1997) employed externalization procedures 
that require that the participants think about counter-examples. There were two 
externalization procedures used. Firstly, participants must try to envisage the different 
possible alternatives on each card, and secondly, they must identify those cards that Could 
contain potential counter-examples. They argued that results should be considered in terms 
of subjective expected utility. In combination with the work of Manktelow and Over (1991) 
there is evidence to suggest hat both utility and probability have a role in mediating the 
reasoning process. 
Initial work then would suggest that utility has a role to play in mediating reasoning 
performance and Green et al. (1997) and Kirby (1994) have produced some evidence to 
suggest a similar role for probability. It should be noted here that the research was 
conducted prior to the publication of Green et al. 's paper. The empirical work to examine 
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5.1 The Horse Race Tasks 
5.1.1 Probabilfty and Reasoning with Conditionals 
As was discussed in Chapter 4 Manktelow and Over (1991,1992) argued that there should 
be some element of the utilities which participants ascribe to certain outcomes, and that 
utilities should be clearly represented in a new formulation of mental models theory for 
explaining deontic reasoning. There appears to be strong evidence, as discussed earlier 
(Chapter 4), that utilities do play a role in mediating deontic reasoning. 
Manktelow and Over (1992) pointed out that it was Cosmides (1989) who first drew 
attention to the role of utilities in reasoning, based around her notion of a benefit-cost 
structure. Manktelow and Over, however, claimed that this structure was too limited, and 
that there should be a more general form of preference represented in a full theory of 
reasoning, and they termed this utility, which is considered to be a traditional construct of 
decision making research. Manktelow and Over presented evidence in support of the 
presence of utility in reasoning. Another construct usually associated with decision making 
should be considered in relation to deontic reasoning: probability. More specifically, not 
only should reasoners consider what use a particular outcome is to them (utility), they 
should also consider how likely the possible outcomes are. Reasoning should be based 
upon a combination of these factors, as argued in the theory of subjective expected utility, 
within the decision-making literature (see von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986 and Evans 
and Over, 1996a & b). 
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It was the aim of the first experiment reported in this thesis to begin to examine the role of 
probability in reasoning. This was done by designing tasks based around horse racing as 
this was considered to be a field in which probability is intrinsically involved. It also has the 
advantage of being an area with which the majority of participants would be familiar, thus 
avoiding any complications around not understanding the task. It is worthy of note here 
that there are very few real-world tasks in which odds are stated as explicitly as they are in 
horse racing. However, there would be a number of manipulations that would emphasise, 
or not, the importance of winning to the participants, thereby combining both probability 
and utility in the tasks. Indeed, in practice these two constructs are inextricably linked as 
participants are likely to have a preference for various outcomes, or a preference of 
differing degrees for the same outcome. 
The three scenarios used here were as follows: one would suggest to the participants that 
the bet was merely for fun, and winning was not of great importance. The second would 
stress the importance of avoiding a loss for the participants, and that it was a serious bet 
that they must win. The final scenario suggested to the participants that winning the bet 
would be good for them, and yet it was seen as a long shot bet, and not of huge 
importance. The scenarios will be given here in fiffl. 
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Ile participants in this experiment were seventy-four first year psychology undergraduates 
at the University of Wolverhampton. All participants took part on an unpaid volunteer 
basis, and had no prior experience of the selection task. 
5.2.2 Matetials. 
Scenario one: Trivia Bet: 
This scenario was designed so that participants would not place a great emphasis on 
winning the bet, the scenario was presented to participants as f6Uows: 
Trivial bet: 
You have recently inherited C100,000 from an old relative, one of the less 
serious things you have decided to do with this unexpected windfall is to 
place a bet of L100 on a horse. A friend of yours hears of your plans and tells 
you about the tipster in "Racing Weekly". She tells you that: If Racing 
Weekly tips a horse then it wins. 
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You know very little about horse racing and as a result of this you think that 
studying the likelihood of success in your bet will be part of the fun of 
spending your newly acquired money. You therefore decide to read Racing 
Weekly and see what the tipster recommends you do. 
Your friend has given you four slips of paper on which she has recorded 
details of horses she backed in four different races. Each slip says whether 
the horse was tipped by Racing Weekly or not on one side, and on the other 
side whether the horse won or not. 
Mich of the slips would you need to turn over in order to judge whether 
your friend! s statement will be likely to lead you to winning your bet? Please 
tick the appropriate answer box(es). 
It is clear from the scenario above that the winning the bet is of little importance, hence the 
line "one of the less serious things ...... Ile participants were then presented with four cards 
to choose from. These were Tipped by Racing Weekly (p), Not Tipped by Racing Weekly 
(not-p), Won (q), Did Not Win (not-q), given that the conditional was of the form if p then 
q. 
Scenario two: lbird Earty Loss: 
This sccnatio was designed to emphasise the impottance of not losing the bet, and this was 
made mote salient due to the fact that the money used was somebody else's. 
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Third Par1y Loss: 
Your father has given you a large amount of money and has asked you to 
place a bet on a horse for him. He has left it up to you to decide which horse 
in which race you wiU bet on. 
You are not sure which horse to back, however, and your knowledge of 
horse racing is far more limited than you had led your father to believe. 
Ilerefore you do not wish to lose your father's money, because he will be 
greatly annoyed that you have let him down, and you yourself will look 
extremely foolish for having lied to your father in the first place. Fortunately a 
friend tells you about the tipster in "Racing Weekly": She states that If 
Racing Weekly tips a hotse then it wins. 
Obviously you want to know how confident you can be in your friend's 
statement, so that you know whether to risk your fathet's money, and your 
pride, on Racing Weekly's next tip. Your friend has given you four slips on 
which she has recorded details of horses she backed in four different races. 
Each slip says whether the horse was tipped by Racing Weekly or not on one 
side, and on the other side whether the horse won or not. 
Which of the slips would you need to turn over to judge whether your friend's 
statement will be likely to lead to you not losing your father's bet, and 
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therefore avoid your father finding out that you have deceived him? Please 
tick the appropriate answer box(es). 
Therefore, as was mentioned above it is important to the subject that they win this bet, not 
only for themselves, but also for their father, hence the introduction of the third party, in 
that the participant must choose carefully, as their choices do not only affect them. Again 
the participants were presented with the same four cards as with the other scenarios. 
FinaRy, the last scenatio which the participants were presented, was the Low Utility 
scenario, in which participants would like to win, but yet the consequences are not dire if 
they fail to do so, that is, the participants would benefit from a win, but losing is not 
terriblY setious. 
Scenario Tbree: Low Utilijy: 
This scenario outlines the bet as being a long shot, and not of the greatest importance, and 
thus the participants are not massively cued to think about the choices that they make. 
Low UtiUW 
Your ftiends are planning to go on a camping holiday in Germany during the 
upcoming summer vacation, and they have asked if you would like to go with 
them. 
You get on reasonably well with all those who are planning to go away and 
would quite Eke to go along. 
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All your friends have jobs and can easily afford the travel costs involved. 
However, your grant does not really allow you to pay for yourself to go 
abroad. 
As a long shot to afford to be able to go on the trip you decide to place a 
small bet on a horse in order to pay for your travel. However you do not 
know a great deal about horse racing, yet a friend tells you about the tipster in 
"Racing Weekly". She states: If Racing Weekly tips a horse then it wins. 
Your friend has given you four slips of paper on which she has recorded 
details of horses she backed in four different races. Each slip says whether the 
horse was tipped by Racing Weekly or not on one side, and on the other side 
whether the horse won or not. 
Which of the following slips would you need to turn over to judge whether 
your friend! s statement will be likely to lead you to winning your bet? Please 
tick the appropriate answer box(es). 
Again the participants were presented with the same cards as they were with the other 
scenarios above. An example of the response sheet can be found in appendix 1- 
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5.2.3 Design. 
Ihe conditional with which the participants were presented in this task was an indicative 
conditional, rather than a deontic conditional, thus participants were expected to test the 
truth or falsity of the rule. In this task what the participants arc trying to do is to assess the 
likehhood of q given p, which is how likely is it that the horse will. win given that it has 
been tipped? nerefore, in terms of predictions regarding the selections of the participants 
in this experiment, they would be expected to select the p, q and not-q cards. These would 
be the rational selections because if there is a not-q on the reverse of the p card, then this 
would suggest unreliability on the part of the tipster, whereas, aq would suggest that the 
tipster is reliable. The participants should hope to find ap on the reverse of the q card, 
indicating that the tipster has tipped any horse that wins, although a not-q would not 
necessaril suggest unteliability. y 11 
FinaRy, the not-q card, which, as discussed above, is the card that participants often ignore 
on indicative tasks. The patticipants should select this card because if they find ap on the 
other side then this would suggest unreliability on the part of the tipster, as this would 
mean that horses that lost their races had been tipped by the Racing Weekly. Therefore, as 
the importance of winning was increased in the scenatio, then it was predicted that the 
selections of the not-q card would increase, as participants do not usually select this card. It 
is predicted that the participants would select increasingly more not-q cards from the 
Trivial Bet scenario through the Low Utility scenario, to the lbird Patty Loss scenario. 'Me 
not-p (was not tipped) is of no use to the participants as this does not help them to assess 
the reliability of the tipster which is what the task requires them to do. In summary then, 
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the predicted pattern of selection is p, q not-q. The not-q card selections should rise 
because participants are trying to assess the likelihood of q given p. 
5.2.4 Proceduir 
The cards were presented in two different orders, and the different scenarios were handed 
to the participants randomly during a lecture. The participants were instructed not to 
confer with each other, and to take all the time they needed to complete the task. 3 task 
types and two order books, giving six answer books in all. An example of a response sheet 
can be found in appendix 1. 
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5.3 Results 
Table 5.1 Results for Trivial Bet Scenario 
The results for Experiment la can be seen in the tables below: 
Percenta2e Frequencies of Card Selections in the Trivial Bet Scenario 
Tipped (p) Not Tipped (not-p) Won (q) Did Not Win (not-q) 
26 9 21 12 
93% 32% 
Combinations of Selections 
75% 43% 
p, q not-q q p, q p, not-q p, not-p AU Cards 
10 3 
10% 7% 17% 33% 10% 3% 20% 
N=28 
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Table 5.2 Results for Ibird Part Loss Scenario 
The results for Eneritnent lb can be seen in the tables below: 
Percentage Frequencies of Card Selections in the Thir PAM Loss Scenario 
Tipped (p) Not Tipped (not-p) Won (q) Did Not Win (not-q) 
15 5 15 10 
79% 26% 79% 53% 
Combinations of Selections 
ps q not-q q p p, q Not-q All Cards 
4 3 3 31 5 




Table 5.3 Results for Low Utili Scenario 
The results for E2jperitnent 1c can be seen in the tables below: 
PercenLage Frequencies of Card Selections in the Low Utili Scenario 
Tipped (p) Not Tipped (not-p) Won (q) Did Not Win (not-q) 
24 6 18 7 
89% 22% 67% 26% 
Combinations of selections 
p, q not-q qpp, q p, not-q p. not-p AU Cards 
2459223 
7% 15% 19% 33% 7% 7% 11% 
N= 27 
100 
Analysis of variance revealed no significant differences between the conditions for all four 
cards. An index was also computed based on Pollatds Indices (Pollard and Evans, 1987). 
However, due to the nature of the prediction made (that participants would select the p, q 
and not-q cards) this procedure needed to be modified slightly. OriginaUy participants 
would be given 1 point for every logically correct selection made, and one point would be 
subtracted for every logically incorrect selection made, thus producing an overall score with 
a range form -2 to +2. However, in the present experiment participants were given 1 point 
for every predicted card selected (p, q not-q), and one point was subtracted for every non- 
predicted selection (not-p). This procedure will result in the loss of some data, but does 
allow for cross-condition comparison for the predicted selection pattern. 'Ibus this 
computation wiH be referred to as the rationalindex, and wiU range from -1 to +3. Matching 
indices were also produced using the foHowing equation (p + q)-(not-p + not-q). These 
indices give a scote within the range -2 to +2. There were no significant differences 
between the three conditions on either of these indices. A graph showing the mean rational 
indices by gtoup is given in fig. 5.1, and a gtaph showing the mean matching indices by 
gtoup is given in fig. 5.2. 
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5.4 Discussion 
It was predicted that the participants would increasingly the select the not-q card as they 
were trying to assess the likelihood of q given p, and also that these selections would 
increase as importance of winning the bet was increased via the scenario. However, the 
. results only 
in part support these predictions. As can be seen from the tables above in the 
Trivial Bet and Low Utility scenarios the selections of the predicted pattern of p, q. not-q 
was very low, at 10% and 7% respectively. Conversely, the p, q combination was selected 
by 33% of participants in both conditions. However, in the third party loss condition the 
predicted combination (p, q, not-q) was selected by 21% of the participants, compared to 
15% for the p, q combination. In this condition the participants did appear to be more 
aware of the importance of selecting the not-q card, in order to assess the probability of q 
given p, that is that a horse wins given that it was tipped. Therefore, it seems that when a 
participant is aware of the importance of correctly assessing probability, then the selection 
of the not-q card increases. it appears that the participant needs to be cued to the 
importance of a correct probability assessment in order to make the predicted selections of 
p, q, not-q- However, this difference was not significant. 
Although there was some support found for the predictions that the participants' choices 
would be influenced by probabilistic manipulations in the tasks, this support was not as 
strong or as clear as had been predicted. One possible reason for this is that the standard 
four-card task is not best suited to experiments in which probability is a factor. 
Another factor to be considered when testing participants on tasks that involve probability 
was raised by Gigerenzer (1991). Gigerenzer suggests that the mind is an intuitive 
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frequentist: when humans make ptobability judgments they do not base them on a single 
case, rather they examine occurrences over time, and then they make a judgment based on 
this. lberefore, the second set of experiments was based on this idea, and gave participants 
the opportunity to measure the tipster over time in order for them to make a sound 
probability judgment about the tipster. In order top do this the Large Array Selection Task 
(LAST) was designed, as it was thought that this would give a more sensitive measure of 
the selections which the participants make with regard to ptobability judgments. Briefly, the 
LAST is a version of the selection where all versions of the cards arc presented a number 
of times. The scenarios used, and the LAST itself are discussed in more detail below, in the 
second part of this chapter. 
5.5 The Frequentist Approach. 
5.5.1 Are Humans FrequentistsD 
Experiment 1 suggested that, participants would select the cards that were relevant to 
making a sound probability judgment when they are given enough incentive to do so by the 
content of the task. However, it has been argued that humans may be by nature 
frequentists, rather than Bayesians (Gigerenzer, 1991,1996), and, if so, it is important that 
tasks are presented to participants in this form, so as to get the clearest measure of 
participantst reasoning. It is therefore important to consider exactly what this frequentist 
approach involves, and how the approach could be applied to the selection task. 
Gigerenzer suggested that the mind might be an intuitive frequcndst (see also Fiedler, 1988 
and Tvetsky and Kahnernan, 1989). He interpreted classic tasks into a frequentist 
framework, and found that cognitive illusions, that had previously been considered to be 
robust phenomena, could be made to disappear. He argued that humans make far better 
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probability judgments when the tasks are presented to them in such a framework. Consider 
the fbHowing tasks which Gigerenzer presented to his participants. 
The Linda problem is a well-known problem that was presented to participants by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1983), in this problem participants ate given a description of a person and 
ate required to make a decision about that person. 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear 
demonstradons. 
Participants were then asked which of the two following alternatives was more probable: 
Linda is a bank teHer M 
Unda is a bank teHer and is active in the feminist movement (T&F) 
When Tversky and Kahneman presented this to their participants they found that 85% of 
their participants chose the T&F option. However, Tvetsky and Kahnernan claimed that 
this was incorrect, that they should choose T because the probability of a conjunction 
cannot possibly be greater than one of its constituents. For this result Tversky and 
Kahneman offer the representativeness heuristic (a heuristic being a short cut to an answer 
which is usually successful, but not always, unlike an algorithm. ). By employing this heuristic 
participants base their choice on the match between the description of Linda, and the two 
alternatives with which the participants are presented. As participants think that Linda is 
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described as being representative of a feminist in the description they select T&F as being 
more probable than just T. 
However, Gigerenzer goes on to suggest that there is faUacy here. Those participants who 
select T&F are not violating probability theory. This is where Gigerenzer introduces the 
concept of frequentist theory (Gigerenzer, 1991). To a frequentist this problem has nothing 
to do with probability theory. Participants are asked for the probability of a single event, 
, not 
for frequencies. Indeed Gigerenzer quotes the statistician Barnard who claimed that 
such judgments should be treated in the context of psychoanalysis, not probability theory. 
(Although as Gigerenzer notes, he should have said cognitive or social psychology, 
however, the point he makes remains). Gigerenzer concedes that the conjunction faRacy 
above is a violation of some subjective theories of probability, such as Bayesian theory. 
However, it is not a violation of the major view of probability, the frequentist conception. 
Fiedler (1988) presented a version of the Linda problem in a frequentist framework, and 
suggested that this would lead to very different results from those reported by Tversky and 
Kahneman as above. He suggested that this would be the case if the mind was a 
frequentist, and thus very sensitive to the difference between single cases and frequencies. 
Gigerenzer cites Fiedler (1988) as an example of the Linda problem framed in a frequentist 
framework. Participants were presented with the description of Linda as above, and then 
asked: 
There are 100 persons who fit the descripdon above (i. e. Linda! s). How 
many of them are: 
(a) bank tellers 
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bank teUers and active in the feminist movement. 
It was found that when the problem was phrased in a frequentist framework such as this, 
the conjunction fallacy, as described above, almost disappears. In Fiedler's frequentist 
versions of the task the conjunction fallacy dropped as low as 17%, compared to 85% in 
Tversky and Kahneman's original study, and 91% in Fiedler's replication of Tversky and 
Kahnernan's experiment. lberefore, Gigerenzer (1991) argued that humans approach such 
tasks with frequentist framework in place in their minds, and thus when tasks are presented 
in this framework, participants perform better than when tasks are presented in a 'single 
shoe framework. 
1hus, in the light of Gigerenzet's arguments the selection task was developed into a 
frequentist framework, so as to decrease any chance of the participants being influenced by 
the form of the task. It also allows for a more sensitive measure of participants' choices, as 
the aim was now to measure the role of probability in conditional reasoning. For example, 
in the single shot version of the task the participants may not consider the not-q card to be 
important enough to select. However, if presented with 5 not-q cards as in the LAST the 
participants may select 2 of them, thus the measure is more sensitive. Again scenarios to 
influence the importance of winning were presented to participants, one scenario where the 
participants must try to avoid losing the bet, and one where the participants must try to win 
the bet. Although initially these may appear to be the same thing, there is evidence to 
suggest hat participants are mote sensitive to losses rather than to gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). However the scenarios were now followed by the Large Array Selection 
Task (LAST - see Appendix 2). Ibus it is predicted that those participants who where 
trying to avoid loss would show a higher level of selection of the not-q card than those 
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trying to wm the bet. A further methodological change that was made here was to add a 
fifth card to the four that were used in experiment one. This was a second not-q card, NO 
TIP GIVEN; this card was similar to the fifth card added to the task by Johnson-Laird, 
Legrenzi and Legrenzi (1972). However, Johnson-Laird et al. predicted that this card would 
be selected whereas here it is predicted that this card will not be chosen. The reason for this 
prediction was that the card does not help the reasoner to decide on the Ekelihood of q 
given p. The card was added to the task in order to test the prediction that it would not be 
chosen. 
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5.6 Experiment 2: The Large Array Selection Task 
Method 
5.6.1 Partidbants. 
The participants in this experiment were 37 first year biomedical students enrolled at the 
University of Wolverhampton stood as participants in this experiment. None of them had 
any prior experience of the selection task. 
5.6.2 Materials. 
There were two scenarios here that were as f6Uows: 
Experiment. 2a. Scenario One: Frequendst Loss: 
You have decided to place a large bet on a horse race. However, you! re not 
sure which horse to back, and you want to give yourself the lowest chance of 
losing all your money. A friend tells you about the tipster in "Racing Weekly": 
She states that "IfRacing Weekly tips a horse then it nins". 
You want to see how confident you can be in this statement, so that you 
know whether to risk Racing Weekly's next tip. Your friend has given you 
copies of her betting slips from the past month on which she has recorded 
details of all the horses she placed bets on in different races. Each slip says on 
one side whether the horse was tipped by Racing Weekly or not, and on the 
other side whether it won or not. 
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Which of the slips would you need to turn over to judge whether your friend's 
statement will be likely to lead to you not losing your bet? Please tick the 
appropriate answer box(es). 
Please tum over the page. 
Exl2t. 2b. Scenario Two: FrequentiSt Win: 
You have decided to place a bct on a horse race. However, you! re not sure 
which horse to back, and you want to give yourself the greatest chance of 
winning some money. A friend tells you about the tipster in "Racing Weekly": 
She states that "IfRacing Weekly tips a horse then it uins-'ý 
You want to see how confident you can be in this statement, so that you 
know whether to follow Racing Weekly's next tip. Your friend has given you 
copies of her betting slips from the past month on which she has recorded 
details of all the horses she placed bets on in different races. Each slip says on 
one side whether the horse was tipped by Racing Weekly or not, and on the 
other side whether it won or not. 
Which of the slips would you need to turn over to judge whether your friends 
statement will be likely to lead to you winning your bet? Please tick the 
appropriate answer box(es). 
Please turn over the page. 
Ihere were three randomised card orders, making six booklets in all (that is two scenarios, 




It can be seen that there is a very subtle difference between these two scenarios: one 
emphasises that the participants should try to avoid losing their money, while the other 
emphasises the chance of winning the bet, and therefore, making a gain. As was mentioned 
earlier there is evidence to show that participants are more aware of avoiding loss rather 
than making again for themselves. The cards presented to the participants were in a 
frequentist format, for the reasons outlined above (the response sheet can be found in 
appendix 2). 
Again, the prediction is that the participants would select the p, q and not-q cards, for the 
same reasons as were outlined earlier. However, it is suggested that the participants who are 
given the scenario in which winning is emphasised would be less likely to select the not-q 
card than those who are given the scenario in which the subject is reminded that they 
should try to avoid losing. 2 scenarios and two randomised card orders, making four 
booklets in each. 
5.6.4 Procedurr. 
The experiment was administered to the participants during their normal classes, and they 
were randomly given one of the two scenarios. Participants were asked not to confer and 
the experimenter remained with the participants to ensure that this was the case. The 
participants were given as long as they needed to complete the task, although most finished 
within ten minutes. Finally, participants were thanked for their participation, and told of the 
broad airns of the experitnent. 
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5.7 Results 
The percentage frequencies of card selections made by participants in this experiment can 
be seen in the tables below: (I'he percentages are calculated by taking the number of each 
card type selected divided by the total number of those type of cards available for selection 
and then multiplying by 100). 
The results from these experiments are shown overleaf in Tables 5.4, and 5.5. 
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Table 5.4 Results forThe Frequentis Loss Scenario 
The results for E2jperirnent 2a can be seen below: 
Percenta2e Frequencies of Card Selections in the Freauentist Loss Scenario 
Tipped (p) Not Tipped (not-p) Won (q) Did Not Win (not-q) No Tip Given 
65 15 73 25 9 
81% 19% 91% 31% 11% 
N= 16 
Table 5.5 Results for Ile Frequentis Win Scenario 
Ile results for Experimen 2b can be seen below: 
Percentne Frequencies of Card Selections in the Frecluentist Win Scenario 
Tipped (p) Not Tipped (not-p) Won (q) Did Not Win (not-q) No Tip Given 
87 17 85 54 10 
83% 16% 81% 51% 10% 
N= 21 
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Combinations of selections were not produced due to the nature of the large array selection 
task making such a computation impossible. However, indices were produced, again based 
on the procedure used by Pollard and Evans, although modified to account for the task. 
The formula used here was (p +q+ not-q) - (q + no tip). This formula produces a range 
of -10 to 15, again this leads to some clouding of the data, but has the advantage of giving 
cross condition comparisons. A graph showing these scores for both groups is shown 
below (Chart 5.3). A one way analysis of variance found that there was no significant 
difference between the two groups on this index (F (1,35) = . 283, p= ns). Again this index 
will be referred to as the rational index. 
5.8 Discussion 
It can be seen from tables 5.4 and 5.5 above, and from the results of the statistical test used 
that there was no difference between the two scenarios. The prediction was that 
participants in the loss scenario would select a higher frequency of not-q cards than those 
participants in the gain scenario, because the former stood to lose rather than gain, and 
previous research would suggest that participants are more away of potential losses than 
potential gains. However, these predictions were not upheld as no differences were found. 
Previous research would suggest that participants should show improved performance in 
the loss condition, as they should want to avoid losing. However, this was not the case. It is 
possible that the scenario did not stress the losses enough or make it clear enough to the 
participants what was at stake. The results showed slightly better performance in the 
scenario that stressed the importance of winning, although this difference was not 
significant. What is perhaps of mote direct relevance overall however, is the influence of a 
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probabilistic manipulation of the task, as this is the central theme of this thesis - are 
participants mote likely to select the not-q card when trying to assess the likelihood of q 
given p. 
With regard to the predictions vis-ý-vis the cards which the participants would choose, it 
can be seen that there is an increase in selection of the not-q card when compared to a 
standard abstract indicative task, as discussed in Chapter Two. It is argued here that there is 
a role for probability in reasoning, as many participants are able to see the importance of 
selecting the not-q card in order to make a sound probability judgment. Hence the increase 
that is shown in the selection of the not-q card. However, the selection of the not-q card is 
not up to the level of the selection of the p and q cards (p and q cards are chosen at around 
the 80% level, whereas the not-q card selecdons were 31% and 51% for the loss and gain 
scenarios respectively). The not-q card should be regarded as being as important in making 
a probability judgement as the p and q cards, and hence should show a similar selection 
rate. Although the rate of selection of the not-q card is not at the level of the p and q cards 
- it is higher than would normally be predicted for an algebraic version of the selection task. 
The version here uses thematic content, although the facilitation of the not-q card selection 
requires more than this as was demonstrated by Manktelow and Evans (1979). lbus it is 
argued here that requiring the participants to assess the Ekelihood of q given p increases the 
selection of the not-q card. 
To follow on from this research there was a revised version of the Win scenario presented 
to participants, which stressed the importance of the participants winning the bet. This 
scenario was selected because it produced the highest level of not-q selections. 
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5.9 Revised Large Arrgy Selection Task 
As was discussed above the experiments so far do suggest some support for the idea that 
probability plays a role in reasoning with indicative conditionals. This was seen to be the 
case due to participants' selections of the not-q card rising up to 51 % (experiment 2b Table 
5.5), compared to far lower levels on the standard abstract task, where selection rate is 
typically around 10% (see Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993, for more details). 
The scenario from experiment 2b that stressed to participants the importance of winning a 
bet was the scenario that elicited the highest selection of the not-q card, and so another 
gain scenario was designed. The cards with which the participants were presented were 
revised slightly, to make the task as clear as possible to the participants, and also the card 
which had previously read 'Did Not Win! was changed to read 'Lose. Although 'Did Not 
Win' is an explicit negative of Won', and this tends to yield increased performance it was 
felt that'Lose may elicit a greater response, as it reinforces not having won, by emphasising 
that'Did Not Win! is more than just failing to gain. 
5.10 Experiment 3. 
Method 
5.10.1 Partitipants. 
Eleven first year psychology students enrolled at the University of Wolverhampton, none 
of whom had any experience of the selection task. All participants participated on an 
unpaid volunteer basis. 
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5.10.2 Materials. 
The scenario that was used in this experiment was as fbUows: 
Hig, hlý Desirable Gain: 
You have decided to undertake an MSc course in order to further your 
acadernic standing and career prospects. However you have been told that the 
likelihood of you being able to receive funding for living expenses or for your 
course fees is extremely unlikely. 
You really do want to take this MSc course but feel that you cannot possibly 
do this without the financial backing you will need. You therefore decide to 
find some way of making money quickly so that you can study for your 
masters degree. Fortunately a friend tells you about the tipster in "Racing 
Weekly", she states that If Racing Weekly tips a horse then it wins. You 
decide that horse racing is as good a way as any to make money quickly so 
you decide to Mow your friend's advice. However, you want to be sure that 
you start winning itntnediately and so you wish to check the reliability of 
Racing Weeklýs tipster. 
Your friend has given you her betting slips on which she has recorded details 
of horses she backed in different races. Each shp says whether the horse was 
tipped by Racing Weekly or not on one side, and on the other side whether 
the horse won or not. 
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Which of the slips would you need to turn over in order to judge whether 
your friend's statement will. be likely to lead you to winning your bet? Please 
tick the appropriate answer box(es). 
5.10.3. Defign. 
Again it was predicted that the participants should select the p, q and not-q cards, and that 
selection rates for the not-q card should be similar to that of the p and q cards. There were 
three card orders presented to the participants, and these different orders were handed out 
to the participants randomly. (Response sheets can be found in Appendix 3). 
5.10.4 Procedure. 
The task was presented to participants during their normal classes. The participants were 
required not to confer, and the experimenter emained with the participants to ensure that 
this was the case. Ihe participants were given as long as they required for the task, and 
most patticipants completed the task within ten minutes. 
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5.11 Results 
Table 5.6 Results for ne Revise Frequentis Win Scenario 
The results for Experiment 3 can be seen below: 
Tipped (p) Not Tipped (not-p) Won (q) Did Not Win (not-q) 
35 10 40 25 
64% 18% 73% 46% 
The results from this experiment can be seen in table 5.6. Paired sample t-tests revealed 
that there was no significant difference between q card and not-q card selections (t = 1, df 
= 10, p= . 341) or p cards and not-q card selections (t = 1.936, df = 10, p= . 082). 
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5.12 Discussion 
It is clear from table 5.6 that the revised version of the task did not seem to make any great 
difference to the selections which the participants made on the task, the results were 
toughly comparable to the results found on the original desirable gain scenario. The most 
remarkable result here was the drop in selections of the p and q cards, down to 64% and 
73%, compared with results in the 80% level reported in the original desirable gain 
scenario. 'Merefore, whilst the selections of the p and not-q cards were not significantly 
different to the not-q card, this must be treated with caution, due to the low selection levels 
of the p and q cards. 
From these results, and those presented earlier it is argued that probability does play some 
role in indicative reasoning, and participants do select the not-q card more than a standard 
abstract task when they are required to make a probability judgment. Participants see the 
importance of selecting the not-q card when they have to abstract some information from 
the cards in order to make a judgment about the likelihood of q given p. However, it is 
clear that although the selection of the not-q card is as important to the judgment of the 
likelihood of q given p as ate the p and q cards the selection of the not-q card is not up to 
the level of the p and q cards which the participants mainly select. 
Therefore, from the three experiments outlined above it can be argued that probabilistic 
manipulations do have some role in indicative tasks. However the effect of probabilistic 
manipulations was not as strong as had been expected. Selections of the not-q cards did not 
come up to the same level as selections for the q and p cards. As was discussed above, so 
called logical performance is low on standard indicative tasks (Wason, 1966,1968), and so 
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it is hardly surprising that the effect of probability was not as great as had been expected. It 
was argued earlier that utility plays a role in deontic reasoning as demonstrated by 
Manktelow and Over (1991), and that the utility is a construct traditionally associated with 
decision-making. Following Manktelow and Over (1991) the possibility of a role for 
probability was investigated here, initially with indicative conditionals. It is a natural step 
then to return to the 'source' of the current research by investigating deontic reasoning, and 
the role that probability plays here, if any. There is a strong possibility that probability 
would play a greater role in deontic tasks, where it would integrate with the utility and 
search for violations elements of deontic tasks. 
Therefore, the methods that have been employed here: the Large Array Selection Task, and 
the probability infortnation will now be applied to cleontic tasks to see the role that 
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6.1 Probabiti1y and Deontic Reasonin 
6.1.1. Deontic Reasoning 
Over and Manktelow (1993) have defined deontic reasoning as: reasoning about the actions 
that one may, should or ought to perform; it is therefore, a more practical form of 
reasoning than reasoning about indicative conditionals. Reasoning about indicative 
conditionals is concerned about what may or may not be the case, and is, by its nature a 
more theoretical form of reasoning. That is not to say that these two forms of reasoning are 
separate; quite the contrary, our theoretical reasoning may have a great deal to do with any 
subsequent practical reasoning that humans may engage in. Ilus what we do may be 
influenced by what we think. 
It is quite plausible that probability does have a role in deontic reasoning. It is reasonable to 
expect a would be reasoner to consider the possible outcomes from the actions that there 
are to choose from. In doing this a reasoner should consider the usefulness these outcomes 
have to the reasoner (utility, which has been shown to play a role in the choices that 
participants make), and also the likelihood of the possible outcomes occurring, that is their 
probability. Given that decision-making appeals to the idea of expected utility then it is 
conceivable that probability will have a role in deontic reasoning. 
fil The Probabifistic LAST 
fi-. 2-1. Rtahahft and the Immigration Task 
A task that is weU known throughout the deontic reasoning literature was taken, and altered 
so as to contain a probabilistic element. Participants' responses were recorded, and the role 
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that the probability element of the task had on the choices that the participants made could 
be clearly examined. The task that was used here was the Immigration task of Cheng and 
Holyoak (1985). Ihe paper in which this task was first presented is quite possibly one of 
the most important for deontic reasoningresearch. Not only was the paper very important 
per se, but it also prompted a vast amount of research in the area of deontic reasoning, 
which has seen the field develop considerably the ten years following the publication of this 
paper. Over and Manktelow (1995) referred to Cheng and Holyoales paper as 'seminar. It 
also saw the introduction of a new theory of reasoning, that of pragmatic reasoning 
schemas, which was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
It was also decided that the frequentist framework that was used in the experiments 2 and 3 
should be kept for these experiments for the same reasons that saw its introduction in the 
first place. The LAST format of the task presents an ideal opportunity to introduce a 
probability manipulation into the immigration task. In order to investigate the role of 
probability, it was decided that probabilistic information would take the form of the 
passengers' country of origin, which would be one of two possible categories, namely, 
European or Tropical. 
In the present task the participants were given the rule 1(aperson bas ENTERING on one Jide 
of Their immigration card then thy must bave CHOLERA on the irverse side. The participants were 
then presented with 16 cards, which contained more information than in the original 
version of the task. The ENTERING and TRANSIT cards that were used in the task were 
changed so that they told the participants both the status of the passenger, and also the 
country of origin of the passenger. There were two types of passenger, those who came 
from a Tropical country, and those who came from a European country. It was the country 
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of origin that was to provide the probability manipulation in the task, in that the 
participants would consider that a passenger from a Tropical country would be mote likely 
to be a carrier of Cholera. Participants were given information in the scenario that would 
reinforce this belief 
It was predicted that the participants would show a bias to select those cards which showed 
that the participants had come from a Tropical country (Brazil, Thailand) compared with 
those cards which showed that the participants had come from a European country 
(Germany, HoUand, Norway). 
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6.3 Experiment Fou 
Method 
6.3.1 Partidpants. 
Twenty first-year psychology undergraduates from the University of Wolverhampton 
participated in the task, on an unpaid volunteer basis. None of the participants had any 
previous experience of the selection task in any form. 
6.3.2 Materials. 
As was mentioned above the materials used here were an adapted version of the task used 
by Cheng and Holyoak (1985). For this experiment the sccnatio was as follows: 
Please imagine that you are working as a customs official at Heathrow airport, and 
as part of your dudes you must check passengers' inunigration cards. One side of 
the immigration shows whether a passenger is entering Great Britain or if they are 
just in transit between planes, together with the traveler's country of origin; while 
the other side of the card shows a Est of diseases against which the traveler has 
been vaccinated. 
You an particularly concerned that people infected with ebolera sbould not be allowed to enter the 
countg. It is well known that cbolera isparticularlv common in Trvpical countiies. 
Ihe rule that was given to the patticipants was If a person bas E=RING on one jide of 
their immigration card then tby must bave CHOLERA on the reverse jide. 
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As can be seen from the scenario above a rationale was included (shown in italics here, 
though not in the original task presented to participants), this was for two reasons. Firstly it 
was to point out the utility for detecting possible violations, and secondly, to point out 
some countries have a greater probability of having passengers who are infected with 
cholera. 
6.3.3 Desi gn. 
As mentioned earlier, the Large Array Selection Task was kept in this experiment, and the 
participants were presented with twenty cards, which were made up in the following way: 
Six were ENTERING (p) cards three of which were European cards (marked as showing 
that the passenger was of European origin), and three of which were Tropical cards 
(showing that the passenger had come from a Tropical country), four were TRANSIT (not- 
p) cards (two European, and two Tropical) five included "cholera" (q) and five did not 
include "cholera" (not-q) among the list of diseases (this response sheet can be found in the 
appendix 4). 
6.3.4 Prvcedurr. 
The task was administered to participants during their usual classes. They were asked not to 
confer, and the experimenter remained with the participants to ensure that this did not 
happen. There were four randomised card orders, and these were administered randomly to 
participants. Participants were given as long as they needed to complete the task, although 
as in previous experiments, most participants were finished within ten minutes. Finally. at 
the end of the experiment the participants were thanked for their participation in the task, 
and given a short explanation of the broad aims of the experiment. 
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6.4 Results and Discussion 
Table 6.1 shows the results for this experiment, in terms of percentage frequencies of 
selections for the cards in this task. 
Table 6.1: Percentage Frequencies of Card Selections in the LAST Immigiation Task. 
Entering Trop (p) Entering Euro (p) Transit (p) (pooled) Cholera (q) No Cholera (not-q) 
98% 57% 6% 5% 67% 
N= 20 
'Me selections for the not-p card were pooled across the two types of passenger (Tropical 
and European) because the selections of this card were so low, there is no benefit in listing 
them separately. 
Participants were classified in terms of the numbers of Tropical and European p cards they 
selected. Nine participants selected more Tropical p cards, 11 chose equal numbers of both 
types of p card and none chose more European than Tropical p cards (p, = 0.002, one- 
tailed sign test). 
It is possible to conclude from this that the prediction that the participants would choose a 
greater number of Tropical p cards than European p cards was upheld. The only difference 
between the two types of card was the information about the origin of the passenger. 
However, it is not easy to compare these results directly with those of Cheng and Holyoak, 
as they do not give a precise frequency of card selection in their task, and also they used a 
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standard four-card task, rather than the large array that was used here. However, reading 
from the graph that the authors gave, it appears that around 90% of their participants chose 
the p and not-q cards. It appears that their participants gave a higher 'correce response than 
those in this experiment. While the p scores were in line with Cheng and Holyoales (1985) 
results the not-q scores were lower. Hence it is possible that in the present experiment 
Tropical scores were raised, or European scores were suppressed. Given the design 
differences between this experiment and Cheng and Holyoales, a baseline measure of LAST 
performance is needed. Consequently, the next experiment was a baseline measure, the 
Large Array Selection Task was used, but the probability information was removed from 
the cards. This experiment is presented below: 
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6.5 Baseline Measures When Using the Large Array Selection Task. 
6.5.1 Rationale for Experiment 5 
As was mentioned above, it was necessary to run a baseline condition in order to determine 
whether the results from the previous experiment were a due to there being an increase in 
the selection of the Tropical ENTERING cards, or a suppression of the European 
ENTERING cards. 
In order to measure this it was necessary to run an experiment in which the probability 
information on the p and not-p cards was removed, that is, the information about the 
country of origin of the passenger. In addition to this, the effect of the rationale sentence 
was also tested in this experiment by including or ornitting it. Chcng and Holyoak (1985) 
showed the importance of a rationale sentence in the facilitation of correct responding on 
the task., in that a higher level of correct responses occurred when the rationale sentence 
was present than when it was not. 
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6.6 Experiment Five. 
Method. 
6.6. IPartidpants. 
Twenty-one first-year psychology undergraduates from the University of Wolverhampton 
participated in the task, on an unpaid volunteer basis. None of the participants had any 
previous experience of the selection task in any form. 
6.6.2 Materials 
As was mentioned above the rationale sentence was omitted for some of the participants, 
and included for others, however, the scenario given to the participants was the same for 
both gtoups, and this was as fbUows: 
Please imagine that you ate working as a customs official at Heathrow airport, and 
as part of your duties you must check passengers' immigration cards. One side of 
the inunigtation shows whether a passenger is entering Great Britain or if they are 
just in transit between planes; while the other side of the card shows a Est of 
diseases against which the traveler has been vaccinated. 
Ten of the participants used received this information alone, and then the task, whereas 
eleven of the participants used in this expctitnent received the rationale passage as wcH, that 
was: 
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You are particularly concerned that people infected with cholera should not be 
allowed to enter the country. It is well known that cholera is particularly common 
in Tropical countries. 
6.6.3 Deii 
, gn. 
The task presented to the participants in this experiment was the same as that which was 
used in the previous experiment, except that the probability information was removed from 
the p and not-p cards. The cards stated whether the passenger was ENTERING the 
country, or just in TRANSIT between planes, as with the first of this set of experiments the 
q and not-q cards stated what vaccinations the passengers had been given prior to them 
beginýg their journey. 
Obviously, the Large Array format of the task was retained in this experiment as it was 
designed to be a comparison to the previous experiment, the overall format of the task was 
also retained, as the participants were presented with the same combinations of cards as 
they were originaRy. That is, six p cards (ENTERING), four not-p cards (TRANSIT), five 
q cards (CHOLERA absent), and five not-q cards (CHOLERA present). 
Again four random card orders were used in this experiment, so as to counterbalance 
against any effect of card orders. (An example of the response sheet used here can be 
found in appendix 5) 
6.6.4 Pmcedurr. 
Participants were allocated at random to one of the two groups, that is rationale present, or 
rationale absent, and the experiment was run during one of the participants' normal classes. 
The participants were asked not to confer, and the experimenter remained present to 
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ensure that this was the case. Participants were told that they had as long as they required to 
complete the task, although most were finished within ten minutes. When the participants 
had all completed the task they were thanked for their participation in the task, and given a 
brief explanation of the broad aims of the experiment. 
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6.7 Results and Discussion 
The percentage selection frequencies of cards for the two groups can be seen in tables 6.2 
and 6.3 below. 
As was stated above the main airn of this experiment was to study the selection of the p 
cards, and to compare these to such selections in the original frequentist immigration task, 
presented in table 6.1. It is clear from the tables 6.2 and 6.3 below that the selections of the 
p cards here compare closely with the frequency of selections of the Tropical p cards in the 
original experiment. 
Table 6.2 Percentage Frequencies of Card Selections in the IAST Immigration Basehng 
Task with Rationale. 
Entering (p) Transit (not-p) Cholera (q) No Cholera (not-q) 
80% 9% 27% 53% 
N11 
Table 6.3 Percentage Frequencies of Card Selections in the IAST Immigrafion Basehnc 
Task without Rationale. 
Entering (p) Transit (not-p) Cholera (q) No Cholera (not-q) 
98% 2% 45% 50% 
N=10 
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Hence it seems to be that the probability manipulation in the original experiment had the 
effect of suppressing the selections of the low probability (European ENTERING) cards, 
rather than facilitating selections of the high probability (Tropical ENTERING) cards. 
Thus, it is suggested here that the participants saw those passengers who are coming from 
European countries qow-tisk areas) as being less subjectively significant. This claim can 
also be corroborated by the findings that the p card has a normally high selection rate, 
ignoring cases which manipulate utility (such as Manktelow and Over, 1991 and Cosmides, 
1989). 
Finally, to consider briefly the effect of the rationale sentence of the selections which the 
participants made. In Cheng and Holyoak (1985), the rationale sentence led to a facilitation 
of p and not-q selections. However, this did not appear to be the case here, as the not-q 
frequency is 53% and 50% for the rationale and no rationale conditions respectively. 
Selections of the p card were lower in the rationale condition than in the no rationale 
condition, although this was only a slight difference. It is also worthy of note that the 
frequency of q card selections was quite high here, and certainly higher than in the original 
experiment, this is put down to the lack of a clear connection between a rationale and 
specific probability and utility information, thus producing more variable performance. It is 
also important to consider what effect the Large Array Selection Task may have on the 
choices which the participants make, given that they are presented with six times as many 
cards as in the standard four card version of the task. There needs to be more research to 
study the connection between selections of the fout-card task, and the Large Array version 
of the task, not only in the deontic domain here, but also with indicative conditionals, and 
abstract materials. However, participants here did seem to produce the predicted pattern 
like Cheng and Holyoak (1985). 
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In order to further examine the effect of the rationale sentence of the selections which the 
participants made a version of the task was run in which the rationale was again omitted 
but the information about the country of origin on the p and not-p cards was reinstated. 
This experiment is presented below. 
6.8 The Effect of Rationale Sentences on Large Array Deontic Conditionals 
6.8.1 Motivation for Experiment Six 
As was discussed earlier the effect of the rationale sentence needed to be examined in more 
detail. Cheng and Holyoak (1985) showed that when participants were provided with a 
rationale for a rule, then they could solve the task reasonably well, using Johnson-Laird, 
Legrenzi and LegrenzPs (1972) postal task. This was the aim of the experiment presented 
here. The rationale sentence that was used for some of the participants in the experiment 
five was omitted for all the participants in this experiment, but the probability information 
on the p and not-p cards was reinstated, that is the information about the country of origin 
of the passengers. lhus the main aim of this experiment was to examine whether there 
needs to be a link between an expEcit rationale setting out the probability and utility 
structure of the scenario and corresponding information in the problem content. 
It is already known that the rationale passage that has been used in the previous 
experiments contains both utility and probability elements. That is that the first part of the 
rationale states that the authorities are particularly concerned to keep people infected with 
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cholera out of their country, and the second part states that this disease is particularly 
common in Tropical countries. 
This experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that the participants need to be 
explicitly cued to this rationale, and that they are not able to construct it for themselves. 
Thus the rationale sentence was completely omitted, and the country of origin information 
was replaced on the p and not-p cards, as in the original experiment that was presented 
above. 
6.9 Experiment Six. 
6.9.1 Parfid 
. 
pants. Fifteen first year psychology undergraduates from the University of 
Wolverhampton participated in the task, on an unpaid volunteer basis. None of the 
participants had any prior experience of the selection task in any form. 
6.9.2 Materials 
The participants were presented with the foHowing scenario: 
Please imagine that you are working as a customs official at Heathrow 
airport, and as part of your duties you must check passengers' immigration 
cards. One side of the immigration shows whether a passenger is entering 
Great Britain or if they are just in transit between planes, together with the 
traveler's country of origin; while the other side of the card shows a list of 




However, there was no rationale sentence given to the participants at aR, and this was the 
only instruction that the participants were given. Obviously participants were told to place a 
tick in the box corresponding to those cards which the participants thought should be 
turned over to ensure that the rule was not being violated. The rule that the participants 
were given was the same as the original rule given to the participants in experiment 4, that 
is 'y a person bas E=RING on one jide of their immiýration card then lby must bave 
CHOLERA on the rrverse jide. Ile participants were then presented with a piece of A4 
paper with the twenty cards on that had been presented to the participants in the original 
experiment, containing the probabilistic information on the p and not-p cards, unlike those 
cards presented to the participants in experiment five. There were four randomised card 
orders used to ensure that there was no effect of card orders on the selections that the 
participants made. (The response sheet here was the same as that for experiment four, and 
can be found in Appendix 4). 
6.9.4 Pmceduir 
The task was administered to the participants during their regular classes, and participants 
were asked not to confer, the experimenter emaining present to ensure that this was the 
case. The four randomised card orders were administered randomly to the participants. The 
participants were allowed as long as they needed to complete the task, although most of the 
participants had completed the task within ten minutes. When all participants had 
completed the task the participants were given a brief explanation of the broad aims of the 
experiment, and thanked for their participation in the experiment. 
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6.10 Results and Discussion 
The percentage selection equencies of cards for experiment 6 can be seen in table 6.4 
below. 
Table 6.4 Percentage Frequengy of Selection of Cards in LAST Immigration Task, 
with no Rationale 
Entering Ttop (p) Entering Euro (p) Transit (p) (pooled) Cholera (q) No Cholera (not-q) 
93% 93% 2% 48% 33% 
N=15 
Table 6.4 shows the percentage selection frequencies of all cards for all participants, again 
the frequency for the not-p cards has been pooled across European and Tropical cards, 
because the selection was so low for these cards. 
Regarding selection of the European and Tropical p cards the results are as clear as they 
possibly could be, that is that the frequencies are exactly the same. The frequency of 
selection of these cards is at the level of the Tropical p cards from the first experiment, or 
the "non-suppressed" level. The return of selections to the non-suppressed level clearly 
indicates that the effect of the probability information on the cards in experiment four was 
to suppress selections of European p cards rather than to facilitate selection of Tropical p 
cards. 
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The trend shown in experiment five was continued here, in that the difference between the 
q and not-q cards was not as clear as it could be. It therefore appears that there must be 
explicit representations of utility-for at least one of the parties involved in a deontic 
reasoning task ate required for clear patterns of inference to be displayed (Manktelow and 
Over, 1992). It seems from the results from this experiment that the same goes for 
probability, in that it needs to be explicitly represented for the expected patterns of 
inference to be observed. 
Thete is one final experiment to be reported in this chapter. An experiment in which the 
participants were given the probability information, the country of origin of the passenger, 
but this time it was on the q and not-q cards, rather than on the p and not-p cards. 
nerefore, the final experiment in this set places this information on the consequent cards, 
and investigates whether this wiU have an affect on the choices the participants wiU make. 
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6.11 The Effect of Probabilfty Information on Consequent Cards 
6.11.1 Rationale for Experiment Seven 
As was stated in 6.9 the experiment here is the same as experiment four, except here the 
probability information was presented on the q and not-q cards rather than on the p and 
not-p cards. There is some work to suggest that probability judgments can affect such 
inferences (Byrne, 1989 and Stevenson and Over, 1995). Byrne (1989) found that additional 
premises had an effect on the corresponding modus tollens inference in indicative 
conditional syllogisms. However, it is not possible to directly link this to deontic reasoning, 
as it is not possible to refer to the modus tollens and modus ponens inferences in an 
indicative task as being equivalent to the corresponding inferences in a deontic task. 
Deontic conditionals are not truth-functional, unlike indicative conditionals, this is clearly 
indicated by the use of modal auxiliaries in their consequents. 
Therefore, although there is not necessarily a link between inferences that participants 
make on indicative and deontic conditionals, predictions can sdU be made. It is predicted 
that even when the information about the passenger's origin is on the q and not-q cards, 
which results in the participants being able to see both the country of origin, and the 
vaccinations which the passengers have had on the same card, they wiU stiU show a bias. It 
is hypothesised that the bias will be a suppression of those cards that show that the 
passenger has come from a European country. 
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Twenty-one first and second year psychology undergraduates from the University of 
Wolverhampton partidpated in the experiment, on an unpaid volunteer basis. None of the 
participants had any experience of the selection task in any form. 
6.12.2 Materials. 
Obviously it was necessary to make some fairly major changes to the instructions that the 
participants were given in this experiment. The scenario with which the participants were 
presented was as foRows: 
Please imagine that you are working as a customs official at Heathrow 
airport, and as part of your duties you must check passengers' immigration 
cards. One side of the immigration card shows whether a passenger is 
entering Great Britain or if they are just in transit between planes; while the 
other side of the card shows a list of diseases against which the traveler has 
been vaccinated, together with the traveler's country of origin. 
You are particularly concerned that people infected with cholera should not 
be allowed to enter the country. It is well known that cholera is particularly 
common in Tropical countries. 
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Again the participants were given the rule, that If aperson bas ENTERING on one side of Their 
immigration card then My mmst bave CHOLERA on the irverse jide. 
6.12.3 Deji gn 
The participants were then presented with twenty-two cards, this was because there were 
other cards added to the response sheet in this experiment. Two cards were added, these 
were one q card, and one not q card, making six in all. 'Mus it was possible to make three 
of the q cards European, and three as Tiopical, and the same with the not-q cards. The 
other cards were set at the same level as the original experiment, that is four not-p cards, 
and six p cards. Obviously, the probability information was removed from the p and not-p 
cards for this experiment, and was only present on the q and not-q cards. (Me response 
sheet can be found in the appendix 6). 
6.12.4 Prvcedurr 
The task was administered to participants during their usual classes, and they were asked 
not to confer, the experimenter remained with the participants to ensure that this did not 
happen. There were four randomised card orders, and these were administered randomly to 
participants. Participants were given as long as they needed to complete the task, although 
as in previous experiments, most participants were finished within ten minutes. FinaUy, at 
the end of the experiment the participants were thanked for their participation in the task, 
and given a short explanation of the broad aims of the experiment. 
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6.13 Results and Discussion 
The percentage selection frequencies of cards for experiment 7 can be seen in Table 6.5 
below. 
Table 6.5 Percentage Frequengy of Selection of Cards in IAST Immigration Task. 
with no Rationale 
Entering (p) Transit (not-p) Cholera Trop (9) Cholera Euro, (9) No Cholera Trop No Cholera Euro 
(not-q) (not-q) 
96% 1% 16% 13% 67% 40% 
21 
Again, the results from tIds experiment are clear, and in the direction that was predicted 
earlier: Participants show a suppression of those cards which show that the passenger has 
come from a European country. 
The results from experiment 7 are quite remarkable considering that the participants can 
see not only what country the traveler is coming from but also what vaccinations the 
traveler has had, on the same side of the card. When the participants are classified as to the 
types of card that they chose the following results were found: six chose more Tropical 
not-q cards than European not-q cards, none chose more European not-q cards than 
Tropical not-q cards, and the remainder of the participants chose equal numbers of not-q 
cards (P=0.016, one-tailed sign test). 
When comparing these not-q card results to those in the original immigration experiment, 
it can be seen that again the effect of the probability manipulation is to suppress selection 
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of the not-q cards for European travelers, rather than facilitating selection of the not-q card 
for the Tropical travelers. 
Finally, the level of q card selection has dropped back to the original level, rather than those 
levels which were found in the interim experiments (around 501/6). This supports the 
suggestion that was made earlier that there needs to be a clear link between task 
information and task materials for the participants to ignore those cards that are of little 
importance. As experiments 5 and 6 omitted part of the instructions or task materials the 
participants did not eliminate the q cards from examination, which, of course, is fruitless as 
it is unable to reveal any violations. 
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6.14 Chapte Summa 
Before, moving on to the final set of experiments in this thesis, there is scope for a general 
overview of the findings of the experiments that have looked at the role of probability in 
deontic reasoning. Other issues to be addressed here include how these findings relate to 
the first set of experiments that used indicative conditionals. 
The initial set of experiments suggested that there was some evidence for participants 
selecting not-q when trying to assess the likelihood of q given p. The not-q card is typically 
ignored in standard indicative versions of the task, and yet selection rates here rose to 
approximately 50% in some cases. Manktelow and Over (1991) demonstrated a tole for 
utility in deontic reasoning, a construct was usually associated with decision-making. It was 
a natural step then to consider a further construct from this area: probability. Probability 
was initially considered alone using indicative conditionals (the horse race tasks, 
experiments 1-3), and some effect was found, as discussed above. 
One of the major outcomes of this shift to consider probability was the introduction of the 
Large Array Selection Task (LASI). Ilis afforded a number of benefits over the standard 
fout-card task. It allows participants to reflect the relevant importance of each card in the 
task. For example, when presenting with 5 not-q cards a participant can select 0,1,2,3,4, 
or all of these depending on how relevant they believe that card to be to the task. This 
flexibility is not present in the standard task where a card is simply selected or not. The task 
also allows a large amount of data to be collected using reasonably few participants. Finally, 
it helps to avoid the cognitive illusions cited by Gigerenzer (1991) by presenting the task in 
a frequentist framework. 
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The horse race task provided some basic evidence for the use of probabilistic information 
by participants when presented with the task. The basis for studying the role of probability 
had been Manktelow and Over's (1991) findings with utility, hence it was a reasonable step 
to return to deontic reasoning for the second set of experiments, using Cheng and 
Holyoak's deontic immigradon task. 
Deontic tasks facilitate selection of the 'correce cards (dependent on the utility and social 
tole of the participant), it seemed to be a prudent move to design a task which involved the 
study of probability through the medium of a deontic task. Thus a version of the 
immigration task originaRy presented by Cheng and Holyoak (1985) was used, in which the 
origin of the passengers was also put on to the cards. This had a marked effect on the 
choices that the participants made, showing a bias against selecting those cards that showed 
that the passenger had come from a European country. 
There is scope here for a comparison between the two sets of experiments conducted thus 
far. The indicative experiments suggested that probabilistic information might be important 
in reasoning with conditionals. Ihe move to deontic reasoning confirmed this - with the 
suppression effect being very clear when participants do not consider a passenger to be a 
. threat to the rule they have been given. Thus the probability information appeared to have 
a greater effect when the rules the participants were given were deontic rather than 
indicative, as was predicted earlier. 
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Subsequent experiments showed that the effect of the probability manipulation was to 
suppress the selection of European cards rather than to facilitate the selection of the 
Tropical cards. Suggesting that the participants judge the Tropical p cards as a greater risk 
of being a violation of the rule that the participants were given rather than the European 
cards. The effect would need to be one of suppression rather than facilitation for a number 
of reasons. Firstly participants on the task almost universally select the p card, and thus the 
only shift could be a decrease in selections or a suppression effect. Secondly, all passengers 
represent arisk, however, some are less risky than others (those from European countries, 
where Cholera is not particularly prevalent). 1hus this should be reflected in a suppression 
effect. If all passengers have a 'default classification' of risky, as would be suggested by 
Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) results as well as the experiments reported here with the 
rationale sentence removed, then the only shift that can occur to this 'classification' is to 
reduce the risk rating of any type of passenger. 
It also seemed to be the case that participants require a clear relation between the task 
instructions, and the task materials, and that the participants need to have the probabilistic 
aspects of the task explicitly pointed out to them. When this information was not made 
explicit the participants selected both types of p card at exactly the same level. Final1y, the 
participants displayed the suppression effect even when the probability information was put 
onto the consequent cards and the participants could assess both the country of origin, and 
the vaccinations that the passengers' had had. There wiu be further discussion of the results 
of these experiments in the general discussion, where theories of both indicative and 
deontic reasoning will. be considered in light of the findings presented here. 
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The final set of experiments was designed to examine bow explidt information about 
probability needs to be for participants to react to it. Manktelow and Over (1991) suggested 
that information about utility and social roles needed to be explicit for participants to select 
accordingly on the task. 1hus experiments were designed which would require the 
participants to extract information about probability. Their performance on a probabilistic 
selection task was then assessed. Participants would be presented with information about 
passengers that showed one type (European or Tropical) of passenger violated the rule 
whereas another did not. Ibcy were then given the LAST where they should display 
knowledge of this bias if they have extracted the probabilistic information from the initial 
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7.1 The Computer Based Selection Tas 
7.1.1 Rationale for Experiment 8 
This experiment was a computer based large array selection task, which allowed the 
participants to click on the cards, and exan-ýine the reverse side of the card, which usually 
remains hidden. In this version of the task the participants receive more information about 
the nature of the cards. They can see whether they conform to the rule or not, thus they 
have more information than is usually given to participants in regular pencil and paper tasks 
- such as those used in other experiments presented both in this thesis, and the majority of 
the selection task literature. 
Ile proposal behind this experiment was to present different information on the cards to 
three different groups, and to see how this information would influence the choices that 
the participants subsequently made as they progressed through the task. The participants 
begin their task, seeing one type of card as more likely to be a violation than another. From 
the previous experiments it can be seen that participants make the choice that Tropical 
ENTERING cards constitute a greater risk to the violation of the country's law on 
immigration than European ENTERING cards do. Subsequently they display a 
suppression effect on the European p cards when compared to the Tropical p cards. Thus 
the participants must have a certain model of the task in their minds before they begin. 
However, if they subsequently receive information that confounds these models then they 
should search for an alternative model that fits with this new data. 
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Thus the problem content was kept broadly the same, in that the Large Array Immigration 
Selection Task was still used, and three groups were used, group number one: in which no 
bias was shown on the cards; there was an equal number of violation of both European and 
Tropical cards. Group two in which there was a bias of European violations; all the 
European ENTERING cards were violations of the rule; they showed ENTERING on the 
one side of their form, but they did not show CHOLERA on the other. Finally, Group 
three: in which there was a bias of Tropical violations; all the Tropical ENTERING cards 
were violations of the rule, for the same reason as given above for the European violations. 
It was predicted that the participants would extract the information from the immigration 
cards as they passed through the task, and that they would show a bias towards the cards 
that showed a bias in their presentation. More explicitly, group number one would show a 
suppression of selection of the European ENTERING cards, this is because even though 
there is no bias in the cards to begin with, the participants should still show the suppression 
effect that was observed in experiment 4. Group two, however, should extract the 
information from the cards with which they are presented that the most likely passengers to 
violate the rule are those travelling from a European country. This should facilitate 
selection of these cards bringing them up to a similar level to the Tropical ENTERING 
cards. Ile third group should show an even greater suppression effect than that which has 
been previously observed, as their original models were being reinforced by the information 
that they receive on the cards with which they were presented. 
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7.2 Experiment Eigh 
Method 
7.2.1 Parlidpants 
Forty-eight first year psychology undergraduates from the University of Wolverhampton 
participated in the task, on an unpaid volunteer basis. None of the participants had any 
previous experience of the selection task in any form. 
7.2.2 Desýn and Matedals. In this task the participants were initiaUy presented with an 
instruction screen, and then with two pages of immigration cards, each containing 16 cards 
(thus 32 in all). Again four randomiscd card orders were used, to eliminate any possible 
effect of card orders. ('Screen Dumps" of the pages with which the subject were presented 
can be found in appendix 7). 
The task was generated using the Macintosh HyperCard software package, with the 
participants having to move the mouse to the card which they thought needed to be turned 
over to check that the rule was not being violated. The selections that the participants made 
was -recorded by the computer, and examined later. 
The instructions that the participants were given were as foHows: 
Please imagine that you are working as a customs official at Headuow airport, and as 
part of your duties you must check passengers immigration forms. One side of the 
form states whether the passenger is entering the country or just in Transit, together 
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with the passenger's country of origin. While the other side of the form shows a list of 
diseases against which the passenger has been vaccinated. You are particularly 
concerned that people infected with cholera should not be allowed to enter the 
country. It is well known that cholera is particularly prevalent in Tropical countries. 
You have, therefore, been given the following rule, If a form says ENTERING on 
one side then CHOLERA must be among the list of diseases on the reverse 
side. 
On the next two pages are 32 such immigration forms, you must click the mouse on 
the forms that you think you must check in order to ensure that this rule is not 
violated, you will then be shown the reverse side of the card. You are free to return to 
this instruction page at any time during the experiment. 
Ile participants were then required to 'clicle on a box marked 'click here to begin the 
experimene, and they were then presented with the first of the two screens of cards. The 
patticipants moved on to the second screen by 'clickine on another box, marked 'next 
page', and were then presented with the second screen of cards. When the participants had 
completed the experiment they were required to 'clicle a box marked 'finished!; they were 
then presented with a 'thank-yod page, and told that they could now leave. Finally, at any 
time during the experiment the participants could return to the instructions page by 
'clickiný a box n=ked'retum to instructions'. 
7. Z3 Procedurr. The participants were asked to participate in the experiments during their 
usual classes, and if they agreed to do so the experimenter met them after their class, and 
escorted them to the laboratory. The participants were asked if they had basic mouse skills, 
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and if they did they then began the experiment, those that did not have such skiHs were 
shown how to do use a mouse. 
The participants were then shown into individual cubicles to begin the experiment, they 
were left in the room alone, and told that if they did not understand the instructions then 
they should ask the experimenter. Any such requests were met with a reiteration of the 
instructions given in the task, which proved to be sufficient explanation for the 
participants. 
The participants were given as long as they needed to complete this experiment, although 
most participants were finished within ten minutes. When the participants had finished the 




The results for this experiment can be seen in the table 7.1 below. Predictions were upheld 
for the control group, although not for the two experimental groups the suppression effect 
was still present in the EATN (European All biased Tropical None biased) group, when it 
was predicted that it would diminish. However, selection rates in this group were 
comparable with both the control group and the ENTA (European None biased Tropical 
AR biased) group. 
Percentages of Card Selections For The Three Groups in Experiment Eighil 
Table 7.1 
Control Gtoup. 
Entering Euro (p) Entering Trop (p) Transit Euro Transit Trop Cholera (q) No Cholera 
(not-p) (not-p) (not-cl) 
54% 80% 24% 44% 10% 54% 
N= 17 
Experimental Groups. 
Euro All Trop None (EAThýj 




Cholera (9) No Cholera 
(not-q) 
58% 85% 21% 
i 
58% 7% 29% 
N= 13 
Euto None Trop All (ENTA) 
Entering Euro (p) Entering Trop (p) Transit Euro Transit Trop Cholera (9) No Cholera 
(not-p) (not-p) (not-q) 
64% 90% 6% 26% 30% 33% 
N=18 
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In order to carry out an analysis of variance on the results that were observed it was 
necessary to compute a falsification index for the cards that were used in the task. Using 
the foHowing formula does diis: 
(p + not-q) - (not-p + q). 
Based on Pollards indices, Pollard and Evans (1987). Descriptive statistics for these 
falsification indices ate given below in Table 7.2 
Descriptive Statistics For Experiment 8 
Table 7.2 
Group Number Minimurn Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CONTROL 17 -2 10 3.29 3.7 
ENTA 18 -1 16 5.22 4.72 
EATN 13 -1 14 4.62 4.09 
An Arc Sine transformation was applied to the percentage card selections for each subject, 
so that the falsification index could then be computed, and used as the data in an analysis 
of variance (Snodgrass, 1977). ne results from the Anova are reported in table 7.3 below: 
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Table 7.3 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Significance 
Between 53.128 2 26.564 
Groups 
Within 308.035 45 6.845 
Groups 
Total 361.163 47 
3.881 . 028 
The results from experiment eight do not support the predictions that were made. There 
was a significant difference between the FI values for the groups (F= 3.881, p=. 028). A 
post-hoc Student - Newman - Keuls test was applied to the ANCIVA results to see where 
the differences exist. This revealed that group 1 (Control) was significantly different from 
group 3 (ENTA). 
This translates as there being a greater selection of logically correct cards by the participants 
in group 3 than in group 1. This could mean that the participants in the ENTA group were 
tending to select the p and not-q cards more than those participants in the control group. 
However, a lower not-p card selection would also raise the index, and it appears that this 
was the case. There was no difference between the EIýTA group and the EATN group as 
had been originally predicted. 
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7.4 Discussion 
Ihe first thing to note is that generally speaking the results are not as clear cut as had been 
predicted above. The groups did not show the biases in their selections that should have 
been suggested to them from the information that they were given on the cards in the 
earlier part of the experiment. 
If the ENTERING cards are examined only then it can be seen that there is no large 
difference in the percentage frequencies of selections of the Tropical cards, 80%, 85%, and 
90% for control, EATN (Euro, All Trop None) and ENTA (Euro None Trop All) 
respectively. This was not what had been predicted, in that there should have been a drop 
in the selections of these cards in the EATN group, but this was clearly not the case. For 
the European ENTERING cards it is again the case that the results do not follow the 
predictions that were made. Here the percentage frequencies of selections were 54%, 58% 
and 64% for the control EATN and ENTA groups respectively. These do not follow the 
predictions in that the EATN group should have shown the highest selection of these 
cards, but this was not the case. It can be seen that there are really no huge differences 
between the three groups with regard to the selection of the ENTERING cards, regardless 
of whether they show that the passenger was from a Tropical country or from a European 
country. Perhaps then, it can be argued that due to the very robust nature of the original 
effect (see experiment four), people's prior beliefs about diseases and countries of origin are 
immune to any new information that they may subsequently receive. This explanation is 
upheld by the only significant difference being that the group which were presented with 
the cards which showed that the Tropical passengers were more likely to be violations (the 
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ENTA group) did not show any suppression of the logically correct cards, when compared 
to the control group. 
The other cards of major concern are the No Cholera cards, the selections here do vary 
across the groups which is strange. Participants should really select all the cards which show 
'No Cholera' as they contain no information about the origin of the passengers, but do go 
some way to forming a potential violation. However, the groups do show a big difference 
in the selections of these cards, 54%, 29% and 33% for the control, EATN and ENTA 
groups respectively. It is also interesting to note that selections of the q card rose to 30% in 
the ENTA condition, which is almost as high as this group's selection of the not-q cards, 
which was not as predicted. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the participants did make some unexpected selections 
of the TRANSIT cards. For the European TRANSIT cards the selections were 24%, 21 % 
and 6% for the control, EATN and ENTA groups respectively, and for the Tropical 
TRANSIT cards the selections for the same groups were 44%, 58% and 26%. These results 
are again strange as there should be a low level of selection for the TRANSIT cards, but the 
selections of Tropical not-p cards in the EATN group were as high as the European 
ENTERING cards for the same group. One possible explanation is that the participants 
did not fiffly understand the nature of being in Transit, and thus they selected the cards. 
This may be the case as there is a bias towards selecting those TRANSIT cards which 
showed that the passengers were of Tropical origin, or a suppression of those which stated 
that the passenger was of European origin. This seems to be a fairly plausible explanation, 
as the Transit cards reproduce the effects observed on the ENTERING cards. However, in 
other versions of this task there does not appear to have been such a misunderstanding (see 
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earlier versions of the task in this thesis and Cheng and Holyoak, 1985), and so perhaps 
there is an alternative explanation for these results. It may be that because the task is 
computer based, and not a pencil and paper task, the participants do not feel as committed 
to the choices that they make on the task, as they feel that it has an air of hypothesis testing 
about it. Consequently, they make some choices that are non-essential just to get'a feer for 
the task. Also using the LAST, like the RAST (reduced array selection task) participants are 
really performing multiple selection tasks, and they may feel that they are able to examine 
more of the cards on such a version of the task than they do on the single shot four card 
task. 'Mere is an element to the LAST that allows the subject to 'revoke' an initial selection 
in a later presentation. 
The hypothesis testing idea fits well with the work of Oaksford and Chater (1994), and 
their rational analysis of the selection task. However, the theory that they propose would be 
unable to account for the participants selecting the not-p card as much as they do, as the 
theory is based on information gain, and the participants do not stand to gain much 
information, if any, by selecting the not-p card. However, it is possible that with only 32 
cards being presented to the participants there is not enough time for them to examine the 
information on the cards and to alter the models which they arc using to solve the task, and 
for this change in models to show in the results from the experiments. 
7.5 Revise Coml2ute Base Selectio Task 
A second version of the task was designed, in which the participants were given a trial run 
through 48 cards - where the bias was contained. 1hus, one group was presented with a set 
of 48 cards that contained cards where the split of violations was equal for European or 
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Tropical passengers (control). A second group was presented with 48 cards which had all 
the European passengers as violators, and none of the Tropical passengers as violators 
(EATN). The final group was presented with 48 cards which showed all the Tropical 
passengers, and none of the European passengers to be violators of the rule (ENTA). The 
participants were then presented with the cards 'for rear, and here no bias was given: the 
cards had an equal split of European and Tropical violations. Ibus it was possible for the 
participants to extract the information about the cards from the trial run, and then adjust 
their models, and it was expected that the difference in the groups that was predicted above 
would show up in the latter section of this experiment. As was mentioned in the discussion 
of the results above, the results were not as predicted and some speculative explanations 
for this were offered. In order to account for the unpredicted results that were observed, a 
revised version of the task was presented to participants to help to provide a better test of 
the original predictions. 
Ile predictions for these different groups were that the first group (control) would show a 
suppression of selection of the European ENTERING cards, as had been the case in the 
earlier experiments. Ibc second group was expected to show a bias towards selecting the 
European ENTERING cards. The cards that they were presented with had all the 
European ENTERING cards as violations of the rule that the participants had been given. 
Thus it was predicted that the participants would alter the models that they were using to 
'solve' the task from selecting the Tropical ENTERING cards, to a model which would 
lead them to select the European ENTERING cards. 
'Ihe third group were presented with a set of cards which had the Tropical ENTERING 
cards as violations, and it was predicted that this group would show a very strong bias 
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towards selecting the cards that showed that the passenger was ENTERING from a 
Tropical country. 
Iberefore the task was revised to remove some of the obstacles which had previously 
prevented a full test of the predictions that were outlined above. The task was extended to 
include a trial run of cards before the experimental cards were presented. It was felt that the 
participants in the previous experiments did not have enough cards to change the models 
that they were using and for this change to show in the results of the experiments. 
Thus the participants were presented with 48 cards which showed the biases that were 
outlined above, the participants were told that they could 'clicle on these cards and the card 
would turn over and the other side of the card would be revealed to the participants. All 
the participants were then presented with the same set of 32 cards on which there was no 
bias, that is, the cards showed an equal number of violations and non-violations for both 
the Tropical and European ENTERING cards. It was predicted that the expected biases 
would then appear in the second set of 32 cards. 
7.6 Experiment Nine, 
Method 
7.6.1 Partidpants 
Forty-two participants participated in the experiment, the participants were first year 
undergraduates enrolled on the psychology B. Sc. course at the University of 
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Wolverhampton. All were unpaid. None of the participants had any prior experience of the 
selection task. 
7.6.2 Design and materials 
The participants were initially presented with a set of instructions about the trial run which 
are shown below: 
Please imagine that you are an finmigration officer at Heathrow airport. 
Oneof your duties is to check passengers' form H. On one side of the form 
is the status of the passengers, whether they are entering the country of in 
transit between planes. On the other side of the form is a list of vaccinations 
that the passengers have had. You are told by the authorities that If the 
form says Entering on one side, then it must have cholera among the 
list of vaccinations on the other side. You are also told that cholera is 
particularly prevalent in Tropical countries. On the next page is a selection 
of sample forms for you to look at, when you click on the form it will turn 
over so that you can see the other side. When you have finished looking at 
these there are some more forms that you must examine, further instructions 
wiU be given when you come to this section. Ilank you, you may now 
begin. 
The participants were then presented with the 48 cards that contained the biased 
information regarding the passengers' countries of origin. The participants had as long to 
look through this information as they required. When they had completed this section the 
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participants were then presented with another set of instructions regarding the second set 
of 32 cards, these instructions Were as follows: 
Again, please imagine that you are working as an immigration officer at 
Heathrow airport. You must now check passengers' form H for real, having 
looked through some sample forms, as you know, one side of the form is 
the status of the passenger, whether they are Entering the country, or in 
transit between planes. On the other side of the form is a list of vaccinations 
that the passengers have had. You are told by the authorities that If the 
form says Entering on one side, then Cholera must be among the list 
of vaccinations on the reverse side. You are also told that cholera is 
particularly prevalent in Tropical countries. 
On the next two pages are 32 such immigration forms, which you must now 
check for real. In order to ensure that this rule is not violated, you must click 
on those forms that you think you need to check in order to make sure that 
the above rule is not violated. 
You may return to this instruction page at any time, you may now begin the 
experiment. 
The participants were then presented with 32 cards which contained no bias whatsoever, 
that is, there were equal numbers of European and Tropical passengers entering the 
country who were not vaccinated against cholera, and were thus breaking the rule that the 
participants had been given. The computer recorded the choices that the participants made 
on this second set of cards. Again the application used to design this experiment was 
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HyperCard on the Apple Macintosh. It is important to note that there was a slight error in 
the design of the card layout here, which was not discovered until the experiment had 
already been run. The error lay in the fact that there were 2 European TRANSIT cards, and 
4 Tropical Transit cards (where there should have been 3 of each type), and there were 7 
Cholera cards, and 9 No Cholera cards (where there should have been 8 of each type). Due 
to the fact that the proportions of cards selected will be Arc Sine corrected (Snodgrass, 
1977) this design fault can be overcome statistically, by then producing a falsification index 
based on the Arc Sine corrected scores. However., it was felt that this design error is 
unlikely to have had any great effect on the results of the experiment. There are still enough 
Cholera and No Cholera cards for the participants to select, and the selection rates for the 
European TRANSIT cards has previously been relatively low. Although it must be noted 
here that the low number of European TRANSIT cards for the participants to select could 
possibly lead to a lower selection of these cards than there might otherwise have been. 
However, in defence of the design, the participants should already have formed the models 
that they are going to use by the time they arrived at this section of the task. As the 
previous experiment showed, subsequent information by that stage is unlikely to lead to any 
great changes in the selections the participants made. (Examples of the initial set of cards 
and the response screens can be found in appendix 8) 
7.6.3 Procedum 
The participants were asked if they would participate in the experiment during their 
seminar sessions, if they agreed to take part in the experiment then the experimenter took 
them to the laboratory. 'Me participants were all tested individually, in a cubicle. The 
participants were asked if they had mouse skills, and if they did they were told to read the 
instructions, and to begin. If the participants had no mouse skills then they were shown 
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how to use the mouse, and then told to begin. All participants were told that if they became 
stuck at any point then they should ask the experimenter for clarification. Any clarification 
given involved a reiteration of the instructions that the participants had already been given. 
Ihe participants were given as long as they required to finish the task, but as before most 
finished inside ten minutes. They were then thanked for their participation, and the broad 
aims of the experiment were explained. 
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7.7 Results 
The results for this experiment can be seen in the table 7.4 below. The table shows that the 
suppression effect was not observed in the EATN group as was predicted, but was still 
observed in the ENTA group when compared to the control group, although it should be 
noted that p card selection rates were low overall for the ENTA group. 
Percentages of Card Selections For The Participants In Experiment Nine 
Table 7.4 
Control Group. 
Entering Euro (p) Entering Trop (p) Transit Euro, Transit Trop Cholera (q) No Cholera 
(not-p) (not-P) (not-q) 
72% 88% 17% 35% 36% 42% 
N= 15 
Euro All Trop None. 




Cholera (q) No Cholera 
(not-q) 
70% 77% 4% 11% 18% 71% 
N=12 
Euto None Trop All 
Entering Euro (p) Entering Trop (p) Transit Euro Transit Trop Cholera (q) No Cholera 
(not-p) (not-p) (not-q) 
47% 54% 13% 18% 16% 53% 
15 
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'Ihe propordons of card selections for each card, for each subject was then Arc Sine 
corrected, and the formula for producing a falsification index was then applied: 
(p+not-q)-(not-p+q). 
An analysis of variance was then applied to the corrected F1 Values for the three groups 
showed that there just fails to be a significant difference at the 5% significance level 
between the FI values of the three groups. The results from the Anova are given in Table 
7.5 below: 
Table 7.5 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Significance 
Between 61.795 2 30.898 3.071 . 058 
Groups 
Within 392.336 39 10.060 
Groups 
Total 454.131 41 
However, application of a post-hoc Student - Newman - Keuls test with significance level 
5% revealed that there was a significant difference between groups 2 and 3. These groups 
were EATN and ENTA respectively, with group 2 having a higher mean FI value than 
group 3. This does, in part support the predictions that were made, in that the suppression 
effect of the European p cards should reduce in the FIATN condition. However, p card 
selections were low in the ENTA group generally, and this may account for the observed 
difference. 
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In order to examine this more closely sign tests were performed on the Tropical and 
Entering p cards for each of the groups to see if there was any difference here as this is 
where the prediction made lies. The results of these sign test were: Control: 2 participants 
selected more Euro than Tropical p cards, 8 selected more Tropical than Euro p cards and 
5 tied (p= . 109 2-tailed). EATN group: 1 participant selected more European p cards than 
Tropical, 3 selected more Tropical p cards than European, and 8 tied (p= . 625 2-tailed). 
ENTA group: 2 participants selected more European than Tropical p cards, 4 selected 
more Tropical than European p cards and 9 tied (p= . 688 two-tailed). A graph showing the 









MEAN FI VALUES FOR EXPERIMENT 9 
1 
GROUP 
1 =CONTROL 2=EATN 3=ENTA 
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7.8 Discussion, 
There is evidence from the data that something along the lines of the predictions is indeed 
taking place. If the percentages of selections for the EATN group are considered it can be 
seen that here there is little or no suppression of selection of the European ENTERING 
cards (70% versus 77% for Euro and trop respectively), and this was one of the predictions 
made. This prediction is upheld by the results of the post-hoc test revealing that there was a 
significant difference between the EATN group and the ENTA group, with the F-ATN 
group scoring a higher mean FI. However, it should be noted here that due to the nature of 
the indices used it is possible that these results are due to higher not-q card and lower not-p 
card selections in the EATN group. This alternative explanation is upheld in that the sign 
test performed showed no significant difference for the EATN and ENTA groups 
selections of p cards. 
Also in this group there is the level of selections of the q and not-q card that would 
normally be expected on this task (18% q card and 71% not-q card). Finally, the selections 
of the TRANSIT cards were very low for this group (4% Euro and 11 % trop). These are 
the results that were predicted for this group. 
However, there were once again some unptedicted results and these ate now discussed. For 
the Control group, it is not clear whether there was any suppression of the Euro 
ENTERING cards or not (72% Euro compared with 88% Tropical). The Cholera and No 
Cholera cards were also very similar in this group, which was not to be expected (36% 
Cholera compared with 42% No Cholera). As was mentioned in the discussion of 
experiment eight, here the TRANSIT cards again show a similar selection pattern to the 
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ENTERING cards in experiment four, suggesting that some participants are unclear as to 
whether those passengers who are in transit represent a threat to the rule or not. 
For the ENTA group, the cholera and no cholera cards showed a reasonable level with 
regard to the predictions, with 53% of the no cholera cards being selected compared to 
16% of the cholera cards. The Transit cards had a reasonably low selection level, 13% Euro 
TRANSIT, and 18% trop. However, it is the ENTERING cards here which show the most 
unexpected result. The European ENTERING cards, as expected, seem to be Mghly 
suppressed when compared to the other groups here, as the level of selection for these 
cards is only 47%, but it is in the Tropical ENTERING cards that the odd result is found, 
with a selection level of only 54%. It was predicted that this group would show a very high 
selection of these cards. 
However, there was a design fault in experiments eight and nine. The likelihood is that the 
participants wiU only have examined those cards that they thought were relevant to the task, 
and therefore, may not have examined A the cards in the 'training see in experiment 9. 
Thus those participants who ignored the European ENTERING cards, as many do, wiU 
not have gained the extra information that was on these cards, and thus wiU not have 
formed the models that it was predicted they would do, and thus the predictions made were 
not very strongly supported. Although experiment nine did show some evidence for the 
prediction that the participants were able to extract, and apply the information on the initial 
cards to the subsequent task. 
Thus, a final experiment was designed in which the participants were required to examine 
A the cards in the first trial. The experimenter remained present to see if this was the case, 
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thus overcoming the problem of some of the participants not examining all the cards, and 
exttacting the infottnation that they contained. 
7,9 Further Revised Computer Based Tasks. 
A new experiment was designed to eliminate the flaws that have been discussed above. 
Here the participants were presented with 48 cards to turn over, and examine the usuaRy 
"hidden" side. The participants were told that they were to examine both sides of every 
card, and then to click in a box below the card if they thought that the cards represented a 
violation of the rule or not. (Again the rule was that if the card says ENTERING on one 
side, then the other side of the card must include cholera among the list of vaccinations). It 
was these cards that contained the bias that would shape the choices that the participants 
would subsequently make, if they extracted the probability information that these cards 
contained. There were two groups used in this experiment, one was presented with cards 
which showed all the European ENTERING cards to be violations of the rule (no cholera 
vaccination). The second group showed all the Tropical ENTERING cards to be violations 
of the rule (again no cholera vaccinations). 
The participants were then presented witli a furdiet 32 cards, and they were required to 
turn over those cards, and only those cards which they thought they needed to turn over to 
ensure that the rule was not violated. Here the cards could not be turned over to exan-dne 
the other side of the cards, so the participants' selections had to be based on the side of the 
card that was visible to them. If the participants selected the card, then they were given the 
message "Card Selected for Exan-dnation". ne participant could click on the card again to 
de-select it if they thought they had made a mistake. 
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By ensuring that the participants would examine every card in the initial set of 48 the 
original problem of participants only selecting the cards which they think are relevant is 
overcome. 
It was predicted that the participants who were presented with the cards which showed aU 
the European ENTERING passengers, and none of the Tropical passengers to be 
violations of the rule, would not show the suppression effect that has previously been 
observed. For the participants who were presented with cards that showed all the Tropical 
ENTERING passengers, and none of the European ENTERING passengers to be 
violations of the rule, the prediction was that the participants would show a similar pattern 
of selection to the original LAST experiments. Namely, a suppression of selection of the 
European ENTERING cards. 
7.10 Experiment Te 
Method 
7.10.1 Participants 
The participants were 23 first year psychology students from the University of 
Wolverhampton, all participated on an unpaid volunteer basis. 
7.10.2 Desi 
, gn and 
Materials 
The participants were presented with a set of instructions regarding the first set of cards 
that they were to examine, these instructions are shown below: 
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"Please imagine that you are an inu-nigration officer at Heathrow airport. 
One of your dudes is to check passengers' form H. On one side of the form 
is the status of the passengers, whether they are entering the country, or in 
transit between planes. On the other side of the form is a list of vaccinations 
that the passengers have had. You are told by the authorities that If the 
form says Entering on one side, then it must have cholera among the 
list of vaccinations on the other side. You are also told that cholera is 
particularly prevalent in Tropical countries. On the next page is a selection 
of sample forms which you have been told to check by the authorities. You 
must click the mouse on every card regardless of the information it contains, 
the card will then turn over and reveal the other side. If you then believe that 
the passenger outlined on the card represents a violation of the rule, then 
you must click in the box below that card, so that an X appears. Thank you, 
you may now begin the experiment. " 
After these instructions the participants were then presented with the 48 cards which 
contained the biases outlined above (there were three card orders used). The participants 
were allowed as much time as they required to look through these cards. The participants 
were instructed to click the mouse in the box below the cards if they thought that the cards 
represented a violation of the rule they had been given. ýt is important to note here that 
the experimenter remained with the participant to ensure that they clicked every card, thus 
examining both sides of all the cards presented). (An example of the screens used here can 
be found in appendix 9). 
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On completion of this section of the task the participants were given a second set of 
instructions, as fbHows: 
Again, please imagine that you are an immigration officer at Heathrow 
airport. You must now check passengers' form H for real. Having looked 
through the sample forms, you know that on one side of the form is the 
status of the passenger, whether they are entering the country, or in transit 
between planes. On the other side of the form is a list of vaccinations that 
the passengers have had. You arc told by the authorities that If the form 
says Entering on one side, then it must have cholera among the list of 
vaccination son the other side. You are also told that cholera is 
particularly prevalent in Tropical countries. 
On the next two pages are 32 such immigration forms which you must now 
check for real. In order to ensure that the rule is not violated, you must click 
those cards, and only those cards, which you think you need to check, in order 
to make sure that the above rule is not violated. If you make a mistake, then 
re-click on the catd, and it wiU be de-selccted. 
You may return to this instruction page at any time. 
lbank you, you may now begin the experiment. 
The participants were then presented with 32 cards, 6 Tropical ENTERING cards, 6 
European ENTERING cards, 4 Tropical TRANSIT cards, 4 European TRANSIT cards, 
and 6 each of Cholera and No Cholera cards. (Again 3 random card orders were used). 
The participants were required to click on those cards which they believed to be a violation 
of the rule, the card then changed to state "Selected for Examination". If the participants 
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wanted to change the selection they had made then they had to click on the catd again, and 
it would return to its original status. 
7.10.3 Pmeedure 
The participants were asked if they wanted to participate in the experiment during their 
seminar sessions, if they agreed then the experimenter took them to the laboratory. ne 
participants were all tested individually in a cubicle. The participants were asked if they had 
mouse skiUs, if they did they were told to begin the experiment. If they had no mouse skills, 
then they were shown how to use the mouse, and then told to begin. All participants were 
told that if they had any difficulties then they were to ask the experimenter for clarification. 
Any clarification given involved a reiteration of the instructions that they had just read. 
The participants were given as long as they requited to finish the experiment, although 
most were finished in ten minutes. The participants were then thanked for their 
participation, and told the broad aims of the experiment. 
180 
7.11 Results and Discussion 
The results for tl-ds experiment can be seen in table 7.6. These tables show that the 
suppression effect was reduced in the European Bias group as had been predicted. 
However, it was still present in the Tropical Bias group as predicted. 
Percentage of Card Selections For The Participants In Experiment Ten 
Table 7.6 
European Bias 
Entering Euro (p) Entering Trop (p) Transit Euro, Transit Trop Cholera (9) No Cholera 
(not-p) (not-p) (not-q)_ 
91% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
N=11 
Tropical Bias. 
Entering Euro (p) Entering Trop (p) Transit Euro Transit Trop Cholera (q) No Cholera 
(not-p) (not-p) (not-q) 
76% 96% 0% 31% 7% 92% 
N= 12 
181 
It is clear from table 7.6 that the results here do support the predictions made, in that in the 
European bias group the suppression effect has ahnost disappeared (only one subject failed 
to select all the ENTERING cards), when making a cross-experimental comparison to 
experiment four. However, in the Tropical bias group the suppression effect has remained. 
Again it was possible to calculate indices for these participants, in the same way as had 
previously been used (Arc Sine transforming the proportions of cards selected by each 
subject, and then applying the formula (p+not-q)-(not-p+q)). 
The results do support the predictions that were made, with the European bias group 
selecting more of the logically correct cards, and not showing the suppression effect that 
had been previously observed. 
A graph showing the mean indices for each group is give in chart 7.2 below: 
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CHART 7.2 










An analysis of variance was then conducted on these indices, (F= 5.637, df = 21, p= . 027). 
There was a significant difference between the selection that the two groups made in this 
experiment, as had been the initial prediction. From the graph, chart 7.2 and mean values it 
can be seen that the European bias group selected more 'correce cards than the Tropical 
bias group. The results from the Anova are shown in Table 7.6 below: 
Table 7.6 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F- Significance 
Between 25.654 1 25.654 
Groups 
Within 95.570 21 4.551 
Groups 
Total 121.224 22 
5.637 . 027 
A sign test was conducted on the Tropical and European ENTERING cards for the two 
groups. For the European Bias group no difference was predicted for the p cards, and this 
was observed when only 1 participant selected more Tropical p cards than European ones. 
For the Tropical Bias group, however, there was no significant difference between the two 
typcs of p card, with 3 participants selccting morc Tropical p cards than Europcan, no 
participants selecting more European than Tropical and 9 selecting the same amount of 
each (p = . 25,2 tailed). A difference was predicted here, as it would be expected that the 
suppression effect previously observed would be observed here also. However, there is 
some evidence that participants extracted the information from the cards with which they 
were presented, in the initial trial. Ihe ANOVA conducted on the Arc Sine transformed 
data suggests that this was the case. 
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However, closer observation of the data reveals that this finding may, at least in part, be 
due to the increased selection of the Tropical not-p card in the Tropical Bias group, which 
would lower the FI for this group. However, the result remains that the European bias 
group selected more 'correce cards than the Tropical bias group. It could be argued here 
that the observation of large amounts of Tropical passengers violating the rule led the 
Tropical bias group to select the Tropical 'Transie card because these passengers were seen 
as representing a risk even though they were in Transit and not Entering. This finding can 
then be argued to add evidence to the idea that participants can extract and use probability 
information with which they are presented. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the participants did extract the information from the 
initial 48 cards, as the formerly observed suppression of the European ENTERING cards 
was diminished in the European bias group. It appears then, that participants are able to 
extract probability information, and base subsequent decisions on it. They appeared to do 
this even when this information is not explicitly stated to them, this is in contrast to utility 
information which needs to explicitly represented for the participants to make decisions 
based on it (see Manktelow and Over, 1991). 
With regard to the TRANSIT cards the results ate again interesting, with the only cards that 
were selected at all being the Tropical TRANSIT cards in the Tropical bias group. This is in 
keeping with some of the results from earlier experiments, in which the participants did 
select the Tropical TRANSIT cards. Presumably is that the participants believe that the 
Tropical passengers till represent a risk to keeping cholera out of the country, thus they are 
devising their own rationale for the rule they are given (see Cheng and Holyoak, 1985). 
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Finally, the Cholera and No Cholera card choices were also in accordance with predictions, 
that is that the participants selected almost no cholera cards, just 7% in the Tropical bias 
group, and almost all the No Cholera cards, 100% and 92% respectively for the European 
and Tropical bias groups. These selections are clearer than in the previous computer tasks, 
but these did contain unpredicted results in places that may have been due to the design 
faults mentioned above. 1hus when the design was corrected then the results supported the 
predictions completely. Participants learnt the relevant instances, without feedback, by 
mere exposure to the fiffi set of cards in the training set, once sound instructions had been 
given. 
I'liese results and all others will be examined in the light of the theories outlined in the 
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8.1 General Discussion 
8.1.1 Overvie of General Discussion 
Chapters 5,6 and 7 provided a detailed account of the ten experiments which were 
conducted in this research programme designed to investigate the role of probability in 
reasoning with both indicative and deontic conditionals. These chapters were largely based 
around the empirical data produced by these experiments, and there was only sparse 
discussion of the theotetical implications of the findings. It is in this section that this wiU 
take place. The aim of this chapter is to provide a summary of the findings from the 
experiments and then to consider these findings in light of existing theoretical accounts of 
conditional reasoning. 
Due to the nature of the research programme being split in terms of indicative and dcontic 
conditionals, tl-ýs chapter will also be broken down accordingly. Initially the results of the 
experiments using indicative conditionals will be summariscd (experiments 1-3). The 
theoretical implications of these findings will then be discussed in some detafl, considering 
three major theories that have been proposed to account for conditional reasoning. 
Namely, optimal data selection (Oaksford and Chater, 1994,1995), mental logic (Braine and 
O'Brien, 1991; Rips, 1994), and mental models theory Gohnson-Laird, 1995; Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne, 1991; though see Evans, 1993). 
The second section will consider the findings from experiments involving dcontic 
conditionals (experiments 4-10). Again there wiU be a summary of the main findings of the 
experiments, and then a discussion thereof in terms of theories of deontic conditionals. 
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Specifically these theories will be the three theories that will have been considered as part of 
the discussion of results for indicative conditionals plus two domain specific theories, 
Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; Holyoak and Cheng, 1995), and 
Cosmides' Social Contract Theory (Cosmides, 1989). 
The third and concluding section of this chapter will provide a summary of this theoretical 
debate and provide discussion of required research, and an overall summary of this research 
programme itself. 
8.2. General Summaty of Findings Usin Indicative Conditionals 
Initially, an experiment was run in which the participants were given an indicative 
conditional in a horse racing scenario, which contained both probability and utility 
manipulations. As was noted earlier it is extremely difficult to separate these two constructs 
in thematic experimental manipulations, as participants will always assess epistemic utility, 
that is the pay-off associated with actions aimed at fulfilling epistemic goals (see Levi, 1984 
for a philosophical view of epistemic utility). For example, mothers will always prefer tidy 
rooms Panktelow & Over, 1991). The results from this experiment did suggest that there 
was some way in which participants take account of probabilistic factors when making 
I choices on the selection task, and that the scenario provided in this experiment was aiding 
participants' selection on this version of the task. Specifically, there was evidence of 
increased selection of the not-q card, the card typically ignored when using indicative 
conditionals and the selection task, except in the therapy experiments (Wason, 1968) (see 
Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993 Chapter 4, for a detailed review of the selection task 
literature). 
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However, the initial results were not as clear as had been predicted, and so revisions were 
made to the format of the task to make it more ecologically valid, to gain a better 
understanding of human reasoning with indicative conditionals which contain some 
probabilistic factor. This resulted in the introduction of the Large Array Selection Task 
(IASI), which was designed to make the task more like those which participants would 
have encountered before in a real world-reasoning situation. When participants make 
probability judgements in an experimental situation they seem to be better equipped to 
consider those problems which are presented within a frequentist framework (Gigerenzer, 
1991 1996, but see also E ahneman and Tversky, 1996) i. e. considering relative frequencies - 
of items, rather than single-event probabilities expressed as proportions. 
Therefore, it was felt that the experiments requiring the participants to make probability 
judgements should take account of this, and experiment 2 as presented in 5.6 was the first 
to do so. 'Ihus the LAST was introduced in order to include the probability manipulations 
that had been inserted into the task. The LAST was necessary here as it enables a 
probability manipulation to be inserted in the task, within an ecologicaIly valid ftamework. 
The LAST also permits a large amount of data to be collected without running large 
participant numbers. FinaRy it aHows; a more sensitive measure, which is of particular 
relevance to probabilistic manipulations. The LAST allows participants to display their 
probability judgements in a way that they could not do in a standard four-card task. It 
allows a participant to select, for example, all the examples of a card that they believe to be 
of particular relevance, but only baý'the examples of a card they consider to be of less 
importance to the task. It is interesting to note here that the LAST is similar to the Reduced 
Array Selection Task (RAST, Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1970, Wason and Green, 1984), in 
190 
that they ate both manipulations of the selection task which allow participants to make 
successive selections of cards on the one task. 
When the LAST was employed the participants' choices of the not-q card (the card which 
participants typically ignore on indicative tasks, see Chapter Two for details), rose as high as 
51%. This suggested that the introduction of probabilistic information into the indicative 
task did lead to an increase in the selection of these cards. However, it was still not to the 
levels that had originally been predicted: that is to the level of selection of the p and q cards 
on the same task, which were at 86% and 78%, respectively, (averaged across tasks in 
experiments 1 and 2). However, it should be noted that 50% is a high level of selection for 
a version of the selection task involving indicative conditionals such as the version used 
here (see Dominowski, 1995). 
FinaUy, a revised version of the gain scenario from experiment 2, which had produced the 
highest selection of the not-q card in the LAST experiment, was designed. 'Me aim here 
was to attempt to raise the selection of the not-q cards to the same level as the p and q 
cards on the same task. This involved labeling the betting slips as week 1, week 2 etc. so the 
participants were clear on what the cards represented, as well as changing the not-q cards to 
'LOST" rather than'DID NOT WIN'. However, these revisions did not lead to facilitation 
on the task, as the participants still chose the p and q cards more than they did the not-q. 
Indeed the most interesting result from this version of the task was that there was a drop in 
the selections of the p and q cards to 64% and 73% respectively, with selections of the not- 
q card at 46%. These results are difficult to reconcile with any of the theories that have 
been examined, as there is no explanation of any version of the task where the p card 
should not be the most commonly selected card. 
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This represents an overview of the results from the three experiments that used indicative 
conditionals rather than deontic conditionals. The basic findings were that although there 
was an increase in the selection of the not-q card, when compared to previous indicative 
task performance with thematic materials (see Manktelow and Evans, 1979), it did not rise 
to the same level as the selections of the p and q cards. The prediction was that participants 
should select the p, q and not-q cards at the same level. The following section will consider 
how the theories would account for these findings. Ile theories to be considered are 
optimal data selection (Oaksford and Chater, 1994,1996; Oaksford, Chater, Grainger and 
Larkin, 1996), mental logic, (e. g. Rips, 1994; Braine and O'Brien, 1991) and mental models 
theory Gohnson-Laird, 1995; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 199 1). 
8.3. Theoretical Discussion and Implications of Findings 
8.4 012tima Data Selectio 
its y, the Optimal Data Selection theory of Oaksford and Chater (1994). This approach is 
of particular interest here as its basis is probability theory, and therefore is of particular 
relevance. Oaksford and Chater claim that individuals do not view the selection task as a 
reasoning task at all, but rather it is seen as a hypothesis testing exercise. When the 
participants arc given the rule, or conditional, they are required to assess whether the rule is 
true or false. Reasoning researchers have traditionally argued that participants should look 
to falsify this rule, and thus they should select the p and not-q cards. However, Oaksford 
and Chater argue that this falsificationist view of science, as proposed by Popper (1959), is 
now outdated, and is no longer the predominant view in the philosophy of science. 
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Consequently, it is unreasonable for reasoning researchers to require their participants to 
conform to this as the ideal performance that everybody should strive to achieve. 
Oaksford and Chater state that when the task is viewed as a hypothesis testing task 
participants will select those cards which ate most likely to decrease their uncertainty about 
the rule, and thus select those cards which contain the most information. Oaksford and 
Chater propose that these cards are as fbHows: 
p>q>not-q>not-p 
And that this should be the pattern of results that participants should display. The literature 
on indicative conditionals, as discussed in Chapter 2 largely displays this pattern of 
performance (see also Evans, Newstead and Byrne, 1993, Chapter 4). 
With the indicative conditionals that have been used here this was indeed the predominant 
pattern of results throughout these experiments. Only two of the experiments failed to 
conform to the predicted pattern of results from Oaksford and Chater and these were 
experiment lb where the pattern was: p=q>not-q>not-p; and experiment 3a where the 
pattern was q>p>not-q>not-p. Ihe results from experiment 3 were noted as being strange 
in the discussion for that experiment, 5.12. 
lberefore the theory proposed by Oaksford and Chatcr does seem to account wcU for the 
majority of the data presented here. There are a number of criticisms which can be made of 
the ODS theory on various levels. The theory does seem to have the failing of explaining 
what is happening without explaining how. To put this more simply the theory is a 
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computational theory, rather than a psychological one. Oaksford and Chater presented 
equations that they clairn can account for the patterns of results that have been found in the 
majority of the selection task literature. These equations arc based on the idea that as 
participants are testing a hypothesis, their goal is to reduce their uncertainty. Oaksford and 
Chater claimed that reduction in uncertainty must equate with information gain (though see 
Evans and Over, 1996a for a criticism of this equality). However, they offer no account of 
how this theory is actually put into practice by people who are engaged in reasoning. 
Wheteas mental models and mental logic have made some attempt, albeit incomplete, to 
account for the psychological processes taking place. 
Thus it appears, to use Matr's (1982) tenninology that Oaksford and Chatcr have provided 
the computational level of their theory there is no algorithmic level of bow people actually 
make the selections they do when presented with the selection task in its indicative form. It 
can be claimed, on these grounds then, that ODS theory is not a psychological theory, and 
that for the theory to truly offer an account of human reasoning processes it must be 
developed to provide a 'HOW as well as a 'WHAT. In addition to this, it seems to be an 
odd claim of the theory that participants ate applying a Bayesian analysis to the selection 
task, when there is an increasing amount of evidence to show that people regularly fail to 
conform to Bayes' theorem in experimental tasks (Sutherland, 1998). However, it is 
important that the predictions that Oaksford and Chater make are exan-dned here in detail 
and discussed in light of the findings of the current research. 
One of the major assumptions of Oaksford and Chater's theory is that of rarity, and this 
assumption has implications for the ordering of card selections that are predicted, this 
assumption is not without criticism (Lan-dng, 1996). Thus rarity wiU bc cxamined hcrc in 
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detail, as will the applicability of the ODS model to the findings of the indicative 
experiments. 
Oaksford and Chater, (1994,1996) calculatcd scalcd expcctcd information gain (SEgg)) for 
the four cards in the selection task based on the assumption that the occurrences described 
in p and q are rare (in this case, tipping and horse, and horses winning races). Oaksford, 
Chater, Grainger and Larkin (1996) illustrate rarity using the following example: 
"All ravens are black, the probability that any given bird is a raven is low, as is the 
probability that it is black. " 
They argue that this holds true for the vast majority of categories that are used to construct 
hypotheses about the world. 
Ibus, what Oaksford and Chater would claim here is that in the rule 'IrRadng Weekly, tos a 
borse then it uins'both the tipping of horses and horses winning races is rare. However, it is 
argued here that in a version of the selection task such as this where participants are given a 
lengthy scenario and rationale for the rule that they have been given the rarity of p and q 
begins to decrease. The rationale must provide participants with enough information to 
discard the rarity assumption. SpecificaRy, their thinking has been directed to the issue in 
the task and thus the irrelevant factors of thought which allow for the rarity assumption to 
hold have been violated (e. g. that it could be any bird), thus negating the need for the 
assumption within the ODS framework. In addition to thýis Racing Weekly is there to tip 
horses, and thus rarity is uncertain here, in that it is not rare for Racing Weekly to tip 
horses. T'hus the rarity assumption is challenged for the p card. With regard to q, however, 
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rarity holds - horses that win must be more rare than horses that lose, because there are 
mote than two horses in each race. In this version of the selection task it is argued that 
rarity holds for the q card, but is uncertain for the p card. Rarity for the p card is that fewer 
horses are tipped (p) than not-tipped (not-p). While it is likely that ranty occurs here it is 
uncertain for participants, and this would have an effect on their selections, because the 
rarity assumption is challenged. Finally, it is difficult for Oaksford and Chater to account 
for the high selections of the not-q card, because, according to their account, this should 
only occur when rarity is challenged, and this is not in the case for the q cards, as argued 
above. 
In summary then Oaksford and Chater's theory provides a reasonable fit for the data 
considered thus far. However, the questioning of the rarity assumption suggests problems 
with the theory as it stands. Given the good fit for most of the data, however, it is unclear 
whether the theory can My account for these findings or not. However, it remains that the 
viability of a theory formed from Bayes' theorem must be questioned given Gigerenzer's 
compeffing account of the importance of a frequentist framework for probabilistic 
exPeritnents. 
U Mental Logic 
As was discussed in Chapter Two mental logic approaches advocate some form of content- 
independent rules that are applied by humans when they engage in reasoning. However, 
O'Brien (1993) has claimed that mental logic has been misrepresented in that it has been 
argued that a theory that adopts this approach would be unable to account for the content 
effects which occur with versions of the selection task which clearly indicated that content 
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effects are present. O'Brien argues that the mental logic approach makes no such claim, but 
rather argues for some kind of Pragmatic principles, such as Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas 
which are evoked to aid reasoning at the appropriate times. 
Presumably then, when participants are presented with a conditional of the form that was 
used in experiments 1-3 here, some form of pragmatic principle would be used by the 
participants to solve the task, rather than applying the abstract formal rules. Mental logic 
proposes that humans use abstract rules to reason when the form of the problem with 
which they ate faced does not evoke the pragmatic principles. 
It is difficult to understand what mental logic would suggest as a prediction. As was 
discussed in Chapter 5 the standard p and not-q prediction is not made. It is important to 
the reasoner to look at the WON (q) card as well as to look at the not-q card. There is 
nothing that exists within the current formulation of mental logic that can capture this need 
to examine the q card as well as the not-q card. A mental logic approach then provides very 
little of any use when trying to assess the likelihood of q given p, as in this task. However, it 
remains the case that it is predicted that there should be an increase in the selections of the 
not-q card, and Braine and O'Brien's approach does state something about this. 
8.5.1 Braine and O'Brien's Mode 
O'Brien (1993) refers to the mental logic theory of Braine and O'Brien (1991) as The 
Model, and the same designation will be adopted here. O'Brien (1993,1995) claims that the 
inferences required to complete the selection task are beyond the scope of the core and 
feeder schemas of The Model, and as such it should be no surprise that participants fail to 
197 
solve the task correctly. Thus it seems that The Model would predict that there should be 
no increase in the selections of not-q cards here, as such reasoning is outside of the 
inference schemas within 'Me Model. 
However, O'Brien (1993) also noted that there exist algebraic versions of the selection task 
which participants correctly solve e. g. Griggs, 1989 (algebraic versions of the task arc 
typically the most difficult for participants). He claims that such patterns of performance 
"are difficult to explain unless one assumes some logical reasoning" (O'Brien, 1993, p. 123). 
This claim seems difficult to reconcile with O'Brien's concurrent claim that the selection 
task lies outside the realm of The Model. Either The Model does provide the inferences 
necessary to solve the selection task or it does not. It should not be claimed that it does 
provide the inferences when participants do solve the task correctly, but does not provide 
them when participants fail to demonstrate logical responses, which is what O'Brien's claim 
appears to be. 
What would the prediction made by The Model be for the indicative rule experiments 
presented here? Basically there are two possible predictions which could be made from The 
Model. If there is a significant facilitation effect due to content on this version of the task 
then it should invoke the pragmatic principles component of the theory. However, this is 
unlikely as O'Brien cites Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985, 
Holyoak and Cheng, 1995) as a suitable theory to handle such cases. This theory is domain 
specific to deontic reasoning, and as such does not apply to indicative conditionals of the 
form presented to participants here. 'Mus it is necessary to consider the predictions that 
could be made from The Model without consideration of the pragmatic principles 
component. This leaves the theory in its more abstract form, which considers the selection 
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task to be outside the range of the inference schema provided within The Model. O'Brien 
(1993) suggests that the reasoning required to turn even the p card is considerable, and is 
not just the MP inference often suggested (e. g. Cheng and Holyoak, 1985). 
It is important to consider the reasoning that O'Brien (1993) suggests would be required for 
participants to select the predicted cards as presented in this research progranune. It 
involves initially supposing that the rule CIf Racing Weekly Tips a Horse then it Wins") is 
true. Given this supposition and a card showing "Tipped by Racing Weekly" application of 
modus ponens should lead the participant to the conclusion that the reverse side of the 
card should show "Won". However, O'Brien claims that this is insufficient reason for the 
participant to select the p card. To select the card the reasoner must now consider the 
possibility that the reverse side of the card shows "Did Not Win". This would then allow 
the supposition that the rule is true to be falsified by reductio ad absurdurn, because there is 
the possibility that there could be "Did Not Win" where there should be "Won". O'Brien 
would therefore suggest that the selection of the p card was outside the realm of the 
inference schema of 'Me Model. Selection of the not-q card (in this case "Did Not Win") is 
an even harder inference to make than that required to select the p card as described above. 
It appears then that The Model would predict low selection rates for both p and not-q 
cards, such as participants resorting to matching. 
The results from the indicative experiments failed to uphold either of these predictions 
derived from The Model of Braine and O'Brien (1991). 'Mus it seems that Braine and 
O'Brien's theory is unable to account for the findings of experiments 1-3 in the present 
research programme. However, Braine and O'Brien's theory is not the only Mental Logic 
based theory that has been proposed to account for performance on the selection task. Rips 
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(1983,1994) has also presented an abstract rule based account of the selection task. This 
wiH now be considered here. 
8.5.2 Rips' Account 
Rips (1994) presented a compelling and lucid account from the mental logic perspective, 
and attempts to explain how such a position might account for the diverse patterns of 
performance observed in participants when presented with the selection task, in its various 
forms. Rips presented his account of the selection task in the Mowing way. Say the rule 
was of the form "If there is a vowel then there is an even number". Ile four cards used in 
this task would be, for example, EK4 and 7. The cards can then be combined with the rule 
to produce the following sets, from which participants must generate conclusions in order 
to complete the task successffilly. 
1. E card IF vowel THEN even 
Vowel. 
2.4 card IF vowel THEN even 
Even. 
? 




4.7 card IF vowel THEN even 
NOTEVEN 
Rips presented his account using the PSYCOP model. When presented with the selection 
task Rips' model would select the E card only, as is the response of approximately one third 
of participants. Ilereason for this response from PSYCOP is that the only set for which 
PSYCOP can produce an inference is 1 above. For all the other sets PSYCOP draws a 
blank, and fails to produce an inference. Ilie important card in relation to the selection 
task is the 7 card (not-q card). PSYCOP produces nothing for this card, as this would 
require possession of a forward modus tollens rule, which the PSYCOP model does not 
have. No backward search is triggered either due to the lack of a subgoal. Ibus PSYCOP 
would select only the E card - as around 30% of participants do. 
However, how would the model explain the modal response of E and 4? Rips accounts for 
this by employing the assumption that the converse of the rule is also assumed to be true 
"If even then vower. When given this rule PSYCOP selects both the E and the 4 cards. 
Rips' model can account for the findings that the E and 4 cards are selected, and that the E 
card alone is selected, but how does Rips account for correct task performance? Rips 
argues, in the same way as O'Brien (1993) that correct solution of the task requires 
participants to project possible values on to the reverse sides of the cards. This process is 
eff, ottful, and as a result, tare, thus accounting for the correct solution rate of c. 10%. As 
with other theories in this section the issue here is: what would Rips' model predict for the 
present experiments, and can it account for the findings? 
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Rips appears to advocate some form of memory cueing hypothesis in order to explain 
content effects on the selection task, he claims that the information received from memory 
would enable participants to draw inferences that they cannot when the task is presented in 
its abstract form. Although Rips discusses Cheng and Holyoak's PRS approach to the 
selection task, this is of little relevance here as PRS theory only attempts to explain 
performance on deontic versions of the task concerned with permission, obligation etc. 
Given that here participants are producing a reasonably high level of not-q card selections 
Rips would presumably explain the results in terms of memory cueing. The prediction 
would be the that if the participants have enough experience of the subject matter used in 
the task they should respond accordingly i. e. by selecting the not-q card. 
Rips acknowledges that a ffill account would need to be given of the retrieval process 
involved in memory cueing, but nonetheless adopts the framework as workable. However, 
although there is some evidence for memory cueing (Manktelow and Evans, 1979) the 
process is largely unexplained. For example, in the experiments here, how much knowledge 
of the area would a participant need? In addition to this if a participant does employ some 
form of memorial cue, then presumably they are no longer employing a purely rule based 
strategy, and thus Rips' model would fail to apply in a situation such as this. Given that the 
participants are not then reasoning via rules they must be using some other process by 
which they can produce the predicted response pattern and Rips' model makes no mention 
of a process such as this. In summary then, the theory remains unable to account for the 
pattern of performance demonstrated here. 
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Two approaches from the view of mental logic have been considered in detail here. Both 
the theories (Braine and O'Brien, 1991 and Rips, 1994) have interesting points to make 
regarding participants' performance on the selection task, due, in part, to the suggestion that 
abstract rule theories are unable to explain the effect of content on the task (Cheng and 
Holyoak, 1985). However, neither of the theories is able to make predictions in line with 
the findings or account for the results observed in the present experiments. 
8.6 Menta Models Theojy 
The remaining theory is mental models, in a formulation of some sort Gohnson-Laird and 
Byrne, 1991; but see calls for revisions to the theory in Manktelow and Over, 1992, Evans, 
1993, Evans and Over, 1996b, Hardman, 1996). Mental models theory was discussed in 
some detail in Chapter Two, and some form of revised mental models theory is favoured 
hete. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne have said that any form of the selection task that leads to the 
fleshing out of further models will lead to increased selection of the not-q card, typically 
ignored by participants when presented with the standard task. Iberefore, what models will 
the participants construct here? Why should this version of the task lead to the selection of 
the not-q card rising as high as 50%, when the q card selections do not diminish, as is 
normally the case when not-q selection rise? (See Dominowski, 1995 and Evans, Newstcad 
and Byrne, 1993). 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) claimed that when presented with the standard version of 
the selection task the participants construct the following initial models, given that the rule 
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is of the form If p then q. Note here that the 1991 notation is maintained although 
Johnson-Laird has recently revised the format Gohnson-Laird, 1995). 
1p] 
where represents implicit models that are yet to be fleshed out, and '[ ]' represents that 
an item is exhaustively represented. Johnson-Laird and Byrne claim that as much 
information as possible will be represented implicitly due to limitations of working memory, 
and other cognitive constraints. 
When the models are ffilly fleshed out then they are as follows, because p cannot appear in 




There is also the issue here of the biconditional interpretation of the rule: If and only if p 
then q. When this interpretation is given to the rule the models constructed are obviously 
different to those described above. However, such models are not of great sipificancc here 
as it is unlikely that the rule used in these experiments would be subjected to a biconditional 
interpretation by participants. Specifically, it is argued here that it is unlikely that 
participants would interpret the rule "If Radng Weekl 'T n y Tips a Horse Then it Wins" as ý(a d 
only if Radq Weekly Tips a Horse Then It Wins" Such an interpretation would be a violation 
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of the knowledge of the participants - that merely tipping a horse does not guarantee its 
success, and if this was the case the whole exercise of tipping horses and placing bets would 
be tendered futile. Ihere is substantial evidence that participants use existing knowledge 
when approaching reasoning tasks (see for example belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, 
where participants rely on their own beliefs rather than their reasoning processes, 
Newstead, PoRard, Evans & Allen, 1992). 
When we consider these models in the sense of the rule that the participants here were 
given we have the following models: 
tipped won 
not tipped won 
not tipped lost 
This fleshing out of the models, claim Johnson-Laird and Byrne, leads participants to 
consider the not-q card, which the initial representations do not, and hence this leads to the 
selection of the not-q card, which was shown in the results here. Thus it is possible to make 
the prediction that a scenario such as that used here is one that would lead to fleshing out 
of initial models. This fleshing out leads to an explicit representation of the p, q and not-q 
cards in the models,, and these cards were then selected by participants. Those participants 
who failed to select the not-q card had not fleshed out the models fully, and subsequently 
selected only the p and q cards. It is therefore, possible to account for the patterns of 
selections shown by participants on this task via the mental models theory. 
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However, there is an issue that remains unsolved here with respect to mental models 
theory. This is the question of focussing. Why should participants here flesh out their 
models and show evidence of focussine. Legrenzi, Girotto, and Johnson-Laird (1993) both 
explained and examined the role of focussing in deduction generally, and on the selection 
task, which is of most interest here. Lcgrenzi et al. argue two points in relation to focussing 
and the selection task: 
"1. Participants consider only those cards that are explicitly represented in their 
models of the rule, that is, they focus on these cards. 
2. They select from these cards those for which the hidden value could have a 
bearing on the rule, that is, those that are represented exhaustively (with square 
brackets in out diagrams of models). " 
Legrenzi, Girotto and Johnson-Laird, 1993 p. 49. 
The question to address here is why should participants be fleshing out and not focussing? 
The answer to this lies in a closer examination of responding. If the task was purely one 
that led participants to focus on the not-q card, then there would be a high level of not-q 
responses, as observed, but it is the other patterns of responses that give the answer to the 
question above. Because some participants are showing a selection pattern of p, q and not-q 
then the task is resulting in fleshing out for these participants, hence they are selecting the 
cards represented in their models. The task does not lead to focussing on the not-q card, 
because selections of the q card remain higher than those of the not-q card. It is therefore 
argued here that the task is leading to fleshing out of initial models, and thus selection of 
the not-q card increases, rather than a qualitative shift to consideration of the not-q card as 
opposed to the q card, as focussing would do. The point is that those participants who 
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represent the not-q card in their model will see it as important, and those who stick with 
their initial representation will not. There is no manipulation of the task per se here that 
should give rise to a focussing effect. As Legrenzi et al note there will always be individual 
differences in the selections made by participants - some correctly solve the abstract task, 
and some fail to solve deontic versions. 
8.7 Summa of Discussion of Indicative Conditionals 
Ilus it is argued here that the first set of results (those from the indicative conditionals) 
favour a mental models explanation than any other. Mental models appears to be the only 
proposed theory which can offer any account of participants' ability to select the not-q card 
in an indicative task such as this, while still allowing for the high selection rates of the p 
card as predicted. Neither Oaksford and Chater' optimal data selection theory, or any 
formulation of mental models has the flexibility to account for the findings reported in 
Chapter 5. Attention will now be turned to the deontic conditionals, and the various 
theories that have been offered to account for reasoning with conditionals in the deontic 
domain. 
8.8 Summa of Findings Usin Deontic Conditionals 
Experiment four was the first of the deontic selection tasks to employ the LAST methodology. 
111is experiment involved the use of a classic task from the literature on deontic reasoning, 
namely Cheng and Holyoales (1985) immigration task. The changes that were made to the 
original task were to present the task in the LAST format, and to include probability 
information on the cards with which the participants were presented. In addition to the 
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infortnation that the participants were given in Cheng and Holyoak's original task the cards 
now contained information about the passengers' country of origin on the p cards, and these 
fell into two categories, either Tropical or European. 
It was predicted that the participants would see those passengers who were ENTERING the 
country as representing a greater risk if they were of Tropical origin than those passengers who 
were of European origin. Even though, of course, any passenger who was a violation of the 
rule that the participants had been given logically represented a risk regardless of their countrY 
of origin. 
Ile results from this experiment did indeed support the predictions that had been made: the 
participants selected the Tropical p cards at a far Mgher level of selection than the European p 
cards, 98% for the Tropical p cards, and 57% for the European p cards. 
1hus having found that probability elements did affect the choices which participants made on 
the task, it was essential to establish whether these changes were due to a facilitation of 
selection of the Tropical ENTERING cards or due to a suppression of the European 
ENTERING cards. 
Therefore, a second experiment was run in which the LAST was used, but the probability 
information was removed from the cards, so as to examine the problem outlined above as to 
whether the effect of probability infortnation was facilitation or suppression. 
Ibete were two conditions used here, one in which the participants were given a rationale with 
their instructions, whereas in a second condition no was rationale was given. The results from 
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d-iis expetiment revealed that the effect of the probability infonnation on the cards was to 
suppress the selection of the European ENTERING cards, rather than to facilitate the 
selection of the Tropical ENTERING cards. In the rationale conditions the frequency of 
selection of the p card was 80%, and in the no rationale condition the frequency of selection of 
the p card was 98%, therefore, collapsing over the two conditions, the p card was selected 
89%. 
The effect of the rationale sentence was examined briefly above, but it was felt that the role of 
the rationale should be examined clearly. Thus a version of the task was designed in which the 
rationale sentence was omitted but the probability information on the cards was reinstated 
(that is the information about the country of or& of the passengers was on the p and not-p 
cards). The results from experiment six could not be clearer, when the rationale sentence was 
omitted the ENTERING cards were selected at the same level, regardless of the country of 
origin: the Tropical and European p cards were both selected 93% of the time by the 
participants. 
The results from this experiment suggest that probability is similar to utility in its role in 
deontic reasoning (see Manktelow and Over, 1991, for a discussion of the role of utility in 
deontic reasoning). More specifically, probability needs to be explicitly represented in the 
rationale or scenario of the task, or be familiar in participants' experience for participants to 
react to such manipulations. This may only be the case in laboratory based tasks, however. The 
participants do not explicitly represent utility and probability when they ate not going to be 
really affected by the outcome of the choices they make; thus these elements of a task need to 
be made explicit for the participants to make their selections based on this information. 
However, it is difficult to imagine that humans do not examine their own 'real-lifc! decisions 
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sufficiently to bring utility and probability elements into the equation, even though such 
factors may not be explicit even in these real world tasks. Indeed it is dear, merely from the 
survival of the human race that people are able to make decisions, often quickly, that result in 
survival over non-survival, for example when driving. Ball, Sutherland and Quayle (1997) 
noted that although participants may bernotivated to behave in a logical manner, they fail to 
do so and thus rely on heuristics, or fail to fully flesh out their models. It is possible that this 
tendency is increased in an artificial enviromnent. 
Expetiment seven was run to assess the tole of probablty when the probabihty information 
was on the consequent cards in the selection task, rather than on the antecedent cards as was 
the case in experiments four to six. 
The participants were presented with instructions which were similar to those in the previous 
experiments, except the instructions told the participants that one side of the card showed 
whether the passenger was entering the country or not. Whereas the other side of the card 
showed both the diseases against which the passenger had been vaccinated, along with the 
country of origin of the passenger. 1hus it was predicted that the participants would select 
those not-q cards which showed that the passengers were from Tropical countries, rather than 
those which showed that the passengers had come from European countries. Again the results 
were consistent with the predictions which were made. The participants showed a bias towards 
selecting those q cards that were of passengers from Tropical countries (rropical q card 
selections were at 67%, against 40% for European q cards). As was stated earlier, this is a quite 
remarkable result considering that the participants could see the vaccinations which the 
passengers had had, as well as the country of origin, and so there really should have been no 
bias shown in this experiment. Although no experiment was run to determine whether the 
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effect was one of facilitation or suppression, it is not unreasonable to assume that it is again a 
suppression effect, as was the case in experiment four. 
Finally, computer based experiments were run that would assess whether participants were 
0 
able to extract information about the likelihood of the rule being violated (experiments 8- 10). 
Experiments 8 and 9 contained design errots, consequently only the results from experiment 
10 wiU be considered here. Experiment 10 clearly demonstrated that participants were able to 
extract probabilistic information when presented with cards wl-dch displayed a bias towards 
Tropical passengers being a violation of the rule. These data are in keeping with Gigerenzer's 
claims that humans base probability decisions on frequencies. Participants were presented with 
48 cards that contained information about violations. The information which participants 
received at this time clearly influenced any subsequent choices they made on the task itself 
Specifically the suppression of the European selections previously observed disappeared when 
the initial 48 cards showed that the European passengers violated the rule, and the Tropical 
ones did not 
Consolidating the results from the initial indicative experiments, the dcondc based tasks 
showed strong evidence for participants being aware of probability when making selections on 
the task. There was suppression of selecting those cards which showed that the passenger was 
of European origin, when the implications regarding Tropical countries and the likelihood of 
carrýng cholera were explidtly presented to the partidpants. 
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8.9 Theoretical Discussion and Implications pf Finding5 
8.9. Sectio Overvi 
Ihe results from the deontic experiments will now be discussed in terms of the major theories 
that have been proposed to account for performance on deontic selection tasks. Firstly, the 
domain-specific theories Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985 and 
Holyoak and Cheng, 1995); and Social Contract Iheory (Cosmides, 1989). Secondly, other 
theories of reasoning will be considered: Optimal Data Selection (Oaksford and Chater, 
1994, 
1996); the mental logic approach (O'Brien, 1993, Rips, 1994); and the mental models approach 
Gohnson-Laird, 1983, Johnson-Iaird and Byrne, 199 1). 
8.10 Pragmatic Reasonin Schem Theo 
Firstly, Pragmatic Reasoning Schema Theory, as discussed in Chapter Three. Cheng and 
Holyoak (1985) contend that once the rule in the task can be used to access one of the 
production rules in the schema then the participants should go on to solve the task 
succcssffilly. However, in the tasks concerned with deontic reasoning above, experiments 4-10, 
if the participants have accessed the production rules, then why do they show the biases which 
they do? 
As it stands the theory of Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas (PRS) would suggest that if the 
production rule has been accessed then the participant should select the corresponding cards, 
usually the p and not-q cards. Therefore, given a rule in the form "I(aperson bas ENMRING 
on one jide of their immi, ýrafion card then thg must bave CHOLERA on the rrverse jide" PRS theory 
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would predict that participants would select the p and the not-q cards. In this version of the 
task this would be the ENTERING card, and the card list of vaccinations that did not include 
cholera. 'Ihe findings of the deontic experiments present a problem for PRS, there is no 
suggestion here that the rule should be 'blocked' in certain cases. However, that would seem to 
be what is happening here. The selection of the European p cards has been suppressed, thus 
participants are failing to make the modus; ponens, deduction required. Byrne has presented an 
account of the blocking of valid modus ponens inference (Byrne, 1989). From the work of 
Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis and Rist (1991) it is possible to suggest that the information that a 
passenger has come from a Tropical country acts as some kind of 'disabling condition' 
blocking the necessary inference. 
The difficulty of probability for PRS theory is comparable with the problem that the role of 
utility presents the theory, and as has been argued earlier the two constructs of probability and 
utility are closely related. 'Me efforts that Holyoak and Cheng (1995 a and b) have made to 
ensure the survival of pragmatic reasoning schemas in light of the evidence that utility has an 
effect on reasoning have decreased the parsimony of the theory considerably. This was initially 
one of its great strengths, and this has now been reduced. Holyoak and Chcng invoke the idea 
that tights and duties are complimentary, and thus, using Manktclow and Over's example, the 
son has a duty to tidy his room to give him the right to go out and play. Holyoak and Cheng 
(1995a) claim that it is this complimentatity which leads to the perspective effects on the 
selection task which have been observed. However, this explanation has been seen as being 
largely unsatisfactory by a number of commentators Gohnson-Iaird and Byrne, 1995; 
Oaksfotd and Chater, 1995; Over and Manktelow, 1995, but see also Holyoak and Chcng, 
1995b). If the theory were now, as appears to be the case, required to be extended again to 
account for probability it would become unpatsimonious, and overly complicated and 
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convoluted. Oaksford and Chater (1995) criticised Holyoak and Chengs (1995a) formulation 
of the theory for being unparsimonious. The addition of fiuther components to account for 
the effect of probabilistic infortnation would increase this difficulty with the theory. In 
summary then the current version of PRS theory would need to provide some mechanism to 
selectively block selections of the p card, which is what happened in the experiments presented 
here. Neither can the theory explain the selective blocIdng of not-q card selections as observed 
in experiment 7. 
8.11 Socia Contrac Theo 
The second of. the domain specific theories to be discussed is that of Social Contract Ibeory, 
(SCI) as presented by Cosmides (1989). Cosmides has argued that humans are evolutionarily 
ptc-programmed to avoid cheaters, those who take a benefit but do not pay a cost. lhc theory 
would suggest that any selection task that fits this cost-benefit framework should yield 
facilitated performance, in terms of an increase in p and not-q responses. It can be seen that it 
is possible to view the imn-ýigration rule in these terms. It is a benefit to enter a country, but 
there is the cost of having inoculations, and Cosmides would argue that this is the reason the 
task produces such a Mgh level of facilitation (c. 90% p and not-q responses - Cheng and 
Holyoak, 1985). In the same way as PRS theory it is difficult to see any reason how the theory 
could account for the drop in p card selections when they are from a European country, as 
was observed here. 'Mus the rule is in accordance with the cost-benefit structure, and yet it 
fails to present the predicted pattern of behaviour. 
In summary, SCT is unable to account for the findings of the research here with deontic 
conditionals, because the observed pattern of performance is not in accordance with the 
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predictions of the theory. PRS theory is also unable to account for the findings for the same 
reason. It is suggested here that domain specific theories are too limited, in that they suggest 
that once a rule is of a certain type then facilitation must follow, but this is not strictly true. 
Ihere are so many factors which are capable of influencing reasoning processes, utility, 
probability, explicit negatives, instructional factors, (see Yachanin and Twenty, 1982; Jackson 
and Griggs, 1990; Manktelow and Over, 1991; Kirby, 1994). Domain specific theories seem 
largely to ignore these and advocate some form of irreversible reasoning route once the rule 
fits the scherna. It is argued here that a theory of this nature ignores too many factors to hope 
to offer a true, justifiable account of the richness of human reasoning. 
8.12 Non-Domain Specific Reasoni Theories 
Having considered those theories proposed to account only for deontic reasoning, attention 
. now be turned to non-domain specific theories of reasoning. Ibcsc theories have been 
considered in the section on reasoning with indicative conditionals (8.3 - 8-7). However, they 
propose alternative accounts of reasoning with dcontic statements and thus will now be 
considered again in Eght of the findings from experiments 4-10. 
8.13 Menta Logic 
The third class of theory that will now be considered is that of mental logic. As was discussed 
in section 8.4 mental logic theory claims a form of abstract reasoning rules in the mind that we 
use when we engage in the reasoning process. However, Braine and O'Bricn argue that when 
we are presented with a thematic version of the selection task we use some form of pragmatic 
principle rather than abstract rules. Mental logic and abstract rules are similar in that they both 
require some component of the theory that specifies when the rules of reasoning will be 
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applied sekaivelyk Given the nature of the task used here, it is with this pragmatic principle that 
this section must concern itself Braine and O'Brien (1991) suggest that the permission schema 
of Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) PRS theory is a suitable candidate for how the content of 
propositions affects the way in which they are constructed. However, the limitations of this 
theory have already been discussed in section 8.8.2 and there is no need to repeat them here. 
Suffice to say that the criticisms raised in that earlier section render Braine and O'Brien's 
approach to reasoning performance as incomplete and unsatisfactory. 
Rips (1994) has also presented an account of reasoning from a mental logic or abstract rules 
perspective. However, Rips also advocates pragmatic principles, and, as Braine and O'Brien 
did, advocates Cheng and Holyoales (1985) PRS theory. TI-ds theory has been demonstrated to 
be inadequate to account for the findings here in section 8.8.2 
In summary then of the mental logic approach, these theories have been criticised for the lack 
of pragmatic factors that they consider. The results that are presented here also give mental 
logicians a difficulty, in that theories of mental logic fail to give any account of probabilistic 
factors. Specifically, there is no account of why the rules should be applied to some of the 
cards, and not to others if it is true that the rules are abstract. However, it is the case that the 
participants here did selectively choose cards: the Tropical ENTERING cards far more than 
the European ENTERING cards, even though they have logically the same value. 
In addition to this, why in the initial indicative versions (horse race scenario) of the selection 
task should the participants' selection of the q and not-q cards be so high? Again this suggests 
that participants are Ming to follow logic when they are presented with problems wl-ýich 
contain probabilistic factors. Presumably they are applying some other method of reasoning to 
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the tasks, which allows them to take account of the probability information which they are 
being given, which is not the case with mental logic. 
8.14 012tima Data Selectio 
Oaksford and Chater (1994) have offered an account of selection task performance based on 
Anderson's theory of rational analysis (Anderson, 1990). It is similar to their account of 
abstract ask performance, in that it is based on information gain. However, the assumptions 
made to account for abstract task performance are altered, and it is these changes which allow 
the theory to account for performance observed on the deontic task (see section 8.3.1). 
As was discussed earlier Oaksford and Chater claim that the selection task is a form of 
hypothesis testing, or certainly is treated as such by participants when they are presented with 
the task. This is why they claim their theory can be used as an account for both the abstract 
and deontic selection tasks. The change that they make here is to claim that rarity is overturned 
in rules in a deontic form, and this, in turn, affects the predicted card orders. In a dcontic 
framework Oaksford and Chater's model predicts that the following card orderings should be 
observed based on the potential information gain of the cards: 
p>not-q>q>not-p 
These card orders are typically observed in deontic versions of the selection task (see 
Dominowskiý 1995 for a review of the effect of content on reasoning). What is important here 
is how do the predicted card orderings from Oaksford and Chater's model compare with the 
observed selection patterns? Oaksfotd and Chater (1996) have claimed that the findings from 
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experiments 4-7 (as published in Manktelow, Sutherland and Over, 1995), offer support for 
their Rational Analysis model, but the extent of this support will be cxalnincd here. 
As Oaksford and Chater make predictions about card orders it is these that wiU be considered 
here first, accordingly, the observed card orders in these experiments were: 
Experiment 4: 
p(trop)>p(Euro)>not-q>not-p>q, 






It can be seen from these figures that generaUy the observed card orders do fbUow the 
ptedictions of Oaksfotd and Chatet's modeL However, as with the majority of theories that 
have been proposed for selection task perfortnance, it is difficult to see how Oaksford and 
Chater's rational analysis can account for the differences in the selection of the two types of p 
card (or not-q card in the case of experiment 7). Oaksford and Chater (1994) claim 
"Ihere are two dimcnsions on which the pattern of cards selected in the cmatic 
selection task depends. Ilie first is rule type ... The second ditnension.... is the 
perspecfive a subject must adopt. " 
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Ihere is no problem with either of these claims as they stand. Rule type clearly has an effect on 
reasoning as discussed in Chapter 3. The second claim is perfectly reasonable also. Manktelow 
and Over (1991) clearly demonstrated an effect of perspective on the cards selected by the 
participants when presented with their version of the selection task (see also Gigerenzer and 
Hug, 1992; Politzer and Nguyen-Xuan, 1992). However, experiments four to seven reported 
here would suggest that there is also an effect of probability in the choices which participants 
make on the deontic selection task- ie. How Akely, is it that this card will represent a violation 
of the rule which the participants have been told to check? 
Oaksford and Chater do consider probabilistic information in their discussion of selection task 
literature as they offer a detailed account of the work of Kirby (1994) in which Kirby 
manipulated the probability of fictional outcomes on the cards with wlýich participants were 
presented. Kirby used the drinking age rule encountered here earlier. He suggested that the 
reason the not-q card selections on this version of the task are so high is due to the fact that 
the probability of a 19 year old illegally drinIdng alcohol (where an over 21 age limit is present) 
is also high. He thus added two further not-q cards a 12 year old, and a4 year old. Kirby 
predicted that the selections of the not q card would decrease as the age on them decreased. 
Kirby found support for these predictions. Oaksford and Chater explain this in terms of their 
model via increased values for the higher ages (MI = .4 for four year olds, M, .5 for 12 year 
olds, and M, = .6 for 19 year olds), as the 19 and 12 year olds were seen as representing a 
greater likelihood of violating the rule hence the greater values ascribed to them. Where P(M) 
is the probability of the independence model. 
There is no way in the version of the task used here that it is possible to ascribe values such as 
this using the rule the participants are given. In Kirby's experiment in can be argued that a 19 
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year old is more likely to be violating the rule. However, it is not the case that someone from a 
Tropical country is more likely to be violating the rule that 'Yyou are Entering tbenyou must bave 
cbolera among the Ast of vacrinadons. ' The participants were told that cholera is particularly 
prevalent in Tropical countries, but this does not mean that the passenger from the tropics is 
any more likely not to be vaccinated against cholera, which would represent a violation of the 
rule, than a European passenger would. If anythin& it could be argued that the Tropical 
passenger is more likely to be vaccinated against cholera than the European passenger simply 
because of the increased prevalence of the disease in the tropics, and thus less likely to be a 
violator than the European passenger. It is perhaps true that if the Tropical passenger has not 
been vaccinated then they represent a greater threat than a European passenger, but this is not 
the task that the participants have been asked to do. Thus it is difficult to assess how Oaksford 
and Chater's model could include the necessary probability information in its current 
formulation. The issue here is that Oaksford and Chater's account would need to include some 
formulation of perceived risk, which it currently lacks. 
In addition to this, Sutherland (1998) has argued that the high levels of not-p card selections 
on the task are impossible to reconcile within Oaksford and Chater's framework. Table 7.1 
shows selections of the Tropical p card as high as 58%, and other values of this card in 
experiments 8-10 include 44 %, 35%, and 31%. The model provided by Oaksford and Chater 
gives this card very little value in terms of its ability to reduce uncertainty, and hence increase 
its likelihood of being selected. Indeed the not-p card is only ascribed a value because an cards 
have some chance of being selected, hence it is given a value of .1 in Oaksford and Chater's 
model. It does not seem unreasonable for participants to consider the Tropical not-p card to 
be of importance given the rationale emphasisng the importance of keeping cholera out of the 
country. 
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In summary, the optimal data selection approach is impressive in its ability to account for 
many of the manipulations of the selection task (Oaksford and Chater, 1994,1996). However, 
there remain a number of problems with the theory. It is unable to account for the high level 
of not-p card selections observed in experiments 8-10. It is also unclear as to how the model 
would represent the probabilities of the p cards in the deontic experiments here. Finally, as 
with the discussion of ODS within the indicative framework here, it is difficult to justify a 
theory of reasoning using Bayes' theorem as a basis, as humans are notoriously poor at 
applying the theory Fahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). 
8.15 Menta Models 
The final theoretical approach to be considered is that of mental models theory Gohnson- 
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 1995). The mental models 
approach is the account favourcd here, as it lends itself to the inclusion of other factors, as 
Manktelow and Over (1991,1992) have suggested (utility), although the need to revise the 
theory to include such factors has been disputed by Johnson-Laird and Byme (1992). As 
discussed earlier the mental models theory claims that any version of the selection task which 
leads to an increase in the fleshing out of models will lead to increased performance on the 
task. The theory would argue that a version such as that used here, based as it is on the 
immigration task, would lead to increased fleshing out of the models, because it is a deontic 
task (see Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991 p. 81). Participants in the versions reported in 
experiments 4-10 &d show increased performance (in comparison with the abstract task) as the 
theory would predict. The theory would argue that this improved performance was as a result 
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of a ffill fleshing out process, leading to the not-q card being explicitly represented and hence 
more likely to be selected. 
As with the other theories considered thus far the issue is how does mental models theory fit 
with the data from experiments 4 to 10? An important point to note here is that there appears 
to be two quite distinct patterns observed in the data, as noted by Manktelow, Sutherland and 
Over (1995). Firstly the participant may select all the Entering cards, regardless of country of 
origin, or they select only the Tropical Entering cards and none of the European ones, there is 
very little crossover between these 'two types' of participant 1hus there are two possibilities, 
either participants see the Tropical cards as mote important, and they flesh these models out 
first, or they see the Entering cards as all the same, and they flesh out a single model for all 
passengers. It is suggested here that this is the distinction that leads to the pattern of selections 
observed. What are the models necessary for participants to select the p and not-q cards? How 
can mental models account for the suppression effect of European p cards? 
As was discussed in chapter 2 the model theory suggests that participants construct models of 
the world or states of affairs that are consistent with the infortnation they have been given in 
the premises and anytelevant knowledge they possess. Ihey then draw a putative conclusion; 
and proceed to search for countcrexamples that are consistent with the premises, but not with 
the putative conclusion, if none is found then the inference is accepted as valid. Lcgrenzi, 
Girotto and Johnson-Laird (1993) have also discussed the issue of focussing in reasoning, and 
this concept may be of relevance here, i. e. that participants focus their attention on those 
models that they believe pose the greatest likelihood of violation of the rule. It is important to 
note here that Evans (1989,1995) Kitby, (1994) and Sperber, Cata and Girotto (1995) term 
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this relevance, but as Evans (1995) notes the difference between the two concepts is largely 
terminologicaL 
When presented with the deontic version of the task Johnson-Laird and Byme (1995) have 
argued that participants make their implicit models explicitý and hence correctly solve the task. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne argue that participants interpret deontic conditionals as 
biconditionals. 'Mus, when presented with the deontic conditional used in experiments 4-10 
participants hould produce the following models: 
eC 
-1c -1c 
where e represents ENTERING and c represents cholera. Participants representing the 
appropriate counterexamples olve the task correctly. For participants in the role of the 
immigration officer the initial model represented would be: 
10 
CC 
Therefore, the rule (entering and cholera occurring together) is represented explicitly, and the 
other possible model remains implicit, as shown by the mental footnote'... '. Given this the 
counterexample represented would be: 
e 
This should be the standard selection pattern observed (entering and not cholera), and this is 
the case, looking at experiment five here, and at Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) results. However, 
in the experiments reported here there are occasions when the p card is not always selected 
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/A- 
ýdie European p card suppression effect). Is it possible for mcntal models to account for this 
suppression effect? 
As mentioned earlier, Manktelow, Sutherland and Over (1995) pointed out that there was a 
clear distinction between two 'types' of participant, those who selected all the p cards, and 
those who selected only the Tropical p cards. Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis and Rist (1991) 
presented convincing data regarding disabling conditions with conditional statements. A 
disabling condition, as defined by Cummins et al. was a contingency that would tend to 
prevent the inference of the consequent from the antecedent of one of these conditionals. 
Thus a valid inference is suppressed due to some additional information (this may be supplicd 
via the experimenter as in Byrne, 1989, or rely on the participants' own knowledge). It appears 
here that the information that a passenger is from a European country provides a disabling 
condition and thus blocks the fleshing out of the European model, and hence the European 
entering selections are suppressed. It is possible that the participants who selected all the 
entering cards merely fleshed out their models without a distinction between Tropical and 
European. However, those participants who showed suppressed European selections did see 
coming from Europe as a disabling condition, and hence only fleshcd out a Tropical model. 
This explanation can be supported via evidence from experiment 10 where those participants 
who were presented with information that showed all rule violators were European had the 
disabling condition disabled, and hence produced a lessened suppression effect This suggests 
an 'integration' of Tropical and European p cards, with cards being treated as entering cards, 
rather than two distinct types of entering cards. 
Johnson-Laird, LegrenzL Girotto, Sonino-Lcgtcnzi and Caverni (m prcss) havc discusscd the 
role of probability in mental models. They approach this ftom the perspective that the majority 
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of participants have little knowledge of probability theory, hence the mistakes typically made 
on probabilistic tasks (e. g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1983). Ihey refer to such reasoners as 
naive. A relevant point from fl-ýis work is that participants construct their mental models, and 
consider them to be equiprobable by default. However, when given information to the 
contrary they can adjust the probability values assigned to models. 
When the suppression effect is observed in participants, they are given no definitive 
probability of the likelihood of cholera in Tropical countries, merely told that cholera is 
particularly prevalent However, it would seem that this is enough for some participants not to 
view both types of passengers as 'equiprobable' to be representing a threat to the rule given, 
hence the suppression effect observed. 
It is argued here then that those partidpants who displayed the suppression effect are 
representing the counterexarnple necessary to solve the task correctly (entering and not 
cholera), but they do not consider this relevant to the European passengers. It is suggested 
here that they are constructing a counterexample as foRows: 
Passenger type 
e -IC Tropical 
Note here that Manktelow and Over (1995) used additional columns to represent utility within 
Mental Models theory, and Johnson-Laird et A (in press) to represent explicit frequencies of 
events. Such a column is suggested now to represent he type of p card to which the model 
applies. The participant now has models that would lead to the selection of Tropical p cards, 
and not the selection of European p cards. The first model would yield the observed pattern 
of selection of Tropical p cards, and not European p cards (as observed), while the second 
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model notes that there are other possible models that are not explicitly represented here - the 
same model but relevant to European passengers. Johnson-Laird et al. Cm press) note that such 
mental footnotes as this are easily forgotten due to wotldng memory limitations, hcncc the 
observed European p card suppression effect 
However, there are participants who do not display the European p card suppression effect 
(see section 6.4 for details). As discussed above there are two possible explanations for this 
pattern of perfonnance. Firstly these partidpants; do not make a distinction between European 
and Tropical passengers, hence the counterexample model produced by these participants 
would be: 
Passenger type 
c --Ic AR 
This model would then lead to the selection of all p cards, regardless of the passengcis 
country of origin, and this was a recognised pattern of performance in experiment four. 
Alternatively these participants could flesh out the implicit model represented in their 
counterexample models, in this case participants would produce the following 
counterex=ple: 
Passenger type 
e -Ic Tropical 
Ile first model here would lead participants to select the Tropical p cards. If the implicit 
model was fleshed out it should yield the following. 
Passenger type 
e "C European 
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This model would then givetise to the selection of the European p cards, as was observed in 
11 participants in experiment four (n = 20). It is argued then that if participants hold on to the 
concept of equiprobability then they should select equal numbers of p cards, regardless of 
passenger type (as 11 participants did). If participants abandon the notion of eqx: dprobability 
and consider the Tropical counterexample as more likely to occur, and thus more likely to 
violate the rule, then they should show the suppression effect (as 9 participants did in 
expetiment four). 
An alternative explanation to disabling conditions can be reached via focussing (LegrenzL 
Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 1993) although the effect is the same, and it could be argued that the 
effect of the disabling condition is to focus attention on the Tropical cards. Through the 
disabling condition the participants focus on the Tropical cards, or see these as more relevant. 
Subsequently the Tropical models are the only ones fleshed out, and the European selections 
are suppressed. Alternatively both types (rropical and European) of model arc fleshed out, but 
because of focussing the Tropical models are given preference, and working memory 
limitations (Baddeley, 1990) causes the suppression effect to be observed. Either way the 
suppression effect would be observed as reported in experiments 4 and 7. Again the European 
bias in experiment 10 would cause a collapse in the disabling condition and hence reduce 
focussing. 
Ms explanation via focussing can explain the pattern of perfonmncc observed. Those 
participants that produce the counterexample: 
Passenger type 
e "c Tropical 
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Focussing on the first model, and failure to flesh out the second model (represented as a 
mental footnote) leads to selection of the Tropical p cards only, and the suppression effect for 
the European p cards, as observed. 
The findings from experiment 10 from the final set of experiments are in keeping with these 
explanations. 1here was a reduction in the suppression effect in the group that had checked 
immigration cards that showed European passengers to be violations of the rule. It is argued 
here that checking through these cards causes an increase in equiprobability of the models 
(rtopical or European), because the information from the initial set of cards is contrary to the 
claims in the rationale that cholera is particularly prevalent in Tropical countries. Subsequently 
participants in this group should represent he counterexamplc: 
Passenger type 
e -1c AU 
This representation would lead to the decrease in the suppression effect that was observed in 
this group (see section 7.11). The group that checked cards that showed all Tropical passcngers 
to be violations of the rule had their lack of equiprobability confirmed (that Tropical 
passengers were more risky) and should have produced the following countcrcxamplc: 
Passenger type 
e -Ic Tropical 
These participants should continue to demonstrate the suppression effect as a consequence of 
this model and there was support for this prediction. 
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Agam this explanation is consistent with the notion of focussing. The passengers in the 
Tropical bias group should focus on the Tropical cards because the rationale directs them to 
such a model, and the information they receive from checIdng the initial set of cards confirms 
this. Hence they should represent the counterexamples as: 
Passenger type 
Tropical 
This should lead to the suppression effect, which there was support for (although the sign test 
did question this support somewhat). 
In the European bias group however, the infortnadon on the cards should cause a decrease in 
focussing, and hence should lead to the model: 
Passenger type 
e "C All 
Given this model there should be a decrease in the suppression effect for this group, and this 
was observed. 
In summary then the mental models theory gives the best account of the results presented 
here, through the inclusion of focussing or the representation of probabilistic information in 
the models. Both of these explanations are consistent with the accounts offered by Johnson- 
Laird and his colleagues (Legrenziý Grotto and Johnson-Laird, 1993; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, 
Girotto, Sonino-Legrenzi and Caverniý in press). Indeed it is plausible to claim that the 
representation of probability information in the models guides focussing. 
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8.16 ConcludiLig Comments 
The experiments reported here have shown that probability has a role to play in reasoning with 
both indicative and deontic conditionals. In experiments 1-3 it was demonstrated that 
participants were aware of the importance of the not-q card when they were trying to assess 
the likelihood of q given p. One of the main outcomes from these initial experiments was the 
introduction of the Large Array Selection Task. This is a methodological innovation that 
affords the selection task many attributes unavailable via the standard four-card version. It 
allows a far more sensitive measure than the standard four-card task when examining the role 
of probability in reasoning. It also provides a larger amount of data than the standard version. 
Finally, it avoids the potential pitfalls of cognitive illusions, such as those suggested by 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1983. 
An explanation of these findings was offered in terms of the mental models theory, and other 
theories of conditional reasoning were deemed either inadequate or inconclusive. The model 
theory could show that fleshing out was enough to produce the effect of selecting the not-p 
card in order to make a sound probabilistic judgement, this was not the case with other 
theories of indicative reasoning. 
Following these indicative expetiments a move was made to study the influence of reasoning 
on deontic conditionals, these exTeriments clearly demonstrated a role for probability in 
deontic reasoning. An explanation for these findings was given in terms of mental models and 
disabling conditions (Cummins et al., 1991). The inclusion of disabling conditions also allowcd 
the disappearance of the suppression effect on the European cards to be explained via 
'disabling the disabling condition'. 
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It is suggested here that these experiments and the interpretation of them mark an important 
step in the integration of reasoning research and decision maldng research (see Johnson-Laird 
and Shafir, 1993 and Doherty and Evans, 1996). The experiments reported herein extend the 
work of Manktelow and Over (1991,1992) and their use of utility to consider another 
construct of dedsion-maldng research, that of probability. The two fields of decision-maldng 
and reasoning have remained separate and distinct until recently. A major contribution to the 
integration of these two schools has been the recent concept of two forms of rationality 
(Evans, Over and Manktelow, 1993; Evans and Over, 1996b, 1997). The basic concept here is 
a distinction between rationality,, which is behaviour that is likely to yield the achievement of 
goals, and rationalit% that is the degree to which people behave in accordance with normative 
theories, such as formal logic or probability theory. 
The results presented here are in accordance with this distinction. The participants were not 
behaving in a rationalý manner when the suppression of the European p cards was observed, 
but it could be interpreted as rational, behaviour. Participants do not want to select every card, 
and hence they make decisions to avoid having to do so. By suppressing selection of the 
European p cards they are behaving in a rational, way because they are reacting to the rationale 
- keeping cholera out of the country, and basing their behaviour on this. A criticism of this 
distinction however, is that it is largely a descriptive framcwork, and presents little in the way 
of a testable theory. However, Evans and Over (1996b) presented a re-intcrprctation of much 
of the reasoning literature in terms of this distinction with a reasonable amount of success. 
Finally, there are a number of issues that remain unresolved. 'Me effect of probability in 
examples which do not lend themselves o easily to disabling conditions would be useful, as 
would further exploration of indicative conditionals and probability, via rules which do 
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produce facilitation even though they are indicative, such as Wason and Shapiro! s (1971) 
Towns and Transport problem. 
In terms of deontic conditionals, the majority of research has focussed on permissions and 
obligations, and there is some confusion as to the nature of these (see Manktelow and Over, 
1990). Clearly there needs to be clarification on this issue. A further suggestion here would be 
an increase in research into other types deontic statements such as promises and threats. In 
order to increase the links between reasoning and decision-nuking consideration of probability 
in other tasks may also prove to be enlightening. Vall6e-Tourangeau and New (1997) 
considered the role of utility in Wason's (1960) 2-4-6 task, and Sutherland, Lucas and Gale 
(1998) the role of probability. It is only through research of this nature that an integrated 
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Response Sheet Used in Experiment I 
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Your father has given you a large amount of money and has asked you to place a bet on a horse 
for him. He has left it up to you to decide which horse in which race you will bet on. 
You are not sure which horse to back however, and your knowledge of horse racing is far more 
limited than you had led your father to believe. Therefore you do not wish to lose your father's 
money, because he will be greatly annoyed that you have let him down, and you yourself will 
look extremely foolish for having lied to your father in the first place. Fortunately a friend tells 
you about the tipster in "Racing Weekly". She states that If Racing Weekly tips a horse then 
it wins. 
Obviously you want to know how confident you can be in your friend's statement, so that you 
know whether to risk your father's money, and your pride, on Racing Weekly's next tip. Your 
friend has given you four slips on which she has recorded details of horses she backed in four 
different races. Each slip says whether the horse was tipped by Racing Weekly or not on one 
side, and on the other side whether the horse won or not. 
Which of the slips would you need to turn over to judge whether your friend's statement will be 













F7 Fý 0 El 
We doWt need to know your personal identity, but the following information will be useful: 
Your age ............... Sex M .......... F ............. (please tick) 
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Week I Week 2 
WON LOST 




n n EI EI n 
Weck6 Weck7 Weck 8 Weck 9 Weck 10 
TEPPED TEPPED 
WON WAS NOT BY LOST BY 
TIPPED RACING RACING 
WEEKLY WEEKLY 
F1 F-I El F-1 Fý 
Week II Week 12 Weck 13 Week 14 Wcck 15 
WAS NOT WON 
TEPPED 
F-I F-I 












El El r7 








:1 F-1 r-l 0 F71 
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0 0 F1 EJ El 
STATUS: VACCINATED VACCINATED STATUS: VACCINATED 
ENTERING AGAINST. AGAINST: TRANSIT AGAINST: 
COUNTRY OF TYPHOID CHOLERA COUNTRY OF MALARIA 
ORIGIN: HEPATITIS TYPHOID ORIGIN. CHOLERA 




F-1 D El 
We do not need to know your personal identity, but the following information would be useful: 
Your Age ........... Sex ............. Have you seen this type of problem before? ......... 
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F-I F-1 F-1 
ORIGIN: ORIGIN: 
HOLLAND THAILAND 
TRANSIT VACCINATIONS: VACCINATIONS: CHOLERA RUBELLA 
MALARIA. HEPATITIS 





















































El Fý F-1 F7 
We do not need to know your personal identity, but the following information will be uscful: 
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El 171 F-1 F1 
CHOLERA TYPHOID 




























Fý Fý El El 
We do not need to know your personal identity, but the following information will be useful: 










liEf! A!. ITIS 
L 
.. 
T. R_ AN5. l_T_. _______ ORIGIN: NORWAY_ 





5 .......... NAGOIN-A ,, ____ 3_TA_T_V H PATITIS E 
........ .. 
jN G TYPH ID T Ij 
_Bau$ OR. I . QIN.: THAIIANQ 
............. 
RUJBJE, LLA 
..... . .. 
D QR. IQ W, BAI 
-5ýý YAGON&T : EEIAN51T 
. 
Q. H. 0L. E. RA 
....... .. ... .... . .........  ........ 
R. B E. LLA V 
....... ...... ....... 
. QR-! Q. IN.. H--QL .. H. EE. A. 




..... LE .. HQ .......... R_ A 
YAQ. P. MT, 0: 
..... .....   
. 
EQLI. Q A .. 
IjQLEf. 3
3TATU;.; ....... ...... 




_T JYEM QID BRAZIL ! IQ 
Q . -Big 
A' 
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........ . ... . .......... ... j .. 
Q 
iIN .. HMLAND. " 
EERADII5... 
____,, _Q. Bl. 
QA., 
1AILANQ_ 
IYEMCL ... . .... 
11 
YAMN_A_! EjQ, '___, . 5i =01D OQLEBA .......... ... JýMsm ... ... 
... BjQ. 
lN.:.. BMZjL ....... BREA IT1.5 ....  ...  





. ....  ....  ...... . .. 
VACCINATED*--- 
. ...........................  ... . t. 
. 







. ....... .... ....  ..... .......... ý. eQL(Q ......... 







j2. -.. Iy Qlj2 ............... 
ýReturn to Preulous Page) 
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STATUS: STATUS: 








P. 0U. 0 
......... . ... .............. 
. 
OR. I. G. IN:.. H. OLLAND 
....... . 
H. EPA. T. IT. I. S 
... .................... 
AM N;.. 13BMIL 
............ .. 
H. EPA. T. IT. I. S 






.............  .......... 
ENIEBIIýQ HEPATTIII. $ 
................   
. 
0. R. lG. l. N;.. TH. Al. LAN. D 
.... .. 
H. E. P. AT. IT. I. S 
..........................  
0. RIGI. N.:.. HOLLAND TYPHOIDgjQLEEIý 






......... . .....  .............. ........ TRANSIT 
. ... ........ 
C. HOLER. A 
...... . ..................... .. 
ENTER. [Nýý 
............................  
R. U. B. E. LL. A 














........ ENTERING CHOLERA 
... 
TRANSIT HEPATI, TI. S 
........................ ............................. 
. 
O. R. IGI. N: 
... 
B. RAZ. I. L 
............ .. 
H. EE! &[jjj5 
.... 
-6Rl. Gj. N.:.. THAl. LA. N. D.... TY D 
.. .... ...................... ............ .... ... . ............. ....... . .... ........ 








...........  ... . .............. 
.. 
P. OLIO. CHOLER. A 
.....  . ........ JENTERING ........................................................... 
ROELL& .............................. ............................. TYPHOID 
..............  .  .. ... 
ORI. GIN: NORWAY 
.......... ...................................   . ...............................  
0R. lGl. N: THAILAND 
VACCINATED: 













...... . ....... ......... .  RUBELLA 









STAT. U. S: 
.................................. ..........  ...  
VACCI. N. AT , 
.................. .. ....... 
M: 
............. ... .......  . ... ... ........ RUBELLA 
... .... -- 
ENTERING 
........ .... .... ... ... ................. 
CHOLERAjXEHQ[Q 
... .. ........... 
IBAUSIT 
..... ........  ..  .. ... F6LI 0 
................ 
I 
OR IG IN H0 LLAND 
....................................................... 
IL 









...... ..................  ... .... ..  . -- ` *` ` NG TYPHOID 6HOLERA PHOID ENTERI . 
TY 
........................ .....  .................. .............................................. I     -IBAM5.1i 
... 
nIN: NORWAY HEPATITIS 
.......  .... 
ORl. Gl. N:.. NO. RWAY,...... CH0. LEjR. A 
......................................... .......... ..... ...... ............. ............ ...... .................................. .. Q 
C NeHt P 
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STATUS: VACCINATED: S US: VACCINATED: 
...... ----------- ................................. .... .......................................................... 




....................  ...... 
TRA. N. Sl. T 
. 
OR. l. G. l. N.:.. H. 0LLAND 
. ..... ., 
HEPATITIS 
...........  ..... .... 
PRI. G. IN: BRAZIL HEPATITIS 
......... . ... .... ............ ..... ... .... .... .... .......................................... ......................................... 
STATUS: VACCINATED: STATUS: VACCINATED: 
ENTERING POLIO E P=!. a 
................... 
. 
OR. IGl. N.:.. TjH. AI. LANjQ 
... .. 
H. E. P. A. T. IT. I. S ORIGIN: HQLLAN. D TYPHO. 19,. QHQLERý 
......... ....... . .... .. .... .........  .. .. ..... ... .... ............................. . .............. ........ II _jl 
STATUS: 













ORIGIN.;. jjjA! Lffip.... gnLERA 
....... 
STATUS: VACCINATED: STATUS: VACCINATED: 
........ ....  ........ . ............  ........................................................... ............................................................ .......................................................... ERING CHOLERA TRANSIT HEPATITIS 
I .... ORIGIN: BRAZIL 
........... 
HEPATITIS 
JQIP ............................... ............................... 
O. Rl. G. I. N.:.. THAl. LA. N. D.... TYEH 
.. ............. .. ... ... ........ .. I. IL- 
( NOHt P 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
Again, please imagine that you are working as an immigration officer at Heathrow airport. 
You must now check passengers' form H for real, having looked through some sample forms, as 
you know, one side of the form is the status of the passenger, whether they are Entering the 
country, or in transit between planes. On the other side of the form is a list of vaccinations that 
the passengers have had. You are told by the authorities that If the form says Entering on 
one side, then Cholera must be among the list of vaccinations on the reverse 
side. You are also told that cholera is particularly prevalent in tropical countries. 
On the next two pages are 32 such immigration forms, which you must now check for real. In 
order to ensure that this rule is violated, you must click on those forms that you think you need 
to check in order to make sure that the above rule is not violated. 
You may return to this instruction page at any time, you may now begin the experiment. 
Start the experiment 
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VACCINATED: 
. ....... .............. ............................ 
VAC. Cl. N, AT. E. D:...... 







............................... ........  .... ... . 
R. U. BEL. LA 
..............  ...... .... .. ..........  . 
P. Q. 1-1.0 
.. ... ... ........... . ... . ................ TYPHOID 






......................     
,. 
STATU. S.: 
................ ... ..............  
VACCINATED.: 
..............   
STATUS: 
........................................................... 
STAT. U. S: 










...... ...... ....... ............  .......... 
STATUS: 









.......................   .  . .. POLIO 










................................. ........ ....... ... 
V. AQC. l. NATEQ; 
.... ..........  ................................... Jami! ll ................................. 
V. AQC. l. N. ATED ................. ENTERING- 
- 
CHOLERA 




I .... &RIG. I. N.:.. BR. A. Z. ll__.. 
_.. 
L.... 
. ........ .. 
HEPATITIS 
____ l 
O. RI. G. I. N11HAILAND.... 
.... .... .... ... ............. .. ........ 
L_ --- j 
TYPH0. lD 
... ................ . ....... .................   
I 
(Return to instructionsý ( NeHt 
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STATU. $.: 
__. _.. __. _. __. 
VACCINATED: 




.... .. ................. TRANSIT 
........ 
TY, PH. 0l. Q 
................................ 
ENTE. R. l. NK***'**'*'** ............... IRANSIT 
........................... '6RIGIN: THAILAND CHOLERA ORIGIN: BRAZIL ORIGIN: HOLLAND 
..........................................   .................................................... ................................ 
YAC. C. I. N. A. T. E. D.: 
. ................  
STATUS: 
....................... 
YAC. C. 1N. A. TED: 
............... .. 
VACCIN. A. TED: 
....  ........ ............  .... .. .. .. .. .....  ... ... ...... ...  . ................  ... ...... ...  TYPHOID 
.............. . .... ... 
HEPATTITIS HEPATITIS 
,. 
RU. B. E. L. LA 
.......  .................... 
ORI. G. IN: BRAZIL BELLA 




VAC. Cl. N. AT. E. D: S! 61! js: ....... ......  ... .......... ..... ... ...... ... ......................  
VACCINATED: 
. 
ENTER. 1N. G. 










. ............................   I. - ........................................................ ....................................... . ............... 
VACCINATED: STATUS: VACCINATED: STATU%S- 
............. ........................ I ...................................  ......... I ..........................................  ....................  ...... ENTERING 
..........  ..... ... 
HERATITIS 
......... . . .... 
TRANSIT 
. 
RU. B. EjLLA 
..... .....  ...... . ..... 
O. RIG. IN.:. 
jN. 
0RWAY 
.... ....... .....  .. .............................. :: MQ!. Q ............................. 













.......................................... Q BELLA QýjEiRINQ 
.......................... POUQ,.. Qlj! QLEBA 
.......... ýQffi 









(Return To Instructions) 
VAC. Cl. NAT. E. D: 
.................. 15! 
02; ýý 
............................... .................... TYPHOID POLIO TRANSIT 
.. .............................................. ........... CHOLERA ORIGIN: NORWAY 














( NeHt Page ) 




STATU. S.:. VACCINATED: 
TRA NS ITIPL 10 




Cneturn To Instructions) 
STATUS: 
...........  ... 
THAILANý 
..................................... 
( NeHt Pa 
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ORjl. G. lN.:.. H. OjL. LAN. D 
....... 
I 






.... ... ... ....................... ............  . RUBELLA Eýl N G 
-------------------- POUO,.. CHOLERA. 
..... ............................ 









............................. !! a! N:. NORWAY 
.................................... ............................................................. Q 
VACCINATED: STATUS: 
I ................................................... .................................... 
. RQEgLj=A .............................. 3BAKII ..................... . ....... 
... 
BIGIN: BRAZIL 
. FgL! Q.,. TYPHOID ......... ........................................ .........................   
Q 
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(Return To Instructions) ( NeHt Page ) 
VACCINATED: S: 3 ......  ......  ............. TYPHOID TRAN IT 
HEPATITIS 
171 
CReturn To Instructions) 
.............................. 
VACCINATED: 
 ................................................ ENTERIN HEPATTITIS 





Again, please imagine that you are working as an immigration officer at Heathrow airport. 
You must now check passengers' form H for real, having looked through all the sample forms, 
you know, that on one side of the form is the status of the passenger, whether they are Entering 
the country, or in Transit between planes. On the other side of the form is a list of vaccinations 
that the passengers have had. You are told by the authorities that If the form says Entering 
on one side, then Cholera must be among the list of vaccinations on the reverse 
side. You are also told that cholera is particularly prevalent in tropical countries. 
On the next two pages are 32 such immigration forms, which you must now check for real. In 
order to ensure that this rule is not violated, you must click those cards, and only those cards, 
which you think you need to check, in order to make sure that the above rule is not violated. If 
you make a mistake, then re-click on the card, and it will be de-selected. 
You may return to this instruction page at any time. 
Thank you, you may now begin the experiment. 



















...................  ... 





STATU. S.;. VACCINATED: VACCINATED: 
ýýýl NG 
.... .... .... ... .... ........ . . .  -- 
TRA NS IT 
.... .... ............ 
TY P HOI D 
.. ................ ...   ............................ 
H EPAT ITI S 
.................... .... . ..... .....  . 6R I G IN H OLLAND 
........................... .................... 






IP.,. C TYPHO HOLEPJ 
...... ........................... 
VACCINATED: STATUS: 
........  .. .55: 
S: 
...... ..........  .....  ..  RUBELLA ENTERING 
..................   
TRANSIT 
......... . ....  .... 
TRANSIT 
.......... ....................      POLIO ORIGIN.:.. HOLLAN. D O. R. IG. I. N: B. RAZIL ORIGIN: NORWAY 
.........................  .... . ....................... ........... ... . .... . ........... . . ........... 
STATUS: STATUS: VACCINATED: 5M 5. 
ENTERING ENTERING TYPHOID ENIEB 
ORIGIN: BRAZIL ORIGK- NORWAY CHOLERA 0 
...........................................  .............. ..     
Bl 







R. Q. BEL! A 
......... . ................  










STATUS: STATUS: VACCINATED: VACCINATED: 
...................... .... ........... ....... ............................................................ ...................................... .................................... ENTERING 




........................   
HEPATITIS 
..........................................   
. 
OR. I. G. IN.:.. H. OLLAND 
....... ......... .... .... .... ............. .. . 
0. Rl. G. IN.:.. THAl. LA. N. D 
.. .... .... .... . ............. ....... . ........ 
RUBELLA 
.................................................. 
TYPHgD.. C. H. O. LE. R/ 









... . ...... . ............. 
TRANSIT 




ORIGIN:. BRAZIL ORIGIN: NORWAY 
STATUS: 









...... . ..................  ORIGIN: BRAZIL ORIGIN: NO CHOLERA 
.: 
HOLLAND 
................................. B ......... ........................................................  QBMN ...............................   
(Return to Instructions) Finished 
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Probabilistic Factors in Deontic Reasoning 
K. I. Manktelow and E. J. Sutherland 
University of Wolverhampton, UK 
v 
D. E. Over 
University of Sunderland, UK 
-1 
Recent research on reasoning has resulted in a number of authors urging a 
convergence between ideas in the hitherto disparate fields of deduction and 
decision making. The deontic reasoning literature in particular refers increasingly 
to the decision-making constructs of subjective utility and subjective probability. 
Although the former construct has received some attention from experimenters, 
the latter has remained relatively unexplored. In this paper a set of experiments 
is reported in which a modified form of Wason's selection task using an enlarged 
array was used to investigate the role of a probabilistic factor in reasoning with 
conditional obligations. Results showed that this factor played a significant role 
in mediating this reasoning, when probabilistic information was added both to 
antecedent and to consequent items. Other results indicated that the effect 
occurred principally by suppressing selections of items with relatively low 
subjective relevance. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the strangest paradoxes of the literature in the psychology of deductive 
reasoning has been its neglect, until relatively recently, of one of the commonest 
forms of thought performed by people in everyday contexts: deontic reasoning. 
Most of the literature has instead been taken up with studies of performance on 
problems containing indicative sentences, such as standard conditionals of the 
form If p then q. Deontic reasoning can be contrasted with indicative reasoning 
roughly along the lines of the philosophical distinction between theoretical and 
practical reasoning: theoretical reasoning aims to infer what is, was, or will be 
the case; practical reasoning, or deontic reasoning in the present context, aims 
to infer what one should, may, or must do (Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 1993). 
Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. K. I. Manktelow, School of Health Sciences, University 
of Wolverhampton, 62-68 Lichfield St., Wolverhampton WVI IDJ, UK. 
The paper was considerably improved by comments from Ruth Byrne, Michael Doherty, and 
Paolo Legrenzi: grateful thanks to them. 
0 1995 Erlbaurn (UK) Taylor & Francis 
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Much of the recent empirical work on reasoning in general has used 
adaptations of Wason's (1968) selection task. There are differences between the 
original abstract task and thematic tasks that reliably produce "rational" 
performance (e. g. D'Andrade's "Sears" version; see Rumelhart, 1980) in these 
terms: the former requires theoretical reasoning about the existence of a 
purported state of affairs described by the target conditional, whereas the latter 
requires practical reasoning about possible actions relative to a regulation whose 
status is not in question. 'Mat such problems as the Sears task are made 
intelligible by their standing as regulations, rather than by their familiar content 
(e. g. shops), was established by Cheng and Holyoak (1985). 
Cheng and Holyoak's paper was pivotal in many respects: in its findings and 
their theoretical interpretation, from which most of the receni work on deontic 
reasoning has taken its cue, and in its methodology, which was adapted for the 
experiments reported here. In their first experiment, they -used two contents, 
expressing postal and immigration regulations. An example of the latter 
contained an implied obligation rule (which Cheng and Holyoak termed a 
permission), If the form says ENTERING on one side, then the other side 
inýludes "cholera" among the list of diseases. Subjects were cued to the 
perspective of an immigration officer, checking cards that had either 
ENTERING (p) or TRANSIT (not-p) on one side, and a list of inoculations 
either including (q) or not including (not-q) cholera on the other. When a 
rationale was provided, around 90% of subjects selected the p and not-q cards, 
the only ones that could contain the critical combination of a passenger entering 
without a cholera inoculation. Crucially, in a second experiment the detailed 
content was replaced by reference only to "action A" and "precondition P", in 
a schematic rule said to be laid down by some authority. There was still a highly 
significant increase in p, not-q selections compared to a non-deontic condition. 
Why and how do deontic contexts give rise to facilitated reasoning 
perfon-nance? 'Ibis is the issue that is the concern of the present paper. To 
acc 
, 
ount for their subjects' behaviour, Cheng and Holyoak introduced the theory 
of Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas. In brief, this proposed sets of production rules 
abstracted from experience, which would produce appropriate inferences when 
a problem contained sufficient cues to activate them. The following were given 
as the four production rules for regulations like the immigration one: 
1. If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied. 
2. If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not be satisfied. 
3. If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. 
4. If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be taken. 
The target conditional in both experiments matches the structure of rule 1, 
which is sufficient to cue the schema; rules I and 4 are the only ones that 
274 
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contain determinate statements for action; the p and not-q cards are the only 
ones that could contain these determinate elements; hence the p and not-q cards 
are selected. 
Pragmatic Reasoning Schema theory was contested first by Cosmides' (1989) 
social contract theory and later by approaches inspired by the mental models 
theory of Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). Cosmides' approach is derived from 
evolutionary principles and the idea of social exchange. Parties in a social 
exchange, she contends, have an understanding that can be expressed in 
conditional form as If you take a benefit, then you pay a cost. She holds that 
people have an innate tendency to look for those who violate - such 
understandings. These are cheaters, who take benefits without paying the cost. 
Thus a reasoning task cast in this form should produce a high rate of selections 
that could detect cheaters. In fact, although there are many results that can be 
interpreted as attempts to uncover cheaters, there are many that cannot, and the 
social contract theory has been criticised accordingly (see e. g. Cheng & 
Holyoak, 1989; Manktelow & Over, 1991,1995). - 
However, Cosmides' work was significant for the research reported here in 
bringing to the fore two factors central to our own approach to deontic 
reasoning: subjective utility and social cognition. The interplay of these factors 
was brought out in a set of experiments on deontic selection tasks reported by 
Manktelow and Over (1991). Predictions about performance in these 
experiments were made on the basis of a semantic account of deontic 
conditionals and an associated decision-theoretic analysis of the tasks. Subjects 
were held to have preferences between mental models of states of affairs from 
a given social perspective, derived from the problem content and personal 
knowledge. (See Over & Manktelow, 1993, for more details on this, and 
Manktelow & Over, 1995, for an even more general analysis. ) Construing 
deontic reasoning in this way has several advantages over the schematic 
approach: for instance, a semantics based on preferences supplies a reason why 
a deontic statement should be uttered in the first place. Representation of 
subjective utility is thus necessary for this form of inference (Manktelow & 
Over, 1992; Platt & Griggs, 1993). 
This account of deontic reasoning relates it closely to the domain of decision 
making, as we have argued elsewhere (Manktelow & Over, 1991,1995). Of 
course, classical decision theory holds that people make decisions on tile basis 
of subjective expected utility, i. e. decisions depend on probability judgements as 
well as ones about utility. Ordinary judgements of both types can be quite vague, 
and can only rarely be represented by precise numbers, as classical normative 
decision theory ideally requires. But work on descriptive decision theories, such 
as that of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), should be directly related to that on 
ordinary deontic reasoning. Although Manktelow and Over (1991) noted the 
need to explore probabilistic factors in deontic reasoning, little empirical work 
has actually been reported so far. 
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From a more theoretical point of view, Kirby (1994) and Oaksford and Chater 
(1994) have argued that probability judgements should have an effect. in non- 
deontic selection tasks, based on indicative conditionals. This view is supported 
by experimental work in Kirby (1994) and by earlier experiments, particularly 
in Pollard and Evans (1983). To give a full account of these tasks, one must also 
employ some notion of epistemic utility or of information gain, and so of 
expected epistemic utility or information gain (Evans & Over, in press; 
Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Over & Evans, 1994). Thus decision-theoretic ideas 
are increasingly being applied to understanding selection tasks, both deontic and 
indicative, although at present this application is controversial. One of the issues 
this research should help to settle is whether subjects do much indicative or 
theoretical reasoning as such in selection tasks, or whether they make decisions 
based purely on expected utility judgements, without performing inferences such 
as modus ponens or modus tollens. (See Evans, 1995, on this issue). 
Probability judgements should indeed affect deductive reasoning performance 
itself, and not just decision making. This is shown in some recent work on 
conditional inference. Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, and Rist (1991) presented 
causal conditionals whose contents had been rated for numbers of alternative 
causes of events referred to in. the consequents, and number of potential 
"disabling conditions". A disabling condition was a contingency that, it was 
predicted, would tend to prevent the inference of the consequent from the 
antecedent of one of these conditionals. Such inferences were affected by these 
manipulations. The reason for this, we would suggest, is that the probability ol 
the consequent given the antecedent is affected by the number of disabling 
conditions and their probability. Whereas Cummins et al. used cues frorn 
subjects' general knowledge, Byrne (1989) inserted explicit additional premiseE 
into conditional arguments and found that valid inferences could be suppressed 
Stevenson and Over (1995) have found a range of suppression effects by varyinf 
the degree of uncertainty suggested by additional information, and argue that the 
suppression occurs because the conditional probability, of the consequent of th( 
conditional given its antecedent, is affected by the extra infort-flation. 
None of these these studies of inference has concerned deontic reasoning ol 
judgement, and all have used conditional syllogisms rather than the selectior 
task. But probabilistic factors should also affect inferences frorn, or decision: 
about, deontic conditionals. In this paper, we report experiments designed to tes 
this possibility. The semantic analysis we have given of deontic thought lead., 
us to predict that people's inferences about probability and utility will interac 
to determine the selections they make. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
A probabilistic element was introduced into a deontic selection task abou 
immigration. Subjects were cued to the perspective of an immigration office 
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checking for potential violators of a conditional obligation specifying required 
inoculations for entering the UK. It was predicted that the p and not-q cards 
would be the most frequently selected (representing the possibility of a 
passenger entering the country but without the requisite inoculation), but that 
subjects would select more such cards when they indicated that a traveller had 
come from an area with a higher probability of infection with the specified 
disease compared with cards for travellers from areas with a lower probability 
of infection. 
Method 
Subjects. Twenty first-year undergraduate psychology students from the 
University of Wolverhampton participated on an unpaid volunteer basis. None 
had prior experience of the selection task. 
Design and Materials. The task materials were adapted from the original 
immigration content devised by Cheng and Holyoak (1985). The target 
conditional used in their Experiment I was: If theform says ENTERING on one 
side then the other side includes cholera among the list of diseases (see 
Introduction). This content was changed for a British population and included a 
rationale (italicised here), as follows: 
Please imagine that you are working as a customs official at Heathrow airport, and 
as part of your duties you must check the passengers' immigration cards. One side 
of the immigration card shows whether the passenger is entering Great Britain or 
if they are just in transit between planes, together with the traveller's country of 
origin; while the other side of the card shows a list of diseases against which tile 
traveller has been vaccinated. 
You are particularly concerned that people infected with cholera should not be 
allowed to enter the country. It is well known that cholera is particularly common 
in tropical countries. 
The rule was If a person has ENTERING on one side of their immigration 
card then they must have CHOLERA on the reverse side. The rationale passage 
was designed to instil the utility for the detection of potential violations of tile 
rule (first sentence) and to alert the subjects to the greater probability of tile 
disease in some parts of the world (second sentence). Following the task 
description were instructions for subjects to fill in tick-boxes against tile cards 
they chose (see Appendix). 
This experiment differs from other selection tasks previously reported in the 
use of a enlarged array in which multiple instances of each contingency were 
presented. Instead of four cards, 20 "immigration cards" were drawn by 
computer on a single sheet of A4 paper, of which six said ENTERING (p), four 
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said TRANSIT (not-p), five included (q), and five did not include (not-q) 
"cholera" among a list of diseases (see Appendix). Using the enlarged array 
enabled the probabilistic manipulation to be inserted. It consisted of additional 
information about passengers' country of origin on the p and not-p cards: half 
gave a tropical country (e. g. Thailand) and half gave a European country (e. g. 
Germany). 
Procedure. The experiment was run during regular classes. Four different 
orders of cards drawn on the test sheets were used and allotted to subjects at 
random. Subjects were free to take as long as they liked over the task, and most 
completed it within 10 minutes. They were asked not to confer, and the 
experimenter was present to ensure this did not happen. At the end of the test 
session, the subjects were thanked and given a brief account of the purpose of 
the experiment. 
Results and Discussion 
Table I shows the percentage frequencies of selections of all cards for all 
sub ects. The numbers of not-p cards were so low that they have been pooled 
across the probability conditions. It can be seen that there were more overall 
selections of "Tropical" p cards compared with "European" p cards. Ile 
subjects were classified according to the numbers of "Tropical" and "European" 
p cards each selected: it was predicted that subjects would tend to select more 
"Tropical" cards. Nine subjects did so, eleven chose equal numbers of each, and 
none chose more "European" than "Tropical" cards (P = 0.002, one-tailed sign 
test). 
Thus the prediction of a difference in selections between p cards on 
probabilistic grounds has been upheld. It is not possible to compare these results 
directly with those of Cheng and Holyoak (1985), as these authors used a 
standard four-card array and did not report single card frequencies. Reading 
from their graph (1985, p. 401) it appears that about 90% of subjects produced 
TABLE 1 
Experiment 1 
P not Pq not-q 
ENTERING TRANSIT "CHOLERA" "CIIOLERA" 
Trop. Euro. (pooled) present absent 
98 57 65 67 
Percentage frequencies'of all cards selected by all subjects in Experimcnt I. 
N= 20 
For each subject there were 6p cards available (3 Tropical, 3 European), 4 
not-p cards (2 Tropical, 2 European), 5q cards, and 5 not-q cards. 
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the p, not-q solution in their immigration task with a rationale. This implies that 
their subjects produced a higher rate of p, not-q selections overall than did those 
in the present study. Consequently, it is not possible to tell from the present data 
whether the probabilistic factor led to a raising of the tendency to select 
"Tropical" p cards, or a lowering of the tendency to select "European" p cards. 
It was therefore necessary to run a second experiment including the large array 
but without the extra information about country of origin on the p and not-p 
cards. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The object of this experiment was to test whether the difference in selection 
frequencies between the high-probability "Tropical" p cards and the low- 
probability "European" p cards observed in Experiment I reflected a facilitation 
of selection of the former or a suppression of the latter. The probabilistic 
information on the p and not-p cards was therefore removed. In addition, the 
effect of a rationale passage in the instructions, which had been found to affect 
responses in Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) experiments, was assessed by 
including it or removing it. 
Method 
Subjects. Twenty-one first year undergraduate psychology students from the 
University of Wolverhampton participated on an unpaid volunteer basis. None 
had prior experience with the selection task. 
Design and Materials. The task used the same large array as in Experiment 
1, but without the country of origin on the p and not-p cards. The content of the 
instructional materials was the same, except that for 10 subjects, the rationale 
passage was included in the instructions, whereas for II subjects it was ornitted. 
Procedure. Subjects were allocated at random to the rationale/no rationale 
conditions. As before, testing took place during regular classes and was 
conducted as in Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 2 gives the percentage selection frequencies for all subjects for the four 
types of card: each subject could select up to six p cards, four not-p cards, five 
q cards, and five not-q cards, The main object of interest here is the frequency 
of selection of the p cards. We can see that they compare closely with the 
frequency of selection of the "Tropical" p cards in Experiment 11, hence tile 
effect of the probability manipulation in Experiment I appears to be to suppress 
selection of the low-probability p cards rather than to facilitate selection of tile 
high-probability cards. This implies that immigration cards relating to 
279 
208 MANKTELOW, SUTHERLAND, OVER 
TABLE 2 
Experiment 2 
p not q not-q 
ENTERING TRANSIT 








Rationale passage omitted. N= 10 
98 2 45 50 
Percentage frequencies of all cards selected by all subjects in Experiment 2. 
For each subject in each condition there were 6p cards available, 4 not-p 
cards, 5q cards, and 5 not-q cards. 
passengers coming from implicitly low-risk areas were seen as less subjectively 
significant. 
The effects of varying the presence of the rationale passage are not clear. In 
Cheng and Holyoak (1985), presence of a rationale tended to increase the 
frequency of p, not-q selections, but there is little evidence of such an effect 
here, with not-q frequencies around 50% in both conditions, and selections of p 
cards slightly lower with a rationale. There were also more q selections in this 
experiment than in Experiment 1, indicating that the lack of a clear connection 
between a rationale and specific probability and utility information produced 
more variable performance. It is also possible that the enlarged array contributed 
to this effect, especially compared to standard four-card versions: there were 
five times as many cards to choose from. The detailed relation between large- 
array selection tasks and the traditional four-card forrnat will have to await 
systematic experimental work with indicative sentences and pcrliaps abstract 
materials; that was not the focus of the present research. 
To explore further the effect of the interaction of the rationale with the 
information on the cards, a third experiment was run in which the rationale was 
omitted, but this time the country of origin infon-nation was reinstated. 
EXPERIMENT 3f 
The object of this experiment was to test whether the probability effect-the 
suppression of selection of instances where cholera is less common-requircs a 
link between an explicit rationale setting out the probability and utility structure 
of the scenario and corresponding information in the problem content. 111c 
rationale passage in the instructions, given in the report of Experiment I 
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contains both utility and probability elements in its first and second sentences 
respectively. It states that the subjects are particularly concerned to keep people 
infected with cholera out of their country, and that this disease is particularly 
common in tropical countries. In technical terms, the rationale could be the basis 
of an expected utility judgement, namely that there is a relatively high expected 
cost in not examining people from tropical countries. To sýe whether subjects 
need to be overtly cued to this rationale, the instruction materials omitted it, and 
the large array including country of origin information, used in Experiment 1, 
was employed. 
Method 
S LI - ubjects. Fifteen first-year undergraduate psychology students from the 
University of Wolverhampton participated on an unpaid volunteer basis. None 
had prior experience of the selection task. 
Design and Materials. The design and materials of Experiment I were used, 
with the exception of the rationale passage in the instructions, - which was 
omitted. 
Procedure. Again, the experiment was run during regular classes and 
conducted as with Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 3 gives the percentage selection frequencies of all cards for all subjects. 
With respect to the high/low probability p cards the results could not be clearer: 
the frequencies were exactly the same, and were at the "non-suppressed" level 
of the high-probability p cards in Experiment 1. In fact, -all but one of the 
sub ects selected all six p cards; the other selected none. j 
In addition, it can be seen that there is no clear difference between the not- 
q and the q cards, following the trend established in Experiment 2. It therefore 
TABLE 3 
Experiment 3 
p not q not-q 
ENTERING TRANSIT 








Percentage frequencies of all cards selected by all subjects in Experiment I 
N= 15. 
For each subject there were 6p cards available (3 Tropical, 3 European), 4 
not-p cards (2 Tropical, 2 European), 5q cards, and 5 not-q cards. 
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appears once again that explicit representations of utility for at least one of the 
parties portrayed in a deontic reasoning task are required for clear patterns of 
inference to be displayed (cf Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Manktelow & Over, 
1992; Platt & Griggs, 1993). In the present case, the same goes for the effects 
of probability. 
One final issue remains for this set of studies: so far, we have reported cases 
where possibly significant information is on the p and not-p cards. It remains to 
be seen whether such information on the q and not-q cards will also affect 
selections. 
EXPERIMENT 4 
This experiment involved a repeat of Experiment 1, except that the country of 
origin information was this time given on the q and not-q cards instead of the 
p and not-p cards. There is some indication from previous work that probability 
judgements affect inferences that correspond to such choices in the selection 
task. Byrne (1989) found a marked effect of additional premises on the 
corresponding modus tollens inference in indicative conditional syllogisms (see 
also Stevenson & Over, 1995). Strictly speaking, this work is only suggestive. 
One cannot straightforwardly refer to the modus tollens and modus ponens 
inferences in an indicative task as equivalent to the corresponding inferences in 
a deontic task, as deontic conditionals are not truth-functional, as shown by the 
use of modal auxiliaries in their conclusions. The correspondent to modus 
tollens here would be to infer "should not enter" from "cholera not mentioned", 
whereas the correspondent to modus ponens would be to infer "should mention 
cholera" from "entering". As we also explain later, we doubt that subjects could 
correctly solve a deontic selection task just by activating some mental deontic 
logic, which would be a formal way of reasoning taking nothing frorn the 
problem content about probability and utility. Subjects could, however, 
implicitly conform to some of the principles of a deontic logic. 
Method 
Subjects. Twenty-one first- and second-year undergraduate psychology 
students from the University of Wolverhampton participated on an unpaid 
volunteer basis. None had prior experience of the selection task. 
Design and Materials. The instructional passages were as in Expcrit'nent 1. 
The card array contained an extra q and not-q card, making six in each case, so 
that half could be given Tropical and half European countries of origin; there 
were still six p items and four not-p, but this time without country of origin 
information. 
Procedui-e. The experiment was again run during regular classes and 
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Results and Discussion 
Table 4 gives the percentage frequencies of selections of all cards for all 
subjects. The predicted difference between the not-q cards can be seen: there 
were fewer selections of "European" not-q cards than of "Tropical" not-q cards. 
Subjects were classified according to whether they chose more "Tropical" or 
"European" not-q cards, and as predicted, there was a tendency for more 
subjects to favour the former over the latter: six did so, none did the reverse, and 
the remainder chose equal numbers (P = 0.016, one-tailed sign test). Comparing 
the not-q frequencies with those in Experiment 1, we see again the apparent 
difference in subjective relevance between the high-probability "Tropical" cards 
and the low-probability "European" cards: the latter's selection has been 
suppressed. 
The frequencies of q selections have returned in this experiment to the low 
levels observed in Experiment 1, compared to the higher levels (around 50%) 
seen in Experiments 2 and 3. Experiments I and 4 are the ones in which all the 
elements of the task, both the instructional material and the card information, are 
in place; Experiments 2 and 3 both leave out aspects of one or the other. It 
would appear, then, that there needs to be clear congruence between the task 
components for this response, which cannot reveal a potential violation of the 
stated rule, to be eliminated. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
These experiments clearly demonstrate that probabilistic factors as well as utility 
judgements play an important role in de'Ontic thought. In Experiment I it was 
shown that the choice of true antecedent cards could be affected by probability 
and utility information, and Experiment 4 showed that choices of false 
consequent cards could be similarly affected. Experiments 2 and 3 provided 
evidence that the effect was to suppress selections of cards about people who 
TABLE 4 
Experiment 4 
not pq not-q 
ENTERING TRANSIT "CHOLERA" "CHOLERA" 
present absent 
Trop. Euro. Trop. Euro. 
96 1 16 13 67 40 
Percentage frequencies of all cards selected by all subjects in Experiment 4. 
N= 21. 
For each subject there were 6p cards available, 4 not-p cards, 6q cards (3 
Tropical, 3 European), and 6 not-q cards (3 Tropical, 3 European). 
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were unlikely to be carrying a disease. The possibility is therefore that selections 
are being mediated by differing subjective expectations of low-probability and 
high-probability items: it is not so much that high-probability items somehow 
acquire extra value, but rather that low-probability items are deemed to be of 
less value. 
One obvious difference between this and other forms of the selection task 
which needs to be taken into account, as we saw in discussing the results of 
Experiment 1, is the enlarged array. Its use here was motivated primarily by a 
methodological concern: to enable us to include a probabilistic, vari able within 
the task. However, the selection task normally only involves "one shot" at each 
contingency., The only exception in the literature is the so-called RAST 
(Reduced Array Selection Task), in which subjects are presented with repeated 
instances of just the q and not-q items, hence its name. One property of this form 
of the task is that most subjects at some stage produce "facilitated" performance, 
i. e. cease examining the q items and focus just on the not-q items (see Wason 
& Green, 1984). Note that the RAST asks subjects to make repeated 
observations concerning an inference, and therefore differs radically from the 
requirements of the standard selection task. Moreover, Gigerenzer (e. g. 1993) 
has argued persuasively that people are natural "frequent ists" in their decision 
making: their behaviour corresponds more closely to normative prescriptions 
when making judgements about frequencies than about single events. These 
considerations would lead one to expect, all else being equal, "facilitated" 
performance with large array selection tasks; however, we have seen that 
subjects' choices are still prone to probabilistic effects. This conclusion is not 
damaged by the differences between the standard task and the large-array 
version used here. 
The rationale manipulated in these experiments made statements about both 
utility and probability-it referred to a concern to keep cholera, out of the 
country and claimed that this disease is common in tropical countries. It may be 
that stressing the utility side of this rationale alone would have had some effect. 
Subjects might not need to be given frequency information, about where cholera 
is common, for them to make appropriate probability judgements and to tend not 
to choose "European" p cards. They might have heard several reports of cholera 
in tropical countries, or even just read one particularly striking report, and 
consequently judge that people from such countries are more likely to have 
cholera than people from European countries. That is, ail availability or 
vividness heuristic might lead subjects to make this judgement even in the 
absence of frequency information. The effect of these possible heuristics in 
deontic selection tasks will have to be examined in future work, and could 
provide a further link with the decision-making literature. (See Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982, on these heuristics. ) 
Our findings concur with the results of the only other study of probabilistic 
effects in deontic selection tasks known to us. Kirby (1994) used the drinking- 
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age task devised by Griggs and Cox (1982). Subjects were cued to the 
perspective of a security officer checking for violations of the following rule: if 
a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 21 years of age. 
Originally, the pot-q card showed an age near to that specified in the rule, e. g. 
19. Kirby ingeniously added two other not-q cards, showing "12 years" and "4 
years". He predicted, and observed, that there would be fewer selections of not- 
q cards as the stated age decreased, because subjects would simply not see the 
point of checking whether a young child was drinking beer: it is an intrinsically 
unlikely occurrence, in most people's experience. Here again we have a 
probability judgement combined with a utility one: the expected cost of missing 
a 4-year-old beer drinker is less in Kirby's rationale than that of missing a 12- 
or 19-year-old beer drinker. 
Kirby discusses his results in terms of subjective relevance, which has also 
been applied to selection tasks by Evans (1989,1995), Legrenzi, Girotto, and 
Johnson-Laird (1993), and Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (in press). Legrenzi et al. 
prefer the term "focusing", but Evans (1995) argues that the differences between 
their idea and that of relevance is largely terminological. For Legrenzi et al., 
subjects in a deontic selection task focus on, or see as relevant, cards that might 
reveal a violation of the rule they are given. This means that the subjects 
explicitly represent the violations in their mental models, and that is why they 
select the cards that they do. We would ask why the focusing happens in the first 
place, or why certain possible outcomes are seen as relevant to a question about 
violation. There has to be something significant in a "violation" before a 
question about it has the right effect (Kirby, 1994; Manktelow & Over, 1992). 
Sperber et al. put it in a word by saying that the violation cases are made 
relevant by being made "undesirable" in some rationale. In more technical but 
equivalent terms, these cases have relatively low utility. What our experiments 
here show is that relatively low expected utility also has an effect. Even more 
generally, what is probabilistically relevant, i. e. infon-nation that raises or lowers 
the probability of a proposition in question, is bound to be a major factor in what 
is pragmatically relevant. 
Legrenzi et al. (p. 39) make the point that human reasoners seem to be 
"inferential satisficers", who will not go on thinking once they find a conclusion 
which "fits the available facts", with the "potentially disastrous consequence of 
overlooking the correct conclusion". In the deontic domain we have explored 
here, the potential error is that of letting a person with a deadly disease, acquired 
by chance in a low-risk area, enter the country. Of course, one could argue that 
it is sometimes rational, and an efficient use of one's time, to ignore the 
possibility of such an error if its utility x its probability, i. e. its expected cost, 
is low enough. 
There is evidence in our data that there are two distinct groups of subjects: 
those who will tend to turn over just "Tropical" p or q cards, and those who will 
tend to turn over all the p or q cards. About half the subjects in Experiments I 
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and 4 fell into either category. One group of subjects might have interpreted the 
rule they were given as being without exceptions. Ile other might have inferred 
from the context that they were being implicitly given two rules: one stating that 
they had an obligation to inspect visitors from tropical countries, and the other 
that they just had pen-nission to check those from European countries. If this is 
the right way to look at the experiments, we would ask why these different 
interpretations existed. All the subjects are asked, by the rationale, to take the 
point of view of a customs officer, and the difference between them could reflect 
judgements about how such officers should rationally allocate their time. That 
is, the different groups of subjects might have had different interpretations of the 
rule because of their different expected utility judgements. It will be interesting 
to explore the psychological differences between these groups in future research; 
at present, generalisation from these findings must be treated cautiously in view 
of the one type of content we have used. An obvious step would be to construct 
scenarios that were less dependent on subjects' world knowledge, as did Cheng 
and Holyoak (1985) and Manktelow and Over (1991), among others. 
Our current findings are clearly consistent with the views of Legrenzi et al. 
(1993), and provide evidence for probability judgements as an important 
influence on which items become focused upon, and hence explicitly 
represented. In mental model terms, it appears that the relevance of the low- 
probability items remains implicit for some subjects, while high-probability 
items form part of an explicit representation that delivers the required selections. 
We favour an account of deontic thought that employs mental models, at least 
in part. (See Manktelow & Over, 1995 for more details on our approach, which 
is influenced by that of Johnson-Laird & Byme, 1991, but distinct from it, as is 
clear from Johnson-Laird & Byme, 1992, and Manktclow & Over, 1992. )
Mental models represent states of affairs, and can be naturally extended to 
represent preferences between those states and the probabilities of them. 
To follow this approach, however, one does not have to suppose implausibly 
that people naturally assign numbers for utilities and probabilities to tile states 
they represent, nor that they always conform to the probability calculus or 
normative decision theory. People could give some vague order to their mental 
models without using precise numbers, but indicating that some of these were 
more preferable or probable than others. They might also tend to focus on costly 
outcomes that they seem at risk of suffering, in order to avoid them or take 
corrective action. That would give them some tendency to loss aversion in 
deontic selection tasks, and there is some evidence that this exists. (See 
Manktelow & Over, 1990, and Kirby, 1994; on loss aversion in a descriptive 
decision theory, see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979. )
Some other theoretical points can be made in conclusion. The probabilistic 
effects demonstrated here, along with those of subjective utility and social role 
demonstrated in earlier research (reviewed in Manktelow & Over, 1995)9 pose 
problems for some of the approaches that have previously been invoked to 
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explain performance in realistic forms of the selection task. For instance, the 
results are very hard to interpret from a purely mental-logic point of view. One 
of the main advocates of this view has argued that the standard selection task 
has nothing to say about logical reasoning because it is too difficult to enable 
subjects to parade their skills (O'Brien, 1995). However, he says little about 
those forms of the task, principally deontic forms, in which people do produce 
clear selection patterns that can be shown to be rational, to some extent, by a 
decision-theoretic analysis (see Evans et al., 1993). 
It is unclear how a mental logic approach could accommodate the 
demonstrated effects of subjective probability, as well as those of subjective 
utility and social perspective. There are indeed deontic logics, but these sanction 
few inferences, and a mental version of any we know would not go very far in 
explaining the richness of ordinary deontic reasoning. This kind of practical 
reasoning is often, we repeat, much more closely related to the kind of 
judgement found in decision making than it is to what mental logic theorists call 
"reasoning". It must go way beyond mere formal, content-independent 
inference, as it can only be done well by making probability and utility 
judgements about content-rich special cases. (See Stevenson & Over, 1995, on 
the problems mental logic has in accounting for the way probability judgements 
affect indicative or theoretical reasoning. ) 
Ile approach that inspired much of the research on deontic reasoning, that of 
Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas, initiated by Cheng and Holyoak (1985), is 
similarly silent on the effects of probability. However, it does hold that 
regulations are laid down by authorities to achieve goals, such as that of keeping 
deadly diseases out of a country. The production rules in the schemas refer to 
actions in their consequents that are to be taken as steps towards these 
presupposed goals. This aspect of this work has received little attention in the 
literature, although it has recently become more explicit (Holyoak & Clieng, 
1995). It is through the idea of a goal underlying deontic reasoning that an 
extension of this approach can be related to decision making, and could possibly 
account for our results. A goal people have in some context is simply an 
outcome they prefer to others, and one that they think they will probably attain 
by taking certain steps. It may be that production rules are not activated, in some 
context, if the steps they refer to seem unlikely to lead to the given goal. Thus 
some subjects might not have used certain production rules in our experiments 
because they judged that the goal of keeping cholera- out the country was not 
best served by examining "European" cards. 
It is true that, in our scenario, no qualifications arc made to the immigration 
regulation. Even so, authorities who lay down rules often expect people to make 
qualifications and work out exceptions to the rules for themselves. Without this, 
many rules would be tremendously complex, and applying them without 
exception would still be counterproductive at times. The goal of most traffic 
regulations, for example, is to prevent death and injury on the roads while 
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keeping vehicles moving. These cannot be too complex if they are to be 
remembered quickly and applied efficiently, but no matter how complex they 
became, there would always be cases when breaking them would prevent an 
accident that conforming to them would cause. In more technical words, good 
deontic reasoning is highly non-monotonic, and the "disabling conditions" for it 
are excuses and mitigating circumstances (Over & Manktelow, 1993). General 
rules can be laid down and applied easily in many circumstances, but sometimes 
we need to withdraw a deontic conclusion we have inferred from the rules after 
learning more about a particular case. People do this, in that case, precisely to 
help them achieve the goals that the rules are there to serve in general. They are 
able to do this, we would contend, because they can grasp the goals, by 
modelling states of affairs, and can make special utility and probability 
judgements to achieve them in exceptional cases. 
Whether the type of production rules employed by Cheng and Holyoak can 
fully account for deontic reasoning is still an open question. Our results here 
show that this approach has to take account, in some way, of probabilistic 
factors, and it has to find a way of making its production system non-monotonic. 
There are also questions about the'production rules themselves, which seem to 
be more like deontic conditionals than rules in a standard production system. 
Cheng and Holyoak's production rules have the deontic tenns "must" and "may" 
in them, and some of the antecedents begin with "if the action is to be 
taken .. . ", which is an implicitly deontic construction. It is unclear what logical 
or computational system underlies these rules (Over & Manktelow, in press). 
Finally, this whole approach seems to imply that subjects examine all the cards 
and perform deontic inferences about all of them. There is evidence that subjects 
do not do this, but instead focus on or see as relevant only those cards that may 
reveal a significant violation (Evans & Clibbens, in press). 
People may well make use of some kind of schemas in their deontic 
reasoning, but our position is that at least the underlying representations are best 
captured by mental models. We hold that people need to model states of affairs 
to have preferences among them and to make probability judgements about 
them. They are also able to model the preferences and probability judgements 
of other people, with other views or perspectives, including those with authority 
and power. They then have goals, whether directly their own or taken from 
authorities, for the actions they perforin. Any possible schemas, inferences, or 
actions in the world are seen as significant if they seem likely to help to achieve 
these goals. This whole process is at the basis of deontic thought: it tells us what 
rules to accept, and when exceptions to them are appropriate. Throughout this 
process, subjective judgements are necessary. That is why people can differ so 
much in their deontic thought, as revealed in these experiments in the different 
ways subjects respond to "European" cards. Obtaining a proper account of this 
process will only be possible if work on deontic reasoning is further integrated 
with that on decision making. 
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APPENDIX 
i 
The enlarged array of cards used in Experiment 1, with country or origin added 
to the p and not-p items. In Experiment 4, this information was added instead 
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